HOW THE SCAM WAS PLAYED

LET ME EXPLAIN SOMETHING I AM LEARNING ABOUT DEUTSCHE BANK, LOOK FOR YOUR ORIGINAL LOAN , FOR EXAMPLE:
IF YOUR ORIGINAL LOAN WAS SAY FROM AMERICAN HOME, BUT YOU REFINANCED THE HOME WITH WASHINGTON MUTUAL, WHO BOUGHT THE LOAN, LOOK FOR YOUR LOAN FROM THE ORIGINAL ORIGINATOR WHICH WOULD BE AMERICAN HOME. THIS IS HOW THE PONZI SCAM WAS PLAYED FORWARD. EVEN IF LETS SAY :
THE ORIGINAL WAS SOLD TO AMERICAN HOME, WHICH WAMU REFINANCED , AND THAN SOLD TO DEUTSCHE BANK, STILL LOOK BACK TO THE ORIGINATOR OF THE LOAN , WHICH IS AMERICAN HOME. THIS IS WHY PEOPLE CAN'T FIND THEIR HOMES INFO ON THE SEC SITE , START FROM THE BEGINNING AND FOLLOW IT.


Certificates in the Deutsche Alt-
A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR5 and/or the Deutsche Alt-B Securities Mortgage
Loan Trust 2006-AB4 between May 1, 2006 through May 30, 2007, inc
.
The table below sets forth the specific tranches, by CUSIP number, of Certificates in each
Trust
TABLE A
TRANCHE
CUSIP
1.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IA1< This is the TRANCHE INFO
25150NAA2 <THIS IS THE CUSIP NUMBER
2.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IA2
25150NAB0
3.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IA3
25150NAC8
4.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IA4
25150NAD6
5.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM1
25150NAE4
6.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM2
25150NAF1
7.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM3
25150NAG9
8.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM4
25150NAH7
9.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM5
25150NAJ3
10.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM6
25150NAK0
11.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM7
25150NAL8
12.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM8
25150NAM6
13.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM9
25150NAN4
14.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IM10
25150NAP9
15.
DBALT 2006-AR5 II1A
25150NAT1
16.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIM
25150NAZ7
17.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIB1
25150NBA1
18.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIB2
25150NBB9
19.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIPO
25150NAW4
20.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIX2
25150NAY0
21.
DBALT 2006-AR5 II2A
25150NAU8
22.
DBALT 2006-AR5 IIX1
25150NAX2
23.
DBALT 2006-AR5 II3A
25150NAV6
TRANCHE
CUSIP
27.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A1C
251513AT4
28.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A2
251513AU1
29.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A3
251513AV9
30.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A3A1
251513AW7
31.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A3A2
251513AX5
32.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A4A
251513AY3
33.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A4B
251513AZ0
34.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A4C
251513BA4
35.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A5
251513BB2
36.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A6A1
251513BC0
37.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A6A2
251513BD8
38.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A7
251513BE6
39.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M1
251513AA5
40.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M2
251513AB3
41.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M3
251513AC1
42.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M4
251513AD9
43.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M5
251513AE7
44.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M6
251513AF4
45.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M7
251513AG2
46.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M8
251513AH0
47.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M9
251513AJ6
48.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M10
251513AK3
49.
DBALT 2006-AB4 M11
251513AL1
24.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A1A
251513AQ0
50. DBALT 2006-AB4 M12
251513AM9
25.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A1B1
251513AR8
51. DBALT 2006-AB4 M13
251513AN7
26.
DBALT 2006-AB4 A1B2
251513AS6
52. DBALT 2006-AB4 M14
251513AP2


HERE IS ALSO THE LISTING OF 1105 FILLINGS - THAT WERE DEUSTSCHE BANK- DB STRUCTURED PRODUCTS- ACE-DBALT-MORTGAGEIT
http://regab.db.com/

Why you should change banks

 Lets not leave out US BANK corp.. they have had there hands in full swing on foreclosures , and supplying private hedge funds with cash to buy your homes, most illegally.

 

9 Reasons To Change Banks – Switch From Wall Street

Reason #1: People Who Change Banks Like It

People who bank with local lenders are far more satisfied than those who bank on Wall Street. (source)

Reason #2: The Wall Street Banks Are Still Too Big to Fail

Reason #3: The Wall Street Banks Are Still Too Big to Jail

Reason #4: The Wall Street Banks Are Too Big to Manage

The megabanks have grown tremendously over the past two decades, making it harder for them to properly manage all their various international pieces.

SOURCE

Reason #5: Wall Street Has Captured Washington

Reason #6: Wall Street Continues To Gamble With the Economy

Gambling on Wall Street lies behind boring, impenetrable names like credit default swaps, synthetic credit derivatives, and mortgage-back securities. All of these bets are types of derivatives. The financial crisis of 2008 occurred largely because these particular derivatives bets went bad. And yet the worldwide derivatives market continues to explode, from under $100 trillion in notional value in 2000 to over $700 trillion in 2011.

