Showing posts with label Washington Mutual. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Washington Mutual. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 26, 2013

Wamu, Chase and the decision that can change lives

Sadly I have said this all along.


It is obvious that documents were produced for Shack to issue these rulings. The affidavits to which he refers should be obtained in their entirety. There is lots to take away from this decision, but most important, is that Chase never acquired the loans from WAMU. The loans originated or acquired by WAMU were already sold to investors, trusts and Fannie or Freddie. The issue with Fannie and Freddie of course is that they were merely fronting for "private label" securitizations hiding behind the veil of the GSE's who were mere guarantors and not lenders. I'd like to see any agreement and transactional documents showing the alleged purchase by Fannie, but it is presumed in the Shack Order and Findings.
It is also obvious that the finding that Chase was not the owner of the debt at any time came from an admission from both a Fannie Mae representative in an affidavit from an alleged Fannie Mae representative. We should direct discovery in Chase cases to that person in Fannie Mae who says they acquired the subject debt and that Chase merely received the servicing rights in the Chase-WAMU merger.
Note that Fannie Mae is considered by Shack to have acted in bad faith, and that Fannie was less than forthcoming in its description of itself stating that they might be the owner or they might be the trustee (pursuant to the Master Trustee Agreement published in 2007) for a securitized trust. Note also that Fannie at no time was chartered as a lender. Thus it could not originate any loans and never did so. The vagueness with which Fannie Mae addresses the issue of ownership shows that the hiding and non-disclosure in bankruptcy courts and state courts continues across the country.
The admission from Fannie that they "might" be the Master trustee for allegedly securitized assets (debts arising out of fictitious transactions on paper that looked like mortgage loans) is both alarming and encouraging. The rush to foreclosure is partially explained by this chaotic pile of fraudulent paper trails.
When you take into account the non stop servicer advances, you can see what the parties are hiding --- that the real creditor on those debts, has been paid all the interest they were expecting, that the principal is being paid in settlements with pennies on the dollar, and that the default alleged in notices from servicers and informing the borrower of the right to reinstate were defective, to wit: that the amount stated as required to cure the alleged default was and remains incorrect. The amount should have been reduced by third party payments including but not limited to the servicer advances which were not loans, and thus could only be characterized as PAYMENT, which is the ultimate defense against a lawsuit or any enforcement mechanism designed to collect a debt.
The dirty little secret is that they diverted title and money from the investors and converted what could have been a secured loan into an unsecured loan. The advances and payments by third parties satisfied the debt that arose when the borrower took the loan. They in turn MIGHT have claims for contribution or unjust enrichment but they are most certainly not protected by a pledge of collateral either as mortgage or assignment of rents or anything else.
Note that it could not have acquired loans except with money from what were represented as securitized trusts with Fannie as master Trustee. Therefore there are no circumstances under which Fannie or Freddie could be owners of the the debt with rights to enforce except upon the only event in which money is paid by Fannie for the loan --- a guarantee payment AFTER FORECLOSURE) that is the only transaction permitted under its charter. This point was missed by Shack or ignored by him, because he had bigger fish to fry --- the lawyers for Chase itself with a copy of the order to be served upon Jamie Dimon, the head of Chase.
The fact is that with the WAMU bankruptcy, seizure by OTS and appointment of FDIC, there were no assignments, agreements of sale or even a permission slip under which Chase could or did acquire loans from WAMU. But that didn't stop Chase from claiming exactly that in tens of thousands of foreclosures.
In cases where Chase is allegedly at the root of title through the merger with WAMU, it would be appropriate to site to the Shack case, get the case documents, get a Title and Securitization report (see http://www.livingliesstore.com) and lawyers should look into a motion for summary judgment, or a motion for involuntary dismissal with prejudice. Even where Chase might allege that it is filing the foreclosure as a representative of Fannie or Freddie, the basis for that allegation needs to be in their pleading or it is not an ULTIMATE fact upon which relief could be granted. Discovery should be aimed at getting the documents upon which Chase allegedly relies in showing that it has the authority to represent Fannie --- and don't stop there. The truth is that nearly all the so-called Fannie and Freddie loans were veils for the private label securitization in which the money was diverted from the trust, as was the title, leaving Fannie and Freddie as well as the investors and the buyers holding nothing.
In cases where the statute of limitations has already run, the dismissal of the foreclosure action, is barred in most cases from ever being brought again by anyone. But the dismissal against Chase should be with prejudice in all events because it isn't the creditor and therefore does not satisfy the statutory requirements in Florida, and I presume all other states, to submit a credit bid at auction in lieu of cash.
The Judges are beginning to understand that by applying basic contract law, they can clear their dockets. It is up to us to help them. The offer of a loan was met with acceptance by the borrower but the loan never occurred. The transfers also had offer and acceptance but again no money because the investors' money was used (outside the trust) directly to fund the origination or acquisition of the loan. This was part of a larger scheme to defraud to investors whose money was to have been deposited into the trust and then used to fund origination or acquisition of the he loans within 90 days (the cutoff).
The investment bank fraudulently induced (see complaints filed by investors, insurers, government guarantee entities etc.) the investors to give them money for an investment into a controlled trust when in fact they diverted the money for their own purposes, taking outsized fees for themselves as the toxic loans materialized to "support" the alleged investment into loans. That is the "mismanagement" part of investors' allegations --- diversion of money into a PONZI scheme.
The investment bank fraudulently diverted title to the loans to strawman entities or were --- sometimes even by name (see American Brokers Conduit) --- mere conduits for undisclosed third party lenders. The argument that the parties managed to hide this from the borrower long enough for the statute of limitations to run out on TILA claims is an affront to the court system and to the statutory scheme enacted by Congress to protect borrowers from predatory lenders and "steal" deals where huge fees were taken, rather than earned, without disclosure to the Borrower.
So the first element of fraud alleged by investors is diversion of the the money. The second is diversion of the paperwork that would have protected the investors at least to some extent. In this scheme title to the loan papers was intentionally diverted from the owners of the the debt, thus rendering the so-called mortgage documents unenforceable --- all alleged by investors, insurers and other co-obligors who have discovered to their chagrin that each of them paid the investment bank 100 cents on the the dollar on each loan multiple times.
And yet borrowers continue to seek modifications, which means they are not looking for free houses. Even knowing they are dealing with criminals the borrowers are willing to start paying these thieves if the terms can be adjusted to give them the benefit of the bargain that was intended at origination of the purchase money mortgage or refinancing or second mortgage or HELOC.
That leaves the servicers and their lawyers being the only ones who want Foreclosures because they want a free house and/or they want the foreclosure to recapture Servicer advances to the creditors --- advances that vastly reduce the amount owed and which cure the alleged borrower default. That has now become a foreclosure folly in which the servicers and their lawyers are the only parties who want it. The investors don't care because they are getting settlements for the fraud of the investment banks for creating unenforceable loan documents (that are frequently enforced anyway because of judicial ignorance) and diversion of investor money.
In the end, the "clean hands" that Shack talks about are clearly absent from both Servicer and government sponsored entities and as judge Shack states in his decision, wrongdoers should not be permitted to profitf or their wrongdoing. If that means a windfall to the borrower, so be it. It can be likened to the old usury laws and the current usury laws where the principal of the debt is wiped out and the fraudster is hit with a judgment for three times the principal, three times the interest or both.

Thursday, September 19, 2013

Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist JPMorgan Chase

Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-And-Desist Order
 http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70458.pdf


Its also time they do an internal audit of all of Washington Mutual and Long Beach Loans that Chase has. Also the Washington Mutual (WAMU) SEC Filings, as well as Long Beach Mortgages
This is long overdue. 

Wednesday, September 18, 2013

Looking for answers

Hi everyone,
This is a long shot , but hoping someone will know . I am looking for employees of Dana Capital , mostly a man named Joe. He would of worked for them in 2004. I want to know if he knows if my note was securitized . I am sure he will.

Dana Capital Group
Category: Mortgage Brokers 
8001 Irvine Center Drive
Irvine, CA 92618

I am also looking for investors for this security

Roosevelt Mortgage ( bought the loans from Archbay Mortgage LLC 2010B) This would be in Jan- Feb of this year. The actual sale was Dec.29. 2012.
Rushmore - Servicer
US Bank Corp - Trustee 

Inside this security is a loan , stating its worth 180,000.00 , this is NOT true, the house is worth 116,000.00. Their are 3 liens on this house, one is a US FEDERAL Lien for 201,000.00, Plus 32,000.00 Tax lien ( not for the house) and a 19,000.00 lien for Beneficial. 

Their is also , questions concerning the actual ownership of this loan. It was originally with Long Beach Mortgage in 2004- 2010. According to land records. However DB Structured Products claimed to of bought it in Sept 2006, but their is no assignment, no land records , nothing they proved to of bought it. In 2010 Deutsche Bank sold it to Archbay holdings LLC 2010B, with a robo signed document, yet, never showed how they were able to sell it, when no land records showed they owned it . ( title now no good) Than in 2011 Chase  claims to own it, ( received by Washington Mutual) Archbay and Deutsche Bank lawyers also have a robo signed assignment signed 6 years after the fact , stating it came from Chase, which Chase has also denied in doing, and was to be sent back to a M.E. Wilderman at Orion Financial group. ( 2nd title defect) Archbay never showed how they were able to buy it, also , why would they request an emerg assignment from Chase , if they in fact had all the required paperwork to buy it? Why robo signed? Why an incomplete assignment? Why if Chase did this , they state they didn't?  Now it was sold to Roosevelt mortgage Dec 29, 2012. 

I want to buy the house and pay in cash . Or I go to federal court and everyone loses. This house has been in foreclosure since May 2006, my only fault was taking on this loan when I didn't have to , and all I wanted was to know who owned it to pay for it. I never asked for a free ride , every work out was walked away from , not by me.

Please contact me , if you can help in this matter.








Monday, September 9, 2013

Pay up Jamie.

