HOW THE SCAM WAS PLAYED

LET ME EXPLAIN SOMETHING I AM LEARNING ABOUT DEUTSCHE BANK, LOOK FOR YOUR ORIGINAL LOAN , FOR EXAMPLE:
IF YOUR ORIGINAL LOAN WAS SAY FROM AMERICAN HOME, BUT YOU REFINANCED THE HOME WITH WASHINGTON MUTUAL, WHO BOUGHT THE LOAN, LOOK FOR YOUR LOAN FROM THE ORIGINAL ORIGINATOR WHICH WOULD BE AMERICAN HOME. THIS IS HOW THE PONZI SCAM WAS PLAYED FORWARD. EVEN IF LETS SAY :
THE ORIGINAL WAS SOLD TO AMERICAN HOME, WHICH WAMU REFINANCED , AND THAN SOLD TO DEUTSCHE BANK, STILL LOOK BACK TO THE ORIGINATOR OF THE LOAN , WHICH IS AMERICAN HOME. THIS IS WHY PEOPLE CAN'T FIND THEIR HOMES INFO ON THE SEC SITE , START FROM THE BEGINNING AND FOLLOW IT.


Certificates in the Deutsche Alt-
A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR5 and/or the Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mortgage
Loan Trust 2006-AB4 between May 1, 2006 through May 30, 2007, inc
.
The table below sets forth the specific tranches, by CUSIP number, of Certificates in each
Trust
TABLE A
TRANCHE
CUSIP
1.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IA1< This is the TRANCHE INFO
25150NAA2 <THIS IS THE CUSIP NUMBER
2.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IA2
25150NAB0
3.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IA3
25150NAC8
4.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IA4
25150NAD6
5.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM1
25150NAE4
6.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM2
25150NAF1
7.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM3
25150NAG9
8.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM4
25150NAH7
9.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM5
25150NAJ3
10.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM6
25150NAK0
11.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM7
25150NAL8
12.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM8
25150NAM6
13.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM9
25150NAN4
14.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM10
25150NAP9
15.
DBALT 2006-AR5 II1A
25150NAT1
16.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIM
25150NAZ7
17.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIB1
25150NBA1
18.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIB2
25150NBB9
19.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIPO
25150NAW4
20.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIX2
25150NAY0
21.
DBALT 2006-AR5 II2A
25150NAU8
22.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIX1
25150NAX2
23.
DBALT 2006-AR5 II3A
25150NAV6
TRANCHE
CUSIP
27.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A1C
251513AT4
28.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A2
251513AU1
29.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A3
251513AV9
30.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A3A1
251513AW7
31.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A3A2
251513AX5
32.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A4A
251513AY3
33.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A4B
251513AZ0
34.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A4C
251513BA4
35.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A5
251513BB2
36.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A6A1
251513BC0
37.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A6A2
251513BD8
38.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A7
251513BE6
39.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M1
251513AA5
40.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M2
251513AB3
41.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M3
251513AC1
42.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M4
251513AD9
43.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M5
251513AE7
44.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M6
251513AF4
45.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M7
251513AG2
46.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M8
251513AH0
47.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M9
251513AJ6
48.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M10
251513AK3
49.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M11
251513AL1
24.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A1A
251513AQ0
50. DBALT 2006-AB4 M12
251513AM9
25.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A1B1
251513AR8
51. DBALT 2006-AB4 M13
251513AN7
26.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A1B2
251513AS6
52. DBALT 2006-AB4 M14
251513AP2


HERE IS ALSO THE LISTING OF 1105 FILLINGS - THAT WERE DEUSTSCHE BANK- DB STRUCTURED PRODUCTS- ACE-DBALT-MORTGAGEIT
http://regab.db.com/

Was your Wamu or any loan bought by DB Structured Products in 2006?

Was your Wamu or any loan bought by DB Structured Products in 2006? Ace securities was what they dumped them in. Heres your link to maybe find your note on the Sec Edgar site

http://www.securitization.net/pdf/DBRS/2007/210414_ACE_Securities_29Jan07.pdf


Wells Fargo was master servicer
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1412888/000105640408000833/dal07003_35-3.txt

How Goldman will sink the ships

Investors Lost, Goldman Won on WaMu Deal 

 

Washington Mutual Inc. and its Long Beach Mortgage Co. subprime-lending unit rang up one of the worst failures in U.S. history. Left in the wake were billions of dollars of soured loans and questionable lending practices.
But when times were better, the two companies had a powerful partner on Wall Street: Goldman Sachs Group Inc. GS -1.31%

Beached

• May 10, 2007: Goldman and WaMu underwrite bonds backed by $532.6 million in mortgages.
• May 16, 2007: WaMu unit says $49.3 million in loans are worthless.
• May 17, 2007: 'Good news,' Goldman trader writes in an email, 'we make $5mm' because the firm shorted the bonds.