SOURCE
What’s more, nearly half of the worldwide derivatives exposure is centered in the United States, and 95% of the total U.S. derivatives exposure comes from 5 megabanks.

SOURCE

Reason #7: Small Lenders Charge Less in Fees

Smaller lenders charge less in account fees, overdraft fees, and off-us ATM fees, as shown in a study from the PIRG Education Fund. According to the study, a substantive portion of small lenders belong to ATM networks that don’t charge anything if you use an ATM which doesn’t belong to your financial institution. That’s better than some megabanks offer.

Reason #8: Small Lenders Are Far More Likely to Offer Totally Free Checking

Small financial institutions are more likely to offer totally free checking accounts. No loopholes or snags. Chart from the Institute of Local Self-Reliance.

Reason #9: Small Lenders Are Far Better For Your Community

If you want to support local job creation, one way to do it is to support local lenders.

Local lenders also make nearly 40% of small business loans, even though they only have 10% of total bank assets. (source)

Conclusion – Why Change Banks?

The problem with the megabanks is that they’re locked in a destructive cycle of being too big to manage, too big to fail, and too big to jail. They continue to have unpredictable, catastrophic losses. The losses lead inevitably to declarations of “too big to fail” (and bailouts). Being “too big to fail” means that the megabanks can’t be prosecuted without endangering the entire economy (or so they say), which makes the megabanks even bigger—and, again (back to the start!), too big to manage.
Therefore:
If you want to help end “too big to fail,” if you opposed the megabank bailouts, if you’re tired of megabanks getting away with crime, if you recognize that these institutions have become too big to manage, if you want to ensure that we never repeat the vast injustice at play in the 2008 crisis, then switch your bank.
You might be thinking, “Yes, okay, Wall Street makes the economy dangerous. But there are plenty of things that make the economy dangerous—more than I could ever effectively boycott.”
That’s why, even if you don’t think changing banks will make much difference for the fiscal health of the nation, you should still change banks for many of the personal advantages listed above. Either, way changing banks to a local lender is a good idea.

Junk mortgages under the microscope

Ita time the sec and the feds take another look at junk bonds with hedge funds

A close-up of one deal shows how subprime mortgages went bad, says Fortune's Allan Sloan.

(Fortune Magazine) -- It's getting hard to wrap your brain around subprime mortgages, Wall Street's fancy name for junk home loans. There's so much subprime stuff floating around - more than $1.5 trillion of loans, maybe $200 billion of losses, thousands of families facing foreclosure, umpteen politicians yapping - that it's like the federal budget: It's just too big to be understandable.
So let's reduce this macro story to human scale. Meet GSAMP Trust 2006-S3, a $494 million drop in the junk-mortgage bucket, part of the more than half-a-trillion dollars of mortgage-backed securities issued last year. We found this issue by asking mortgage mavens to pick the worst deal they knew of that had been floated by a top-tier firm - and this one's pretty bad.

So many homes are up for sale that prices are falling, and holders of mortgage-backed securities are getting hurt.

It was sold by Goldman Sachs (Charts, Fortune 500) - GSAMP originally stood for Goldman Sachs Alternative Mortgage Products but now has become a name itself, like AT&T and 3M.
This issue, which is backed by ultra-risky second-mortgage loans, contains all the elements that facilitated the housing bubble and bust. It's got speculators searching for quick gains in hot housing markets; it's got loans that seem to have been made with little or no serious analysis by lenders; and finally, it's got Wall Street, which churned out mortgage "product" because buyers wanted it. As they say on the Street, "When the ducks quack, feed them."
Alas, almost everyone involved in this duck-feeding deal has had a foul experience. Less than 18 months after the issue was floated, a sixth of the borrowers had already defaulted on their loans. Investors who paid face value for these securities - they were looking for slightly more interest than they'd get on equivalent bonds - have suffered heavy losses.