JPMorgan Should Not Have To Pay For The Sins Of Bear Stearns And Washington Mutual


The government is in overkill mode toward JP Morgan Chase. It should not have to pay for the lousy mortgage securities foisted on FNMA and Freddie Mac by Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual. Those two firms needed to be absorbed by a stronger partner in the 2007-2008   financial crisis. And that stronger partner, JP Morgan, did not have the time to discover exactly what spurious securities it was putting on its own balance sheet.
Why should JP Morgan pay for crimes it did not commit itself?  After all, these lousy securities were not sold by JPM to the housing authorities. They could properly argue they were not aware of all the troubles they were assuming in the bailouts of these two troubled firms.
To my way of thinking JP Morgan should pony up whatever losses the bank caused for FNMA and Freddie Mac for the mortgage securities its own employees put together and flogged for prices that were not going to stand up in the meltdown. That would be a fair assumption of guilt to make good on.
Overkill is not called for here. Yes, the regulators are late on the curve for going after the big banks for their sins. The government has looked bad  spending hundreds of billions to save Wall Street  in order for the banks to show extraordinary profits, while the middle class was getting squeezed and unemployment was really 14%.
Playing catch up appears to have infected some regulators with the revenge factor. That’s understandable. The public have been waiting 4 long years for retribution against Wall Street. As the biggest target, JP Morgan must pay a whopping fine for falsely reporting the loss on the “London whale” trades made with the bank’s own money. This is fair and square. After all, it underscores the  finding that the risky, highly leveraged proprietary trading by too-big-to-fail banks is a real danger to the system. Rogue traders with access to a vast pool of money and poorly supervised can indeed cause mayhem. Dimon had no effective risk control system and no 24 hour a day 7 days a week scrutiny of all the bank’s positions. More than sloppy. Pay up Jamie.
The government appears to be in overkill mode as the public has been braying for blood from the too-big-to fail banks they helped survive with transfusions of hundreds of billions of bailout money. This is understandable in the sense of the revengeful feelings of the middle class and the people who are out of work and out of home.
The baring of JP Morgan’s errors and omissions and false reporting of the losses from the  huge illiquid trades in London do require a meaningfully huge financial penance. The invulnerability of boss Jamie Dimon has put him in a very unfavorable spotlight. The government should demand retribution for the crimes committed by The House of Morgan, not two mediocre financial institutions picked up on the cheap when the world was falling apart.


E-Mails Imply JPMorgan Knew Some Mortgage Deals Were Bad

E-Mails Imply JPMorgan Knew Some Mortgage Deals Were Bad

Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan's chief. The bank is being sued over mortgage-backed deals.J. Scott Applewhite/Associated PressJamie Dimon, JPMorgan’s chief. The bank is being sued over mortgage-backed deals.
When an outside analysis uncovered serious flaws with thousands of home loans, JPMorgan Chase executives found an easy fix.
Rather than disclosing the full extent of problems like fraudulent home appraisals and overextended borrowers, the bank adjusted the critical reviews, according to documents filed early Tuesday in federal court in Manhattan. As a result, the mortgages, which JPMorgan bundled into complex securities, appeared healthier, making the deals more appealing to investors.
The trove of internal e-mails and employee interviews, filed as part of a lawsuit by one of the investors in the securities, offers a fresh glimpse into Wall Street’s mortgage machine, which churned out billions of dollars of securities that later imploded. The documents reveal that JPMorgan, as well as two firms the bank acquired during the credit crisis, Washington Mutual and Bear Stearns, flouted quality controls and ignored problems, sometimes hiding them entirely, in a quest for profit.

The lawsuit, which was filed by Dexia, a Belgian-French bank, is being closely watched on Wall Street. After suffering significant losses, Dexia sued JPMorgan and its affiliates in 2012, claiming it had been duped into buying $1.6 billion of troubled mortgage-backed securities. The latest documents could provide a window into a $200 billion case that looms over the entire industry. In that lawsuit, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, has accused 17 banks of selling dubious mortgage securities to the two housing giants. At least 20 of the securities are also highlighted in the Dexia case, according to an analysis of court records.
In court filings, JPMorgan has strongly denied wrongdoing and is contesting both cases in federal court. The bank declined to comment.
Dexia’s lawsuit is part of a broad assault on Wall Street for its role in the 2008 financial crisis, as prosecutors, regulators and private investors take aim at mortgage-related securities. New York’s attorney general, Eric T. Schneiderman, sued JPMorgan last year over investments created by Bear Stearns between 2005 and 2007.
Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan’s chief executive, has criticized prosecutors for attacking JPMorgan because of what Bear Stearns did. Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in October, Mr. Dimon said the bank did the federal government “a favor” by rescuing the flailing firm in 2008.
The legal onslaught has been costly. In November, JPMorgan, the nation’s largest bank, agreed to pay $296.9 million to settle claims by the Securities and Exchange Commission that Bear Stearns had misled mortgage investors by hiding some delinquent loans. JPMorgan did not admit or deny wrongdoing.
“The true price tag for the ongoing costs of the litigation is terrifying,” said Christopher Whalen, managing director at Carrington Investment Services.
The Dexia lawsuit centers on complex securities created by JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual during the housing boom. As profits soared, the Wall Street firms scrambled to pump out more investments, even as questions emerged about their quality.
With a seemingly insatiable appetite, JPMorgan scooped up mortgages from lenders with troubled records, according to the court documents. In an internal “due diligence scorecard,” JPMorgan ranked large mortgage originators, assigning Washington Mutual and American Home Mortgage the lowest grade of “poor” for their documentation, the court filings show.
The loans were quickly sold to investors. Describing the investment assembly line, an executive at Bear Stearns told employees “we are a moving company not a storage company,” according to the court documents.
As they raced to produce mortgage-backed securities, Washington Mutual and Bear Stearns also scaled back their quality controls, the documents indicate.
In an initiative called Project Scarlett, Washington Mutual slashed its due diligence staff by 25 percent as part of an effort to bolster profit. Such steps “tore the heart out” of quality controls, according to a November 2007 e-mail from a Washington Mutual executive. Executives who pushed back endured “harassment” when they tried to “keep our discipline and controls in place,” the e-mail said.
Even when flaws were flagged, JPMorgan and the other firms sometimes overlooked the warnings.
JPMorgan routinely hired Clayton Holdings and other third-party firms to examine home loans before they were packed into investments. Combing through the mortgages, the firms searched for problems like borrowers who had vastly overstated their incomes or appraisals that inflated property values.
According to the court documents, an analysis for JPMorgan in September 2006 found that “nearly half of the sample pool” — or 214 loans — were “defective,” meaning they did not meet the underwriting standards. The borrowers’ incomes, the firms found, were dangerously low relative to the size of their mortgages. Another troubling report in 2006 discovered that thousands of borrowers had already fallen behind on their payments.
But JPMorgan at times dismissed the critical assessments or altered them, the documents show. Certain JPMorgan employees, including the bankers who assembled the mortgages and the due diligence managers, had the power to ignore or veto bad reviews.
In some instances, JPMorgan executives reduced the number of loans considered delinquent, the documents show. In others, the executives altered the assessments so that a smaller number of loans were considered “defective.”
In a 2007 e-mail, titled “Banking overrides,” a JPMorgan due diligence manager asks a banker: “How do you want to handle these loans?” At times, they whitewashed the findings, the documents indicate. In 2006, for example, a review of mortgages found that at least 1,154 loans were more than 30 days delinquent. The offering documents sent to investors showed only 25 loans as delinquent.
A person familiar with the bank’s portfolios said JPMorgan had reviewed the loans separately and determined that the number of delinquent loans was far less than the outside analysis had found.
At Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual, employees also had the power to sanitize bad assessments. Employees at Bear Stearns were told that they were responsible for “purging all of the older reports” that showed flaws, “leaving only the final reports,” according to the court documents.
Such actions were designed to bolster profit. In a deposition, a Washington Mutual employee said revealing loan defects would undermine the lucrative business, and that the bank would suffer “a couple-point hit in price.”
Ratings agencies also did not necessarily get a complete picture of the investments, according to the court filings. An assessment of the loans in one security revealed that 24 percent of the sample was “materially defective,” the filings show. After exercising override power, a JPMorgan employee sent a report in May 2006 to a ratings agency that showed only 5.3 percent of the mortgages were defective.
Such investments eventually collapsed, spreading losses across the financial system.
Dexia, which has been bailed out twice since the financial crisis, lost $774 million on mortgage-backed securities, according to court records.
Mr. Schneiderman, the New York attorney general, said that overall losses from flawed mortgage-backed securities from 2005 and 2007 were $22.5 billion.
In a statement shortly after he sued JPMorgan Chase, Mr. Schneiderman said the lawsuit was a template “for future actions against issuers of residential mortgage-backed securities that defrauded investors and cost millions of Americans their homes.”

Saturday, August 10, 2013

JP Morgan,Chase,Washington Mutual , Long Beach Mortgage What they have in common

No Jamie, your not responsible for anything that goes wrong. The housing collapse, the fraud committed with Washington Mutual  and Long Beach mortgages, YOU had in your possession, Your employees even stated , yes, in writing to the VT AG and the OCC and a lawyer, Yes, we own both loans, and sent copies of both the mortgage and the note and the HUD paperwork. A year later , suddenly, whoops, we don't own the first, but we do have the second, and were gonna write the second one off as paid and satisfied . So , how did you also have in hand BOTH a year earlier? How was it also, it showed up in a private hedge funds hands a year and a half later, when after 7 years only you were able to show proof of both notes? How many other people who had Washington Mutual  and Long Beach notes did you fraud this way?

You SIR need to go to jail with no pass. Instead of throwing your employees under the bus, how about being a man, and taking responsibility for your wrong doings for a change? I forgot, your no man, your a coward. Your karma will come ..its a matter of time. Your no different than Bernie Madoff .. except your fraud has gone global, and he paid for his crimes and you run from it.