Recently released emails and other documents, including securities filings, show how Goldman, considered one of Wall Street's most elite banks, built its mortgage business by closely working with lenders such as Washington Mutual and Long Beach, two firms that "polluted the financial system" with souring loans, according to a Senate review of Washington Mutual on April 13.
"Long Beach…was not a responsible lender," Sen. Carl Levin (D., Mich.), chairman of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, said in his opening remarks April 13. "Its loans and mortgage-backed securities were among the worst performing of the subprime industry."
Goldman declined to discuss its business with Washington Mutual or the communications in the emails released by the Senate panel.
Goldman was one of several Wall Street firms that helped sell bonds backed by Washington Mutual loans. Over the weekend, the Senate subcommittee released internal Goldman emails, including one showing that the firm made a $5 million trading profit by betting against securities Goldman sold in a Long Beach bond offering that lost money for its investors, raising a potential conflict with its clients. On Tuesday, the panel plans to question Goldman executives in a separate hearing.

The emails and others like them highlight "the importance of transparency, the importance of things being in the open, the importance of it being known who is in a position to benefit from what," senior White House adviser Lawrence Summers said Sunday on CBS's "Face the Nation."
Much has been written about Washington Mutual's failure. In September 2008, the Seattle lender was forced to sell itself to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. JPM -0.87% at the height of the crisis in the largest-ever U.S. bank failure. But there has been less scrutiny of the ties between Washington Mutual and Goldman, which emerged stronger than rivals after the mortgage market's collapse.
J.P. Morgan said the Washington Mutual loans and securities being investigated were issued before J.P. Morgan's purchase of Washington Mutual. A lawyer for former Washington Mutual Chief Executive Kerry Killinger couldn't be reached.
At times, executives at Washington Mutual discussed seeking out Goldman for its reputation for excellence, according to Washington Mutual emails. But Washington Mutual executives also were wary of their partner because of concerns about how the Wall Street firm traded.
"We always need to worry a little about Goldman because we need them more than they need us and the firm is run by traders," a Washington Mutual executive wrote in an email released by the Senate panel in its probe of the lender.
Long Beach was founded in 1979 as Long Beach Savings & Loan by Roland Arnall, a Los Angeles developer who got his start in business in Los Angeles selling flowers on a Los Angeles street corner. A unit called Long Beach Financial Corp., based in Orange, Calif., was sold to Washington Mutual in 1999.
Aided by mortgage brokers who channeled loans to Long Beach, Washington
Mutual and Long Beach ended up bundling subprime home loans into $77 billion worth of securities, according to the Senate inquiry.

Some Long Beach bonds were ultimately used to allow Wall Street firms and hedge funds to bet against the U.S. mortgage market. Long Beach bonds were among those underpinning subprime-mortgage indexes—assembled by Goldman and other Wall Street firms—that allowed those firms and hedge funds to bet against the housing industry, according to data provided by Markit Group Ltd., which helps run the indexes.
The Long Beach loans ended up being among the worst performing in the indexes, according to a Nomura Holdings report. Separately, some Long Beach bonds also underpinned the Abacus 2007-AC1 debt pool now at the center of a Securities and Exchange Commission securities-fraud case against Goldman, which the firm is fighting.
By 2005, Long Beach was in trouble. According to the Senate report released April 13, Long Beach had to buy back $875 million of nonperforming loans from investors. Problems persisted.
Behind one sale of Long Beach securities was Goldman. In 2006, Goldman teamed with a Washington Mutual unit to sell a debt pool called Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-A. Both firms agreed to buy some of the securities with the intention of reselling them or making a secondary market for them, according to a prospectus for them. Of the $496 million deal, Goldman was expected to purchase about $322 million of the securities with the intention of reselling them.
Washington Mutual executives appeared troubled by loans at Long Beach.
In an April 2006 email, a Washington Mutual executive told Mr. Killinger that
Long Beach's "delinquencies are up 140% and foreclosures close to 70% ... It is ugly."
By early 2007, Goldman bankers also were growing anxious about their business dealings with Washington Mutual and Long Beach, according to emails released as part of the Senate investigation into Washington Mutual.
A Goldman banker raised questions about the performance of Long Beach loans that were "performing dramatically worse" than other similar deals in 2006. "As you can imagine, this creates extreme pressure, both economic and reputational, on both organizations," the Goldman banker said.
In May 2007, Goldman executives were discussing problems facing the debt deal it had helped underwrite called Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-A, according to emails released by the Senate panel.
Among the Senate documents is an email from a Goldman executive to Michael Swenson, then a Goldman managing director in the firm's mortgage group, about the 2006-A bond deal. In an 8 a.m. email, Goldman executives circulated a securities report that showed loans inside the pool had soured.
Six minutes later, a Goldman executive wrote, "bad news…(the price decline in the bonds) costs us about 2.5 mm," adding, "good news…we make $5mm" on a derivatives bet against the bonds.
The Senate panel, in a statement over the weekend, said the email showed how the soured Long Beach bonds "would bring [Goldman] $5 million from a bet it had placed against the very securities it had assembled and sold."
Mr. Swenson declined to comment through a Goldman spokesman. He is among the Goldman executives set to appear at Tuesday's hearing. A Goldman spokesman said in a statement: "It's our standard, prudent practice to hedge exposures."
Despite the close relationship between Washington Mutual and Goldman, Washington Mutual wondered which side Goldman was on. In October 2007, Mr. Killinger wrote in an email about a situation with Goldman: "I don't trust Goldy on this. They are smart, but this is swimming with the sharks. They were shorting mortgages big time."
  This is the link to SEC info
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1355515/000127727706000388/form8kpsa20063.htm