Two former JPMorgan Chase employees are expected to be arrested for their role in the so-called "London Whale" scandal that lost the bank roughly $6.2 billion last year, The New York Times reports. The arrest of the employees, Javier Martin-Artajo and Julien Grout, will reportedly take place in London.
Not among those expected to be charged is the London Whale himself, one Bruno Iksil, who built up the massive positions in the derivatives market that eventually cost the bank billions, according to a Reuters report published Thursday. According to a later report, Iksil will have to play a key role in any arrests related to the scandal.
On Thursday, Reuters reported that JPMorgan, the largest bank in the country by assets, was close to a settlement with the Securities and Exchange Commission over the scandal in which the bank would admit fault, a relative rarity on Wall Street.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation and federal prosecutors are separately investigating whether company employees underrepresented the scandal's potential fallout to investors in a 2012 meeting, according to a separate New York Times report.
The company's chief executive officer, Jamie Dimon, early on described the scandal as a "tempest in a teapot," an opinion he later described as "dead wrong," according to the Wall Street Journal. But Dimon has maintained that he did not purposefully deceive anyone with his initial comments. "There was no hiding, there was no lying, there was no bullshitting, period," he said of the scandal In June.

Friday, August 9, 2013

HOW THE SCAM WAS PLAYED


LET ME EXPLAIN SOMETHING I AM LEARNING ABOUT DEUTSCHE BANK, LOOK FOR YOUR ORIGINAL LOAN , FOR EXAMPLE:
IF YOUR ORIGINAL LOAN WAS SAY FROM AMERICAN HOME, BUT YOU REFINANCED THE HOME WITH WASHINGTON MUTUAL, WHO BOUGHT THE LOAN, LOOK FOR YOUR LOAN FROM THE ORIGINAL ORIGINATOR WHICH WOULD BE AMERICAN HOME. THIS IS HOW THE PONZI SCAM WAS PLAYED FORWARD. EVEN IF LETS SAY :
THE ORIGINAL WAS SOLD TO AMERICAN HOME, WHICH WAMU REFINANCED , AND THAN SOLD TO DEUTSCHE BANK, STILL LOOK BACK TO THE ORIGINATOR OF THE LOAN , WHICH IS AMERICAN HOME. THIS IS WHY PEOPLE CAN'T FIND THEIR HOMES INFO ON THE SEC SITE , START FROM THE BEGINNING AND FOLLOW IT.



Certificates in the Deutsche Alt-
A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR5 and/or the Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mortgage
Loan Trust 2006-AB4 between May 1, 2006 through May 30, 2007, inc
.
The table below sets forth the specific tranches, by CUSIP number, of Certificates in each
Trust
TABLE A
TRANCHE
CUSIP
1.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IA1< This is the TRANCHE INFO
25150NAA2 <THIS IS THE CUSIP NUMBER
2.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IA2
25150NAB0
3.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IA3
25150NAC8
4.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IA4
25150NAD6
5.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM1
25150NAE4
6.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM2
25150NAF1
7.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM3
25150NAG9
8.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM4
25150NAH7
9.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM5
25150NAJ3
10.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM6
25150NAK0
11.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM7
25150NAL8
12.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM8
25150NAM6
13.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM9
25150NAN4
14.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM10
25150NAP9
15.
DBALT 2006-AR5 II1A
25150NAT1
16.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIM
25150NAZ7
17.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIB1
25150NBA1
18.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIB2
25150NBB9
19.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIPO
25150NAW4
20.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIX2
25150NAY0
21.
DBALT 2006-AR5 II2A
25150NAU8
22.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIX1
25150NAX2
23.
DBALT 2006-AR5 II3A
25150NAV6
TRANCHE
CUSIP
27.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A1C
251513AT4
28.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A2
251513AU1
29.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A3
251513AV9
30.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A3A1
251513AW7
31.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A3A2
251513AX5
32.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A4A
251513AY3
33.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A4B
251513AZ0
34.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A4C
251513BA4
35.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A5
251513BB2
36.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A6A1
251513BC0
37.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A6A2
251513BD8
38.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A7
251513BE6
39.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M1
251513AA5
40.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M2
251513AB3
41.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M3
251513AC1
42.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M4
251513AD9
43.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M5
251513AE7
44.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M6
251513AF4
45.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M7
251513AG2
46.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M8
251513AH0
47.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M9
251513AJ6
48.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M10
251513AK3
49.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M11
251513AL1
24.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A1A
251513AQ0
50. DBALT 2006-AB4 M12
251513AM9
25.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A1B1
251513AR8
51. DBALT 2006-AB4 M13
251513AN7
26.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A1B2
251513AS6
52. DBALT 2006-AB4 M14
251513AP2


HERE IS ALSO THE LISTING OF 1105 FILLINGS - THAT WERE DEUSTSCHE BANK- DB STRUCTURED PRODUCTS- ACE-DBALT-MORTGAGEIT
http://regab.db.com/

Thursday, August 8, 2013

#AskObamaHousing

Well, so he answered some questions, but here's some more.
 #AskObamaHousing- President Obama, what is being done, about these private hedge funds, that suddenly come up with false paperwork that has been missing for years, with no assignments , no Allonge, nothing to show where they got them from and courts allowing this as proof , they own a note?

#AskObamaHousing -President Obama, Land records not recorded to show proof of ownership, and Judges FIXING them, this clearly shows Title Fraud, and leaves the homeowners in a situation of someone coming back to them, down the road creating more problems. The homeowners have a right to know who has their homes, and this is being denied by Judges across the country, and here in VT.

#AskObamaHousing -President Obama, What about Chase and the FDIC , allowing foreclosures of Washington Mutual and Long Beach Notes, that clearly were not there's to begin with? Example# Yes, we OWN both your  notes ( Chase explains) they send you all the paperwork, the note, the mortgage, HUD papers. Everything is now in order and for the first time in 5 years , someone actually shows they own the note and mortgage Started in Sept 2006- Its now Summer of 2011 . Yet, the Judge who never saw this paperwork, allows in Dec 2008, Deustsche Bank to intervene saying, we bought the note in Sept 2006, yet, no land records recorded, no papers to show proof, no Bill of Sale that directly showed ownership ( they will make some up in 2012) Than in 2010 sells the note , still not showing how they bought it, to Archbay Holdings LLC 2010B - and than they sign land records, ( which still clearly show on the town records Long Beach Mortgage owns its , and this is in 2010) Their is NOTHING  on the record that shows Deutsche Bank ever owned this note or was given to them by, Washington Mutual, Long Beach or Chase, Yet, the Judge allows Archbay to intervene.. still no proof of ownership. ( private Hedge fund that failed in 2012, and was taken over by York who funded it and removed all employees and CEO) Than after almost a year of Chase saying they owned it, they come back and say Oh, we made a mistake , were sorry,. we never owned the first note or had it in our possession! HUH? Yet, they sent all the papers and even CC the VT States Attorney and the OCC in 2011 , telling them as well they owned it. Suddenly, Archbay sells it to Roosevelt Mortgage and low and behold they have ALL the paperwork in 2013~The Judge sees it , and gives them my home! I have spent over 70,000.00 and I didn't get a federal bail out check, because I believed Chase! I am now selling my business to save my home, because all my savings , EVERYTHING is gone, because of of theft and loading the courts with paperwork to stall, for 7 years! Not to mention a Judge who just wanted this over , not allowing my lawyer or I to see how this note went from Long Beach to ending up in Roosevelts hands with all the documents that were never there before., or allowing me my rights to appeal. 
I was charged for insurance ( I had insurance) Its an outrageous sum.
I was charged 365.00 for a drive by appraisal ( he stated the house was worth 160,000.00- 165,000.00 when a honest appraiser came just a year and a half before and appraised it at 117,000.00. )
 OH, and I forgot to mention, how Chase in late 2012 stated after reviewing there records-AGAIN - nothing ever showed of a sale to Deutsche Bank only servicing transferred to Select Pro-Folio Services on Oct 2006, in which Washington Mutual remained as Master Servicer, which is how Chase had the original documents to begin with! Not to mention , how, even Select Pro-Folio Services lawyer never heard of Deutsche bank owning the note in OCT 2008. 
So whats your take on this question President Obama?  
 
 #AskObamaHousing -President Obama,Are you aware of the many frauds still happening in this country? My answer is NO. People are subject to this still , happening NOW, and its being done by Hedge Funds being funded by the BIG Banks to hide the fraud and are still taking peoples home! What is being done about this? I know , NOTHING!



 #AskObamaHousing -President Obama- How about you, come to these actual foreclosures, or with the Sheriffs and see for yourself the abuse actual homeowners you FORGOT, are enduring. Or how about you tell the children and the families, that nobody will work with you , because they want the homes because they can't rewrite these notes! How about YOU, take a stand for these people, like you promised during the re-election.

#AskObamaHousing -President Obama- I forgot to mention to you, I went looking for these people myself  and to try and find the truth of who owned my home in 2008, because I knew when Deutsche Bank stepped in, something was wrong, I thought I found it when Chase said after 5 months of looking , that they owned my home and, even told my lawyer they owned my note  and  would work with me to  fix the problems so I could pay for it, see I wasn't  trying to do anything but PAY for my home , that was over appraised by Long Beach appraisers, and nobody would let me.. Nobody wanted my money, just my home. 
I also forgot to mention that a week after Chase claimed they made a mistake , satisfied the second mortgage paid in full and stated it on the credit report and with town records as well . Not a dime was paid for it , but they wrote it like it was and did I forget to mention how Long Beach still has an open foreclosure on record for the first note that dates back to May 2006? So this ends my story.. but sir, there are millions more.  
It would be nice to have these questions answered - #AskObamaHousing


Obama Takes to Social Media to Address Housing Issues

Social_Media_Block_Letters
President Barack Obama, fresh off discussing the potential elimination of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, discussed his housing plan online, fielding questions from Vine, Twitter and other social media outlets using the hashtag #AskObamaHousing for a virtual roundtable discussion. Questions for the President began pouring in well before the designated start time and varied from topics, such as cities facing monumental foreclosures (like in Detroit), to what proposed initiatives have been outlined for those with already-existing portfolios. While the President was unable to field every question, he answered quite a few.
Calling the roundtable, A Better Bargain, the President, along with Zillow CEO Spencer Rascoff moderated the event. While some of his answers were fairly standard, the President tackled a few curveballs, notably indicating that he is still pushing for a government refinance program, with interest rates being so low.
Obama also praised those who wish to rent, which he describes as a “safe” alternative to purchasing a home. Not long after giving that response, Obama answered a question regarding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with "You can't have a situation in which the government is underwriting and guaranteeing all the mortgage lending,” adding, “The private market can step in and do a good job and government can be a backstop." This is, of course, alluding to the work that Sens. Tim Johnson (D-SD) and Michael Crapo (R-ID) have been doing in their efforts to outline the potential dissolving of the GSEs.
The President also indicated that change isn’t immediate and that new laws and regulation could take time. The concept of shocking the market with such an abrupt change isn’t something that anyone in the Obama White House is looking to do.
"This is something that would have to be phased in,” Obama said.
Obama also put an emphasis on the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Bureau's push towards transparency. "The more knowledge consumers have the more empowered they are going to be,” Obama said.

Friday, August 2, 2013

The courts are finally getting it! I hope VT listens.

n the other hand we should not assume that they have arrived nor that this decision will have pervasive effects throughout California or elsewhere in the United States or other countries.
J.P. Morgan did suffer a crushing defeat in this decision. And the borrower definitely receive the benefits of a judicial decision that will allow the borrower to sue for wrongful foreclosure including equitable and legal relief which in plain language means reversing the foreclosure and getting damages. Probably one of the most damaging conclusions by the appellate court is that an examination of whether the loan ever made it into the asset pool is proper in determining the proper party to initiate a foreclosure or to offer a credit bid at a foreclosure auction.  The court said that alleged transfers into the trust after the cutoff date are void under New York State law which is the law that governs the common-law trusts created by the banks as part of the fraudulent securitization scheme.
Before you give them a standing ovation remember that it is possible for additional documentation to be created, fabricated and forged showing that despite the apparent violation of the cutoff date, the trustee has accepted the loan into the trust. This will most likely be a lie. I don't think there is any entity acting as trustee of a trust that doesn't know that it is under intense scrutiny and doesn't want to be subject to liability that could amount to trillions of dollars advanced by investors with the purchase of bogus mortgage-backed bonds that were presumably managed by the trustee but in reality not managed at all  because the bonds were worthless. This gave the banks the opportunity to claim that they owned the bonds and therefore had an insurable interest which gave rise to the whole problem with AIG and AMBAC and other insurers or parties who had guaranteed the bond, the loan or any loss (credit default swaps).
The fact that the loan in this case was definitely securitized is also interesting. Of course Washington Mutual was stating to everyone that it was not involved in the securitization of mortgage loans when in fact nearly all of the loans originated became subject to claims of securitization. This case explains why I never say that the loan was securitized or that the loan was in any particular trust, to wit: I don't believe that a funded trust exists with the ability to purchase loans and therefore I don't believe the loans are in any of the asset pools. So when people ask me how they can prove which trust their loan is actually in, I reply that they are asking the wrong question.
What is being played out here in this case and hundreds of thousands of other cases is a representation by the foreclosing entity that the trust owns the loan when in fact it never owned the loan nor could it because the money that was advanced by investors was never deposited into the trust. We have the same banks representing to regulatory authorities and insurers that it is the bank and not the trust that owns the loan even though the bank merely made the loan using money advanced by investors who believed that they were buying mortgage-backed bonds. The truth is they were merely making a deposit into an account maintained by the investment bank. The resulting transactions do not qualify for exemption as securities or insurance under the 1998 law. Nor do they qualify for REMIC treatment under the Internal Revenue Code.
In other words if you take a close look and actually follow the path of the money and the path of the paper you will find that despite the pronouncements from the Department of Justice and other agencies, this is a simple fraud case using a Ponzi model. The hallmark of a Ponzi model is that it collapses as soon as the investors stop buying the bogus securities. If the government cares to do so it can freely prosecute the individuals and companies involved without any air of exemption under the 1998 law because none of the parties followed the securitization path presumed by the 1998 law. So we are back to this, to wit: a security is a security and subject to SEC regulations and insurance is an insurance contract subject to insurance regulators, and fraud is fraud subject to recovery of restitution, compensatory damages, punitive damages, treble damages etc.
You should remember when reading this decision that the appellate court was not ruling in favor of the borrower granting the substantive relief the borrower  was seeking. The appellate court merely reversed the trial court decision to dismiss the borrower's claims. That only means that the borrower now as an opportunity to prove the elements of quiet title, wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, cancellation of instruments and relief under California's version of unfair business practices. But the devil is in the details and proving the case requires aggressive discovery and aggressive preparation for trial. It is highly probable that the case will settle. The bank will probably be willing to pay almost any amount of money to avoid a judgment setting forth the elements of a wrongful foreclosure and how the bank violated the law.
The Bank will attempt to avoid any final order that undermines the value of loans that are subject to claims of securitization, because those loans supposedly support the value of the bogus mortgage-backed bonds sold to investors.  Any such final order would also undermine the balance sheet of J.P. Morgan and any other major bank carrying the mortgage bonds as assets on their balance sheet. If those assets are diminished, then the bank is not as well funded as it has been reporting. In fact, those assets might well vanish completely from the balance sheet of those banks, causing the banks to be seized by the FDIC and broken up into smaller pieces for regional and community banks to pick up. Hence this decision represents a risk factor that could eliminate the legal fiction created by smoke and mirrors from Wall Street banks, to wit: it is not the borrowers who are deadbeats, it is the banks who are broke and whose management has run off with billions and perhaps trillions of dollars that should be in the United States economy. The absence of that money lies at the root of our unemployment and low economic activity.
This Glaski case has many of the elements that we have been discussing for years. Fabricated documents, forgeries, perjury, false affidavits and no money trail to backup the story painted by the fabricated documents. And of course it has our old friend Washington Mutual Bank And the supposed take over by Chase Bank that never actually happened.
And it involves the issue of assignments and the fact that the assignment is not the transaction itself but only a report of a transaction. If the borrower proves that the transaction reported in the assignment or other instrument of conveyance never occurred, or if the borrower is successful in shifting the burden of proof to the bank to show that it did occur, the assignment will have no value whatsoever unless the transaction is present, to wit: that someone actually purchased the loan through the payment of money or other valuable consideration that was received by a party who actually owned the loan.
Thus even if Chase Bank were able to show that it entered into a transaction in which the loans were transferred (something we can find no evidence of which the FDIC receiver says never occurred) that would only be the equivalent of a quit claim deed, to wit: whoever received the consideration for the transfer of the loans was merely conveying any interest they had even if they had no interest at all. Hence the transactions by which Washington Mutual allegedly came to be the owner of the loan must be examined in the same way as the transaction between the Washington Mutual bankruptcy estate and chase bank.
You should also take note that the decision was published with the admonition that it is  "not to be published in the official reports."  this is further indication that the court is concerned about the far-reaching effects of the decision and essentially tells trial judges that they do not have to follow it. So for those who wish to point to this decision and say "game over" we are not there yet. But I do think that we passed the halfway point and we are probably in the fifth or sixth inning of a nine inning game. Translating that to time, I would estimate that it's going to take another three or four years to clean up this mess and that it might take several decades to clean up the title corruption that was created by the banks.