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1119605/000127727706000409/fwptermsheet_longbeach2006a.pdf

Suprise Suprise !! The big banks again!

The usual suspects in the banking fraternity are the subject of another class-action suit over...

• Friday, July 12, 3:07 PM ET
  The usual suspects in the banking fraternity are the subject of another class-action suit over price-fixing in the CDS market, with the plaintiffs in this case being 4 Danish pension funds. The case was filed in federal court in Illinois, the same locale as a similar complaint logged in May by a labor union. Across the pond, the EU this month filed their own charges. Banks named: BAC, BCS, C, CS, DB, GS, HBC, JPM, MS, RBS, UBS, BNPQY.PK. 
•  
• Big banks are facing new allegations they conspired to control pricing and access in the lucrative credit derivatives markets.
  Four Danish pension funds filed a complaint Thursday in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging antitrust violations and saying the banks "unreasonably restrained competition" in the $25 trillion credit- default swaps market.
  Thursday's class action filing follows a similar complaint filed in May, also in northern Illinois, by the Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 33 Cleveland District Pension Plan. That complaint said the banks' control of the CDS market led them to overcharge customers in the market about $7 billion a year, and seeks treble damages if the plaintiffs prevail.
  The complaint also comes on the heels of action by European antitrust authorities, who also alleged improper practices in credit derivatives markets.
  Both U.S. cases cite as defendants 12 banks, as well as Markit Group Ltd., a financial data provider specializing in derivatives, and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, a global financial trade body.
  The banks named in the U.S. complaints were: Bank of America Corp. ( BAC ), Barclays PLC (BCS, BARC.LN), BNP Paribas S.A. (BNPQY, BNP.FR), Citigroup Inc. ( C ), Credit Suisse Group AG (CS, CSGN.VX), Deutsche Bank AG (DB, DBK.XE), Goldman Sachs Group Inc. ( GS ), HSBC Holdings PLC (HBC, HSBA.LN, 0005.HK), J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. ( JPM ), Morgan Stanley ( MS ), Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC (RBS, RBS.LN) and UBS AG (UBS, UBSN.VX).
  Spokespeople for Bank of America, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citi, Credit Suisse, Goldman and J.P. Morgan and RBS declined to comment. The other banks, pension plans and Markit didn't immediately return requests for comment.
  A spokeswoman for ISDA said it believes "the allegations against us are without merit and that ISDA acted properly at all times."
  The move by authorities constitutes the latest headache for banks already facing a wave of lawsuits on everything from mortgage bonds to alleged manipulation of interest rates.
  Chris Burke, partner at Scott + Scott, which is representing the Sheet Workers pension plan, said customers in the CDS market were wary of filing their complaint because the banks control the credit markets. He said he hoped other bank customers "would join the fray."
  Earlier this month, the European Commission accused Markit, along with 13 banks and ISDA, of colluding to prevent credit default swaps from trading on open exchanges.
  The U.S. Department of Justice confirmed in 2009 that it had launched a probe into the possibility of anticompetitive activity in credit derivatives trading, clearing and in the information services industries supporting it, but didn't say when the probe began. That investigation is ongoing.
  Prosecutors have been looking into whether dealers implemented certain arrangements that allowed them to control access to the market, both for trading and clearing CDS.
  The Danish funds--Unipension Fondsmaeglerselskab, Arkitekternes Pensionskasse, MP Pension-Pensionskassen for Magistre & Psykologer, and Pensionskassen for Jordbrugsakademikere & Dyrlaeger--are seeking damages and a jury trial.
  
  
  Read more: http://www.nasdaq.com/article/danish-pension-funds-sue-banks-over-cds-20130712-00438#ixzz2YrXDG5Ui