Wednesday, July 31, 2013

Another great post by Neil Garfield

Perils of Pooling: OneWest

by Neil Garfield
Apparently my article yesterday hit a nerve. NO I wasn't saying that the only problems were with BofA and Chase. OneWest is another example. Keep in mind that the sole source of information to regulators and the courts are the ONLY people who understand mergers and acquisitions. So it is a little like one of those TV shows where the only way they can get an arrest and conviction is for the perpetrator or suspect to confess. In this case, they "confess" all kinds of things to gain credibility and then lead the agencies and judicial system down a rabbit hole which is now a well trodden path. So many people have gone down that hole that most people that is the way to get to the truth. It isn't. It is part of a carefully constructed series of complex conflicting lies designed carefully by some very smart lawyers who understand not just the law but the way the law works. The latter is how they are getting away with it.
Back to OneWest, which we have detailed in the past.
OneWest was created almost literally overnight (actually over a weekend) by some highly placed players from Wall Street. There is an 80% loss sharing arrangement with the FDIC and yes, there appears to be some grey area about ownership of the loans because of that loss sharing agreement. But the evidence of a transaction in which the loans were actually purchased by a brand new entity that was essentially unfunded is completely absent. And that is because OneWest and Deutsch take the position that the loans were securitized despite IndyMac's assurances to the contrary. The only loans in which OneWest appears to be a player are those in which the loan was subject to (false) claims of securitization. No money went to the trustee, no money went to the trust, no assets went into the pool because the REMIC asset pool lacked the funding to purchase any assets.
Add to that a few facts. Deutsch is usually the "trustee"of the REMIC asset pool, but Reynaldo Reyes says he has nothing to do. He has no trust accounts and makes no decisions and performs no actions. Sound familiar. I have him on tape and his deposition has already been taken and publicized on the internet by others. Reyes says the whole arrangement is "counter-intuitive" (a very creative way of saying it is a lie). It is up to the servicer (OneWest) to decide what loans are subject to modification, mediation or even reinstatement. It is up to the servicer as to when to foreclose. And the servicer here is OneWest while the Master Servicer appears to be the investment banking arm of Deutsch, although I do not have that confirmed.
The way Reyes speaks about it the whole thing ALMOST makes sense. That is, until you start thinking about it. If Deutsch Bank has an extensive trust subsidiary, which it does, then why is a VP of asset management in control of the trust operations of the REMIC asset pools. Answer: because there are no funded trusts and there are no asset pools with assets. Hence any statement by OneWest that it is the owner of the loan is untrue as is the allegation that Deutsch is the trustee because all trustee duties have been delegated to the servicer. That leaves the investor with an empty box for an asset pool and no trustee or manager or even an agent to to actually know what is going on or who is monitoring their money and investments.
Note that like BOfA using Red Oak Merger Corp., there is the creation of a fictional entity that was not used by the name of, no kidding, "Holdco." This is to shield OneWest from certain liabilities as a lender. Legally it doesn't work that way but practically it generally does work that way because judges listen to bank lawyers to tell them what all this means. That is like asking a 1st degree murder defendant to explain to the jury the meaning of reasonable doubt.
Now be careful here because there is a "loan sale" agreement referenced in the package posted by the FDIC. But it refers to an exhibit F. There is no exhibit F and like the ambiguous agreements with the FDIC in Countrywide and Washington mutual, there are words there, but they don't really say anything. Suffice it to say that despite some fabricated documents to the contrary, there is no evidence I have seen that any loan  receivable was transferred to or from a REMIC asset pool, Indy-mac, or Hold-co.
These people were not stupid and they are not idiots. And their lawyers are pretty smart too. They know that with the presumption of a funded loan in existence, the banks could pretty much get away with saying anything they wanted about the ownership, the identity of the creditor and the ability to make a credit bid at the auction of a property that should never have been foreclosed in the first instance --- and certainly not by these people.
But if you dig just a little deeper you will see that the banks are represented to the regulatory authorities that they own the bonds (not true because the bonds were created and issued to specific investors who bought them); thus they include the bonds as significant items on their balance sheet which allows them to be called mega banks or too big to fail when in fact they have a tiny fraction of the reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve which follows the Basel accords.
Then when you turn your head and peak into courtrooms you find the same banks claiming ownership of the loan receivable, which was created when the funding occurred at the "closing" of the loan. They know they are taking inconsistent positions but most judges lack the sophistication to pinpoint the inconsistency. And that is how 5 million people lost their homes.
On the one hand the banks are claiming there was no fraud in the issuance of mortgage backed bonds by a REMIC asset pool formed as a trust. In fact, they say the loans were transferred into the REMIC asset pool. Which means that ownership of the mortgage bonds is ownership of the loans --- at least that is what the paperwork shows that was used to sell pension funds on buying these worthless bogus bonds. Then they turn around and come to court as the "holder" and get a foreclosure sale in which the bank submits the credit bid and buys the property without spending one dime. What they have done is, in lay terms, offered the debt to pay for the property. But the debt, according to the same people is owned by the investors or the REMIC trust, not the banks.
Then they turn to the insurers and counterparties on credit default swaps, and the Federal reserve that is buying these bonds and they say that the banks own the bonds, have an insurable interest, and should receive the proceeds of payments instead of the investors who actually put up the money. And then they say in court that the account receivable is unpaid, there is a default, and therefore the home should be foreclosed. What they have done is create a chaotic complex of lies and turn it into an illusion that changes colors and density depending upon whom the banks are talking with.
There is no default on the account receivable if the account was paid, regardless of who paid it --- as long as it was really paid to either the owner of the loan receivable or the authorized agent of the owner (i.e., the investor/lender). And so it is paid. And if paid, there can be no action on the note because the loan receivable has been satisfied. There can be no action on the mortgage because it was never a perfected lien and because the loan receivable was extinguished by PAYMENT. You can't use the mortgage to enforce the note which is evidence for enforcement of a debt when the debt no longer exists.
Judges are confused. The borrower must owe money to someone so why not simply enter judgment and let the creditors sort it out amongst themselves. The answer is because that is not the rule of law and if a creditor has a claim against the borrower it should be brought by that creditor not some stranger to the transaction whose actions are stripping the real creditor of lien rights and collection rights over the debt. What the courts are doing, by analogy, is saying that you must have killed someone when you fired that gun so we will dispense with evidence and a jury and proceed to sentencing. We will let the people in the crowd decide who is the victim who can bring a wrongful death action against you even if we don't even know when the gun was fired and who pulled the trigger. In the meanwhile you are sentenced to death or life in prison under our rocket docket for murders of unknown persons.

Tuesday, July 30, 2013

The never ending lie


Perils of Pooling

by Neil Garfield

We hold these truths to be self evident: that Chase never acquired any loans from Washington Mutual and that Bank of America never required any loans from Countrywide.  A review of the merger documents approved by the FDIC reveals that neither Chase nor Bank of America wanted to assume any liabilities in connection with the lending operations of Washington Mutual or Countrywide, or Long Beach Mortgage ,respectively. The loans were expressly left out of the agreement which is available for everyone to see on the FDIC website in the reading room.
With the exception of a few instances in which the court pointed out that Chase only acquired servicing rights and that Bank of America may not have acquired any rights, judges have been rubber-stamping foreclosures initiated by Bank of America (or entities controlled by Bank of America like Recontrust) under the assumption that Bank of America must be the owner of the Countrywide mortgages. The same is true  for judges who have been rubber-stamping foreclosures initiated by Chase under the assumption that Chase must be the owner of the Washington Mutual mortgages,and  Long Beach Mortgage. After all, if they don't own the mortgages then who does? The answer is that in nearly all cases either BofA nor Countrywide and neither Chase nor WAMU, nor Long Beach Mortgage, owned the loans and their financial statements prove it.
Not only have the judges been rubber-stamping the foreclosures and participating in a scheme that is correcting our title records nationwide, the entry of judgment against the borrower and for Bank of America or for Chase completes the theft of the investors money that was used for exorbitant fees, profits and bonuses and then finally for the funding of the origination or acquisition of loans. The fact that the REMIC trust was ignored in both form and content has also been the subject of the defective rulings from the bench.  Not only have the courts ruled against the borrowers and for the banks, they have even ruled against the presentation of evidence that would have shown that the investors were being stripped of their expected lien rights and then stripped again on their expected return of principal and interest, and then barred by collateral estoppel from ever bringing it up.
Since most of the foreclosures have emanated from Bank of America and Chase it is a fair assumption that most of the foreclosure sales were void because no valid bid was received in exchange for the deed. The property is still owned by the original homeowner In any case where a credit bid was submitted by Bank of America or Chase on any loan in which either Countrywide Mortgage or Washington Mutual,or Long Beach Mortgage was involved. I might add that the Federal Reserve in New York is completely aware of these facts and is steadfastly refusing to reveal the truth to the public or even to the homeowners whose homes were illegally and wrongfully foreclosed by Bank of America and Chase for a loan where both Bank of America and Chase and their chain of affiliates had been paid multiple times on a loan receivable account owned by the source of the funds, to wit: the investors who thought they were buying mortgage bonds from a funded legally organized REMIC trust.
CAVEAT:  The courts are mainly concerned with finality. In many states there may be a statute of limitations to challenge a void deed from an auction sale. Check with an attorney who is licensed in the jurisdiction in which your property is located before you take any action or make any decision.
It seems crazy to think that someone could apply for a loan and get the benefits of funding without ever being required to pay it back to the lender.  But that is exactly what is happening as a result of defective court decisions.  The lender consists of a group of investors including pension funds that are now underfunded as a result of the civil and possibly criminal theft of funds by Bank of America and Chase or the investment firms acquired by them.
Homeowners are being forced to pay Bank of America and Chase rather than the investors who actually advanced the funds. Bank of America and Chase actively interfere and Stonewall whenever a borrower or an investor seeks to peek under the hood to see what is in the box. There is nothing in the box. The deal was always between the investors and homeowners. The bank's lied. They pretended that they were the lenders when in fact there were only the intermediaries. The result was that all the payments received from borrowers, government, the federal reserve, insurers, guarantors, co-obligors, and counterparties on credit  default swaps went to the accounts of Bank of America and Chase rather than to the investors.
 By holding back the money, Bank of America and Chase, just like other banks created the illusion of a default and since they had created the illusion of ownership of the default they took the money instead of handing it over to the investors. You read the lawsuits that have been filed by  investors against the investment banks that sold them worthless mortgage bonds issued by an empty asset pool you will see that they allege affirmatively that the notes and mortgages are unenforceable.
That makes it unanimous! Both the lender and the borrower agree that the documentation is defective and unenforceable. Both the lender and the borrower agree that the lender should get paid.  And both the lender and the borrower agree that the lender is entitled to be paid only once for the money advanced by the lender.  And both the lender and the borrower agree that the banks are holding trillions of dollars in money that should have been used to pay off the account receivable owned by the investors.
With the lender paid off or where the account receivable has been reduced by payments to the banks who were acting as agents of the investors but breaching their duties to the investors, the amount payable by the homeowner as a borrower would be correspondingly reduced or eliminated. In fact, under the requirements of the federal truth in lending act, the overpayment is due to the borrower for failure to disclose the true facts of the transaction. In fact, under federal law, treble damages, legal interest, attorneys fees and costs probably also apply.

A CASE OF FRAUD


Case 1:12-cv-04761-JSR Document 39 Filed 02/04/13 Page 1 of 46
DEXIA SA/NV, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BEAR STEARNS & CO., INC, et al.,
Defendants
JPM, CHASE, WASHINGTON MUTUAL, DB STRUCTURED PRODUCTS, DEUTSCHE BANKS, LONG BEACH MORTGAGE,
http://sdnyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/12-Civ.-04761-2013.02.04-Opposition-to-Motion-for-Summary-Judgment.pdf


THIS STORY GOES WITH THE ABOVE


JPMorgan Hid Reports of Defective Loans Before Sales

JPMorgan Chase & Co. overrode an independent analysis of home loan portfolios by buying and selling defective loans to create a sanitized version of the pool, which was then securitized and sold, a court was told.
FSA Asset Management LLC, which bought the residential mortgage-backed securities that later collapsed in value, and its parent Franco-Belgian bank Dexia SA filed hundreds of e- mails and transcripts of employee interviews in federal court in Manhattan on Feb. 4, urging a judge not to throw out their lawsuit over the collateralized securities.
JPMorgan received reports from independent mortgage loan underwriters showing that 20 percent to 80 percent of the loans in samples used for testing didn’t meet the underwriting guidelines, including fraudulent home appraisals or missing documentation, FSA Asset Management, or FSAM, said in the filing.
“Rather than disclose these known defects to FSAM, defendants bought and sold massive quantities of defective loans,” FSAM said. “Defendants secretly overrode the independent loan underwriters’ determinations, creating a final, sanitized version.”
FSAM failed to expressly assign fraud claims related to the securities to Dexia, so the bank isn’t allowed to sue under New York law, JPMorgan said in a Jan. 21 filing, urging the judge to throw out the lawsuit without a trial.
FSAM also can’t sue because it had recovered the full purchase price of the securities it bought so it suffered no harm, JPMorgan said.
The plaintiffs purchased more than $1.6 billion of residential mortgage-backed securities in 51 offerings between 2005 and 2007, according to an amended statement of claim filed in New York State court in May. The purchases were made from JPMorgan and two banks the New York-based lender acquired during the 2007 credit crisis, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual.
“Defendants rehash the well-worn ‘don’t blame us, blame the financial crisis’ defense, which numerous courts have rejected,” Dexia said.
The case is Dexia SA v. Bear Stearns & Co. 12-cv-04761. U.S. District Court Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

Saturday, July 27, 2013

JPM: The Washington Mutual Story


by Josh Rosner - March 13th, 2013, 8:00am
 
 
 
inShare5

Josh Rosner (@JoshRosner) is co-author of the New York Times Bestseller “Reckless Endangerment” and Managing Director at independent research consultancy Graham Fisher & Co. He advises regulators, policy-makers and institutional investors on banking and financial services (a more complete bio appears at the end of this column).
This is part 2 of 5; Yesterday evening, we published the Introduction. We will be releasing a different part each evening and morning culminating in the release of Rosner’s complete report on Friday morning. On that date, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations will release their final report on JPM’s CIO Group (aka the London Whale).
~~~
We will address under-appreciated but material fundamental issues in a forthcoming report. Consistent with the purpose of this report we felt it important to consider outstanding internal control, headline and other extraordinary items that could materially impact JPM’s profitability and potentially highlight further breakdowns in controls.
Washington Mutual: a Story of Opacity and Impunity

Perhaps no other example illustrates JPMorgan’s scorched-earth legal approach better than the disputes over the estate of Washington Mutual (WaMu), which the firm acquired from the FDIC in September 2008. JPMorgan portrays its purchase of WaMu during the depths of the financial crisis as a patriotic act performed by a well-run bank. Its public statements and regulatory filings tell a different tale.
In August 2009, Deutsche Bank, as trustee for about $92 billion of notional WaMu securitizations, filed suit against the FDIC demanding the repurchase of billions of dollars of mortgages that they argued violated representations and warranties in the pooling agreement. The FDIC moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that JPMorgan had assumed the liabilities in the WaMu purchase. Consequently, Deutsche Bank amended its complaint to add JPMorgan[i]. JPMorgan is protected by a broad gag order that has sealed away, from public view, any internal communications on Washington Mutual. We have had to rely on public information and information provided as a result of freedom of information requests.
After several years of agreeing with the FDIC’s position and acknowledging that it acquired the mortgage liabilities of Washington Mutual[ii], JPMorgan appears to have changed its mind when it realized the enormity the industry’s mortgage putback risks[iii]. JPMorgan is now boldly demanding indemnification from the FDIC Insurance Fund.
JPMorgan, which in the aftermath of the financial crisis, accepted more than $391 billion of government emergency program support[iv], is seeking to shift losses on over $190 billion of Washington Mutual-related mortgage securities onto the FDIC – claiming that for a mere $1.9 billion it bought nearly all of the positive value of WaMu and was able to stick the public with essentially all of the ongoing losses. If the firm fails in these efforts it could be stuck with settlement costs on claims of between $3 and $5 billion. Unfortunately, a continued lack of clarity about the firm’s reserves coupled with recent plaintiff-friendly court rulings that may increase putback settlement costs make it difficult to assess whether JPMorgan is adequately reserved.
Since it began to deny its obligation, JPMorgan has repeatedly tried getting the FDIC to agree that it has approval to settle and then send the FDIC the bill.  The arrogance, impunity and extent to which lengths JPM’s lawyers go in attempts to saddle the FDIC with its own losses are amazing. In a strongly worded letter of response to JPM’s repeated attempts to fool the FDIC into stating or implying it accepted consent, the FDIC strongly states that it has not consented to any actions or inactions by JPM and that “insomuch as these assertions may have become boilerplate language in correspondence from this firm, please consider this letter to be the FDIC’s standing rebuttal” [v]. Still, recent press reports suggest that JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank are engaged in settlement talks and that JPM’s strategy may be to settle with the Deutsche Bank (Trustee) investors, indemnify those investors and have them file a claim against the FDIC for indemnification.
Even beyond losses on the $92 billion of original principal balance for which Deutsche Bank is trustee, there are losses associated with another $100 billion of WaMu mortgage securities over which either JPMorgan or the FDIC will ultimately be required to settle.
The Acquisition

In early 2008, JPMorgan began to do due diligence on Washington Mutual with an eye to acquiring the troubled but still solvent firm, but because of the potential for big losses at WaMu, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon chose not to move forward with an acquisition[vi]. Three months later, WaMu was bankrupt. As the FDIC began to plan for the closing and sale of WaMu, it offered bidders five possible transaction structures[vii], each with different levels of acquired liabilities.
On September 23 and 24, 2008, the FDIC negotiated over JPMorgan’s bid, which was for the acquisition of all of WaMu’s assets and liabilities except for the preferred stock, subordinated debt and senior debt of the bank[viii]. The deal structure that JPMorgan chose also required that the winning bid come at the least cost to the FDIC.

During the talks, JPMorgan sent an e-mail[ix] to the FDIC expressing concerns and seeking clarity about the “liabilities assumed by the assuming bank”[x] and expressed concern over the broadness of the provision[xi]. In a Q&A document released during the initial invitation to bid process, the FDIC made it clear that the obligations associated with mortgage securitizations would pass to the buyer[xii], their position did not change and JPMorgan did not receive the desired changes to the standard indemnification to protect itself against the liabilities associated with Washington Mutual’s mortgage securitizations. It couldn’t have been clearer that JPMorgan understood the liabilities it was accepting.
The FDIC did make limited changes to the standard bidding form, indemnifying the bank for up to $500 million for damages brought by Washington Mutual or third parties.[xiii] The agency also agreed to provide JPMorgan indemnification against mortgage-borrower (but not investor) claims[xiv], a frequent cause for concern in the fall of 2008.
On September 25, 2008, the FDIC announced that JPMorgan acquired the banking operations of Washington Mutual at no cost to the FDIC’s insurance fund [xv].  In an SEC filing that evening, JPMorgan said it “acquired all deposits, assets and certain liabilities of Washington Mutual’s banking operations from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), effective immediately. Excluded from the transaction are the senior unsecured debt, subordinated debt, and preferred stock of Washington Mutual’s banks. JPMorgan Chase will not be acquiring any assets or liabilities of the banks’ parent holding company (WM) or the holding company’s non-bank subsidiaries. As part of this transaction, JPMorgan Chase will make a payment of approximately $1.9 billion to the FDIC”[xvi].
Clearly, the FDIC and JPMorgan both intended and believed that all liabilities not specifically excluded were transferred. Had the FDIC believed otherwise it would have considered its potential exposures to retained liabilities in its announcement and, if there were other bidders, in its decision to award Washington Mutual to JPMorgan. After all, the FDIC has a statutory obligation to approve the least costly resolution.
Acknowledgment of WaMu Liabilities
When JPMorgan announced its earnings for the fourth quarter of 2008, Dimon proudly claimed that JPMorgan was “doing its part” to help stabilize the financial markets and hasten recovery. We assumed risk and expended resources to assimilate Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual.”[xvii] The comments make for a great patriotic sound-bite but deserve further scrutiny in light of the bank’s subsequent claim that it never acquired WaMu’s mortgage liabilities. After all, since the bank bought WaMu’s assets at book value and wrote the loan book down by $31 billion, it is hard to understand what risk it took if it didn’t acquire the liabilities relating to Washington Mutual’s securitization activities.
In a Jan. 9, 2009, SEC filing, Freddie Mac disclosed that “JPMorgan Chase will assume Washington Mutual’s recourse obligations to repurchase any of such mortgages that were sold to Freddie Mac with recourse. With respect to mortgages that Washington Mutual sold to Freddie Mac without recourse, JPMorgan Chase has agreed to make a one-time payment to Freddie Mac with respect to obligations of Washington Mutual to repurchase any of such mortgages that are inconsistent with certain representations and warranties made at the time of sale[xviii].” This filing, like several filings made by JPMorgan, demonstrate that the firm had recognized its obligations to repurchase WaMu-related mortgages sold to the GSEs[xix]. If, as JPMorgan now contends, these repurchase obligations were the rightful liabilities of the FDIC, then one must ask how the firm could legally have settled them on behalf of the FDIC. In fact, section 12.2(f) of the Purchase Agreement specifically protects the FDIC from paying for liabilities it did not assume by requiring that it consent to any settlement that would result in an indemnification obligation. 
Further supporting the argument that JPMorgan acquired the WaMu liabilities are SEC filings and presentations to shareholders by JPMorgan. In connection with 2010 earnings, the bank warned that “we and certain of our subsidiaries, as well as entities acquired by us as part of the Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual and other transactions, have made such representations and warranties in connection with the sale and securitization of loans (whether with or without recourse… Our obligations with respect to these representations and warranties are generally outstanding for the life of the loan, and relate to, among other things, compliance with laws and regulations; underwriting standards; the accuracy of information in the loan documents and loan file; and the characteristics and enforceability of the loan…. if a loan that does not comply with such representations and warranties is sold, we may be obligated to repurchase the loan and bear any associated loss directly, or we may be obligated to indemnify the purchaser against any such loss. Accordingly, such repurchase and/or indemnity obligations …acquired by us as part of the Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual and other transactions…could materially and adversely impact our results of operations and financial condition.” The essence was repeated in other filings as well[xx].
In November 2011, Judge Denise Cote[xxi]of the Southern District of New York  found that “JPMorgan does not directly contest the Amended Complaint’s detailed allegations that it has assumed WaMu Bank’s liabilities with respect to the securitizations at issue here.  Indeed, as the plaintiff points out, JPMorgan itself has publicly referenced its liability for ‘repurchase and/or indemnity obligations arising in connection with sale and securitization of loans’ by, among others, WaMu.  The FDIC has likewise opined that ‘the liabilities and obligations’ arising from WaMu’s sale of mortgage-backed securities ‘were assumed in their entirety by JPMC [(JPMorgan Chase)] under the P&A Agreement, thereby extinguishing any potential liability by FDIC Receiver.’ Thus, for the purposes of this motion, there is no dispute that JPMorgan is a proper defendant with respect to FHFA’s WaMu- related claims.” Did this finding cause JPMorgan to increase its litigation reserves? We do not know because their disclosures are inadequate.
Lack of Clarity on Reserving Policy
On the first quarter of 2010 earnings call, JPMorgan’s Michael Cavanagh noted that the bank had put up representation and warranty reserves for WaMu exposures related to both GSEs but acknowledged that the reserves were difficult to decipher, were in several pockets and he then informed investors that JPM would not give any more meaningful guidance or detail[xxii]. In a November 2010 presentation at a Bancanalysts Association of Boston Conference, a JPMorgan senior executive provided details of the Company’s “Private Label  Repurchase Risk Exposure” broken out by Chase, Bear and WaMu and by product type. Nowhere in this presentation did the firm disavow the liabilities or suggest that they were the liabilities of the FDIC[xxiii].
In January 2010, recognizing that JPMorgan’s disclosures were inadequate for investors’ ability to analyze its risks, the SEC sent a letter to Michael Cavanagh directing the bank to provide greater detail[xxiv] of their repurchase obligations. Again, rather than providing investors with the class-leading transparency JPMorgan often claims, the bank responded to the letter, in redacted form[xxv], requesting confidential treatment of certain portions of their response.
While, in the past the bank repeatedly acknowledged its acquisition of WaMu repurchase liabilities and initially included those in discussions of repurchase reserves, it appears those policies have not been consistent over time. Where earlier WaMu-related repurchase liabilities appear to have resulted in increased repurchase reserves it seems that once JPMorgan decided to assert that the WaMu repurchase liabilities as the FDIC’s obligation, the comparability of their already weak disclosures became even less analyzable.
New Mortgage Suits
In the past few months, a new round of mortgage-related suits were filed against the firm. investors, regulators, prosecutors, and insurers have filed a new round of claims against the bank related to billions of dollars’ worth of securities backed by residential mortgages.
On February 5, 2013, in the matter of Assured Guaranty v. Flagstar[xxvi], U.S. Southern District Court Judge Jed Rakoff appears to have created precedent by handing down a decision to allow staistical analysis provided by Assured’s independent auditor, rather than loan-by-loan analysis, to be a basis for findings of breaches to PSAs and Reps and Warranties in pooled mortgage loans. The auditor found that 606 of the sample of 800 loans across the trusts were found to have material breaches. While the ruling will likely be appealed, the reality is that it significantly heightens the risks to JPM and other defendants in putback litigations. It may also lead JPM to determine that they need to increase reserves.
In November 2012, CIFG Assurance sued JPM over more than $100 million of losses it sustained in CDOs. U.S. Bank, as Trustee, also filed suit[xxvii], claiming breaches of certain terms and conditions of the Pooling and Servicing Agreements (defining the parties’ obligations to each other) of an RMBS with $698 million of original principal balances suffered losses of $358 million. In a sample of the loans that defaulted, the plaintiffs claim that 74% had one or more breaches. Mortgage insurer Syncora Guarantee also filed suit[xxviii] claiming that, as a result of misrepresentations on almost 85% of the loans involved in the deal, Syncora has had to pay more than $94 million in claims to investors on losses of more than $111 million. The National Credit Union Administration Board filed suit against JPM on WaMu-related losses on almost 50 RMBS deals. In the filing, the NCUA demonstrates the massive difference between the expected losses and the actual losses in these deals[xxix]. This follows an NCUA suit filed against JPM relating to $3.6 billion of “faulty” securities related to JPM’s Bear Stearns acquisition.
In October 2012, the New York Attorney General, Eric Schneiderman, filed suit against JPM related to alleged misrepresentations in RMBS securities offerings, which are claimed to have resulted in $22.5 billion losses of the $87 billion in original principal value[xxx].
On February 4, 2013, related to a suit filed against JPMorgan by Dexia, Dexia released hundred of e-mails and employee interview transcripts suggesting that JPM received independent underwriter reports showing that between 8% and 20% of the loans sampled for inclusion in pools did not meet underwriting guidelines. Rather than disclose these defects to investors, JPM overrode the independent determinations to create a “final, sanitized version.”[xxxi]


[ii] http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2289737617x0xS950123-10-102689/19617/filing.pdf J P MORGAN CHASE & CO, “FORM 10-Q (Quarterly Report).” Last modified 2010. http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2289737617x0xS950123-10-102689/19617/filing.pdf. “From 2005 to 2008, Washington Mutual sold approximately $150 billion of loans to the GSEs subject to certain representations and warranties. Subsequent to the Firm’s acquisition of certain assets and liabilities of Washington Mutual from the FDIC in September 2008, the Firm resolved and/or limited certain current and future repurchase demands for loans sold to the GSEs by Washington Mutual, although it remains the Firm’s position that such obligations remain with the FDIC receivership. Nevertheless, certain payments have been made with respect to certain of the then current and future repurchase demands, and the Firm will continue to evaluate and pay certain future repurchase demands related to individual loans. In addition to the payments already made, the Firm has a remaining repurchase liability of approximately $250 million as of September 30, 2010, relating to unresolved and future demands on the Washington Mutual portfolio. After consideration of this repurchase liability, the Firm believes that the remaining GSE repurchase exposure related to the Washington Mutual portfolio presents minimal future risk to the Firm’s financial results.”
[iv] http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321506.pdf p.131 United States Government Accountability Office, “FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Policies and Processes for Managing Emergency Assistance.” Last modified 2011. http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321506.pdf .  p. 131.
[v] Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Identification Claims Letter.” Last modified 2012. http://www.scribd.com/doc/127203581/Fdic-Letter-to-Jpm-05-011-2012.
[vi]http://wmish.com/joshua_hochbergs_joke/epic_fail/4366/JPM_EX00004075.PDF Morgan Chase and Company, “Letter: (Fw: Meeting with Emilio Botin).” Last modified 2008. http://wmish.com/joshua_hochbergs_joke/epic_fail/4366/JPM_EX00004075.PDF.  (See: “Asked why did JP Morgan not buy Wamu and instead TPG injected the capital Jamie replied he thinks the potential losses are higher than TPG estimating plus their losses are limited to their initial equity investment unlike for JPMorgan or any other USA bank which has to mark to market and assign/inject additional capital accordingly”)
[vii] http://wmish.com/joshua_hochbergs_joke/epic_fail/4405/JPMCD_000001550.00001.pdfWashington Mutual Bank, “Various Documents.” http://wmish.com/joshua_hochbergs_joke/epic_fail/4405/JPMCD_000001550.00001.pdf.
All liabilities are assumed except the preferred stock.
All liabilities are assumed, except the preferred stock and the subordinated debt.
All liabilities are assumed except the preferred stock, the subordinated debt and the senior
 debt.
The acquirer assumes all deposits and secured liabilities.
All insured deposits and secured liabilities are assumed.

[viii] Insert link to p. 31 of Deutsche Bank Response to FDIC and JPM Motions (See: “Under this transaction, the Purchase and Assumption (Whole Bank), the Potential Acquirer whose Bid is accepted by the Corporation assumes the Assumed Deposits of the Bank and all other liabilities but specifically excluding the preferred stock, non-asset related defensive litigation, subordinated debt and senior debt, and purchases all of the assets of the Bank, excluding those assets identified as excluded assets in the Legal Documents and subject to the provisions thereof.”)
[ix] p. 31 of Deutsche Bank Response.
[x] http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/Washington_Mutual_P_and_A.pdf
(See p.8) Whole Bank, “PURCHASE AND ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT.” Last modified 2008. http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/Washington_Mutual_P_and_A.pdf . (See: p. 8)
[xi] See p. 32 Deutsche Bank Response (See: ” Let’s say there is a contract between the thrift and the Parent and that is included in the Books and Records (not something like “accrued for on the books of the Failed Bank,” which probably would fix the problem) of the thrift at the time of closing. Any liability under that contract is then arguably a liability reflected in the Books and Records. Therefore one would most likely conclude that liabilities under that contract are assumed under 2.1. . . . In a normal P&A between commercial parties this is not something a buyer would ever assume and it really doesn’t make sense (nor frankly is it fair) here.”)
[xii] Deutsche response p. 33 (See: “9. Are the off-balance sheet credit card portfolio and mortgage securitizations included in the transaction? Do you expect the acquirer to assume the servicing obligations? If there are pricing issues associated with the contracts (e.g., the pricing is disadvantageous to the assuming institution), can we take advantage of the FDIC’s repudiation powers to effect a repricing?
Answer: The bank’s interests and obligations associated with the off-balance sheet credit card portfolio and mortgage securitizations pass to the acquirer. Only contracts and obligations remaining in the receivership are subject to repudiation powers.”)
[xiii] http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/Washington_Mutual_P_and_A.pdfWhole Bank, “PURCHASE AND ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT.” Last modified 2008. http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/Washington_Mutual_P_and_A.pdf.  (See: Section 12.1(a)(9) )
[xiv] Ibid. (See: “any liability associated with borrower claims for payment of or liability to any borrower for monetary relief, or that provide for any other form of relief to any borrower . . . related in any way to any loan or commitment to lend made by the Failed Bank prior to failure, or to any loan made by a third party in connection with a loan which is or was held by the Failed Bank, or otherwise arising in connection with the Failed Bank’s lending or loan purchase activities”)
[xv] http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08085.html Gray, Andrew. Federal deposit Insurance Corporation, “JPMorgan Chase Acquires Banking Operations of Washington Mutual.” Last modified 2008. http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08085.html .
[xvii] http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2313711404x0x264159/4c69348f-3ee3-4117-bc1b-45a61e2963a4/4Q08-Earnings-Press-Release-Final.pdf  JP Morgan Chase and Company, “JPMORGAN CHASE REPORTS FULL-YEAR 2008 NET INCOME OF $5.6 BILLION, OR $1.37 PER SHARE, ON REVENUE OF $67.3 BILLION; FOURTH-QUARTER 2008 NET INCOME OF $702 MILLION, OR $0.07 PER SHARE.” http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2313711404x0x264159/4c69348f-3ee3-4117-bc1b-45a61e2963a4/4Q08-Earnings-Press-Release-Final.pdf .
[xviii] http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026214/000102621409000005/f71045e8vk.htm  US Securities and Exchange Commission, “FORM 8-K, CURRENT REPORT, Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .” Last modified 2009. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026214/000102621409000005/f71045e8vk.htm .
[xix] http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000095012310016029/e82150e10vk.htm (See p5 US Securities and Exchange Commission, “Form 10-K, Annual report pursuant to section 13 or 15(d) ofThe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (JPMorgan Chase & Co.).” Last modified 2009. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000095012310016029/e82150e10vk.htm . (See p.5 “If a loan does not comply with such representations or warranties is sold or securitized, we may be obligated to repurchase the loan and bear any associated loss directly, or we may be obligated to indemnify the purchaser against any such losses. In 2009, the costs of repurchasing mortgage loans that had been sold to government agencies such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae increased substantially, and could continue to increase substantially further. Accordingly, repurchase and/or indemnity obligations to government-sponsored enterprises or to private third-party purchasers could materially and adversely affect our results of operations and earnings in the future.”) and p14 and P18 http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/0x0x419854/b4dfc42d-8093-4e2e-a3cb-5fb51c17216b/BAC-ML%20Presentation_FINAL_11.17.10.pdf and p.14, p.18 and JP Morgan Chase and Company, “BAC-ML Banking and Financial Services Conference.” Last modified 2010. http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/0x0x419854/b4dfc42d-8093-4e2e-a3cb-5fb51c17216b/BAC-ML Presentation_FINAL_11.17.10.pdf .
(example: “The Firm resolved and/or limited repurchase risks associated with certain WaMu GSE loan sales ― minimal future risk”)
[xx] http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000119312509249391/d424b7.htm  (See:P. JP Morgan Chase and Company, “PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (October 16, 2007).” Last modified 2007. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000119312509249391/d424b7.htm .  (See: p. S -7 “We and certain of our subsidiaries, as well as entities acquired by us as part of the Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual and other transactions, have made such representations and warranties in connection with the sale and securitization of loans (whether with or without recourse), and we will continue to do so as part of our normal Consumer Lending business. Our obligations with respect to these representations and warranties are generally outstanding for the life of the loan, and relate to, among other things, compliance with laws and regulations; underwriting standards; the accuracy of information in the loan documents and loan file; and the characteristics and enforceability of the loan.
A loan that does not comply with such representations and warranties may take longer to sell, or may be unsaleable or saleable only at a significant discount. More importantly, if a loan that does not comply with such representations and warranties is sold, we may be obligated to repurchase the loan and bear any associated loss directly, or we may be obligated to indemnify the purchaser against any such loss. Accordingly, such repurchase and/or indemnity obligations arising in connection with the sale and securitization of loans (whether with or without recourse) by us and certain of our subsidiaries, as well as entities acquired by us as part of the Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual and other transactions, could materially increase our costs and lower our profitability, and could materially and adversely impact our results of operations and financial condition.”) and http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/847571171x0x415409/c88f9007-6b75-4d7c-abf6-846b90dbc9e3/BAAB_Presentation_Draft_11-03-10_FINAL_PRINT.pdf(JP Morgan Chase and Company, “BANCAN LYSTS ASSOCIATION OF BOSTON CONFERENCE.” Last modified 2010. http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/847571171x0x415409/c88f9007-6b75-4d7c-abf6-846b90dbc9e3/BAAB_Presentation_Draft_11-03-10_FINAL_PRINT.pdf(See: P24-26 “Private label Repurchase risk exposure.”)
[xxii] http://seekingalpha.com/article/198755-jp-morgan-chase-amp-co-q1-2010-earnings-call-transcript?part=single Seeking Alpha, “JP Morgan Chase & Co. Q1 2010 Earnings Call Transcript.” Last modified 2010. http://seekingalpha.com/article/198755-jp-morgan-chase-amp-co-q1-2010-earnings-call-transcript?page=1. (See: “Let me make this simple. In the investment bank, retail and corporate we have put up rep and warranty reserves and litigation reserves for GSEs and all other mortgages including private securities. We have tried to do it diligently. Some of those numbers ran through the investment bank this quarter. We have broken out the numbers in retail and we have put the numbers in corporate. A lot of the numbers in corporate relate to WaMu. We are not going to give any other information. We think we properly accrued for reps and warranties whether they come through on the rep and warranty line or the litigation line. There are legitimate claims that some of these mortgages were [properly] done. It is going to be done mortgage by mortgage. Other than that we think we have done a pretty good job recognizing the problem early.”)
[xxiii] http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/847571171x0x415409/c88f9007-6b75-4d7c-abf6-846b90dbc9e3/BAAB_Presentation_Draft_11-03-10_FINAL_PRINT.pdf(See: P24-26 “Private label ― Repurchase risk exposure”) Scharf, Charlie. JPMorgan Chase & Co, “BANCANALYSTS ASSOCIATION OF BOSTON CONFERENCE.” Last modified 2010. http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/847571171x0x415409/c88f9007-6b75-4d7c-abf6-846b90dbc9e3/BAAB_Presentation_Draft_11-03-10_FINAL_PRINT.pdf .  (See: p.24-26 “Private label ― Repurchase risk exposure.”)
[xxiv] http://www.scribd.com/doc/33507476/SEC-Letter-to-JPM-Re-More-Disclosure-on-Buybacks-Jun-17-2010 Security and Exchange Commission, “SEC Letter to JPM, Re More Disclosure on Buybacks.” Last modified 2010. http://www.scribd.com/doc/33507476/SEC-Letter-to-JPM-Re-More-Disclosure-on-Buybacks-Jun-17-2010.  (See: The specific methodology employed to estimate the allowance related to various representations and warranties, including any differences that may result depending on the type of counterparty to the contract; Discuss the level of allowances established related to these repurchase requests and how and where they are classified in the financial statements; Discuss the level and type of repurchase requests you are receiving, and any trends that have been identified, including your success rates in avoiding settling the claim; Discuss your methods of settling the claims under the agreements. Specifically, tell us whether you repurchase the loans outright from the counterparty or just make a settlement payment to them. If the former, discuss any effects or trends on your nonperforming loan statistics. If the latter, discuss any trends in terms of the average settlement amount by loan type; and Discuss the typical length of time of your repurchase obligation and any trends you are seeing by loan vintage”)
[xxv] http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000095012310020146/filename1.htm Rauchenberger, Louis. JPMorgan Chase & Co., “Mr. Amit Pande, Accounting Branch Chief Division of Corporation Finance United States Securities and Exchange Commission Letter.” Last modified 2010. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000095012310020146/filename1.htm.  The Firm informed the SEC that:
Their potential rep and warranties violations generally surface and are resolved within approximately 24 – 36 months of the loan’s origination date.
After the Firm’s acquisition of certain residential loan assets and liabilities of Washington Mutual Bank from the FDIC in September 2008, the Firm reached agreements with the Agencies to limit the Agencies’ repurchase demands with respect to certain Washington Mutual Bank loan repurchase liabilities.
As of December 31, 2009, the Firm’s allowance related to breaches of reps and warranties (the “Allowance”) was $1.7 billion. [Redacted]
[xxvii] http://www.structuredfinancelitigation.com/files/2012/11/US-Bank-Summons.pdf  “SACO I Trust 2006-3, issuer of the SACO I TRUST 2006-3 MORTGAGE-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-3, v. EMC Mortgages.” Last modified 11/8/12. http://www.structuredfinancelitigation.com/files/2012/11/US-Bank-Summons.pdf.
[xxix] http://www.ncua.gov/News/Press/NW20130104MorganComplaint.pdf p.36-50 NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION BOARD v. J.P. Morgan Chase. Last modified 2013. http://www.ncua.gov/News/Press/NW20130104MorganComplaint.pdf.   p. 36-50
[xxx] McLaughlin, David, and Chris Dolmetsch . Bloomberg BusinessWeek, “NY Attorney General Says More Suits Will Follow JPMorgan.” Last modified 2012.  http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-01/jpmorgan-sued-by-n-dot-y-dot-for-fraud-over-mortgage-securities.