Investors to Fed: Thanks for nothing

That's because their securities have either defaulted (for a 100% loss) or been downgraded by credit-rating agencies, which has depressed the securities' market prices. (Check out one of these jewels on a Bloomberg machine, and the price chart looks like something falling off a cliff.)
Even Goldman may have lost money on GSAMP - but being Goldman, the firm has more than covered its losses by betting successfully that the price of junk mortgages would drop. Of course, Goldman knew a lot about this market: GSAMP was just one of 83 mortgage-backed issues totaling $44.5 billion that Goldman sold last year.
Now let's take it from the top.
In the spring of 2006, Goldman assembled 8,274 second-mortgage loans originated by Fremont Investment & Loan, Long Beach Mortgage Co., and assorted other players. More than a third of the loans were in California, then a hot market. It was a run-of-the-mill deal, one of the 916 residential mortgage-backed issues totaling $592 billion that were sold last year.
The average equity that the second-mortgage borrowers had in their homes was 0.71%. (No, that's not a misprint - the average loan-to-value of the issue's borrowers was 99.29%.)
It gets even hinkier. Some 58% of the loans were no-documentation or low-documentation. This means that although 98% of the borrowers said they were occupying the homes they were borrowing on - "owner-occupied" loans are considered less risky than loans to speculators - no one knows if that was true. And no one knows whether borrowers' incomes or assets bore any serious relationship to what they told the mortgage lenders.
You can see why borrowers lined up for the loans, even though they carried high interest rates. If you took out one of these second mortgages and a typical 80% first mortgage, you got to buy a house with essentially none of your own money at risk. If house prices rose, you'd have a profit. If house prices fell and you couldn't make your mortgage payments, you'd get to walk away with nothing (or almost nothing) out of pocket. It was go-go finance, very 21st century.
Goldman acquired these second-mortgage loans and put them together as GSAMP Trust 2006-S3. To transform them into securities it could sell to investors, it divided them into tranches - which is French for "slices," in case you're interested.
There are trillions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities in the world for the same reason that Tyson Foods offers you chicken pieces rather than insisting you buy an entire bird. Tyson can slice a chicken into breasts, legs, thighs, giblets - and Lord knows what else - and get more for the pieces than it gets for a whole chicken. Customers are happy, because they get only the pieces they want.
Similarly, Wall Street carves mortgages into tranches because it can get more for the pieces than it would get for whole mortgages. Mortgages have maturities that are unpredictable, and they require all that messy maintenance like collecting the monthly payments, making sure real estate taxes are paid, chasing slow-pay and no-pay borrowers, and sending out annual statements of interest and taxes paid. Securities are simpler to deal with and can be customized.
Someone wants a safe, relatively low-interest, short-term security? Fine, we'll give him a nice AAA-rated slice that gets repaid quickly and is very unlikely to default. Someone wants a risky piece with a potentially very rich yield, an indefinite maturity, and no credit rating at all? One unrated X tranche coming right up. Interested in legs, thighs, giblets, the heart? The butcher - excuse us, the investment banker - gives customers what they want.
In this case, Goldman sliced the $494 million of second mortgages into 13 separate tranches. The $336 million of top tranches - named cleverly A-1, A-2, and A-3 - carried the lowest interest rates and the least risk. The $123 million of intermediate tranches - M (for mezzanine) 1 through 7 - are next in line to get paid and carry progressively higher interest rates.
Finally, Goldman sold two non-investment-grade tranches. The first, B-1 ($13 million), went to the Luxembourg-based UBS (Charts) Absolute Return fund, which is aimed at non-U.S. investors and thus spread GSAMP's problems beyond our borders. The second, B-2 ($8 million), went to the Morgan Keegan Select High Income fund. (Like most of this article, this information is based on our reading of various public filings; UBS and Morgan Keegan both declined to comment.)

Welcome to Bailout City!

Goldman wouldn't say, but it appears to have kept the 13th piece, the X tranche, which had a face value of $14 million (and would have been worth much more had things gone as projected), as its fee for putting the deal together. Goldman may have had money at risk in some of the other tranches, but there's no way to know without Goldman's cooperation, which wasn't forthcoming.
How is a buyer of securities like these supposed to know how safe they are? There are two options. The first is to do what we did: Read the 315-page prospectus, related documents, and other public records with a jaundiced eye and try to see how things can go wrong.
The second is to rely on the underwriter and the credit-rating agencies - Moody's and Standard & Poor's. That, of course, is what nearly everyone does.
In any event, it's impossible for investors to conduct an independent analysis of the borrowers' credit quality even if they choose to invest the time, money, and effort to do so. That's because Goldman, like other assemblers of mortgage-backed deals, doesn't tell investors who the borrowers are.
One Goldman filing lists more than 1,000 pages of individual loans - but they're by code number and zip code, not name and address.
Even though the individual loans in GSAMP looked like financial toxic waste, 68% of the issue, or $336 million, was rated AAA by both agencies - as secure as U.S. Treasury bonds. Another $123 million, 25% of the issue, was rated investment grade, at levels from AA to BBB--.
Thus, a total of 93% was rated investment grade. That's despite the fact that this issue is backed by second mortgages of dubious quality on homes in which the borrowers (most of whose income and financial assertions weren't vetted by anyone) had less than 1% equity and on which GSAMP couldn't effectively foreclose.

It's all in the math

How does toxic waste get distilled into spring water? Watch. It's all in the math - and the assumptions about how borrowers will behave.
These loans, which are fixed-rate, carried an average interest rate of 10.51%. After paying the people who collected the payments and handled all the other paperwork, the GSAMP Trust had ten percentage points left. However, the interest on the securities that GSAMP issued ran to only about 7%. (We say "about" because some of the tranches are floating-rate rather than fixed-rate.)
The difference between GSAMP's interest income and interest expense was projected at 2.85% a year. That spread was supposed to provide a cushion to offset defaults by borrowers. In addition, the aforementioned X piece didn't get fixed monthly payments and thus provided another bit of protection for the 12 tranches ranked above it.
Remember that we're dealing with securities, not actual loans. Thus losses aren't shared equally by all of GSAMP's investors. Any loan losses would first hit the X tranche. Then, if X were wiped out, the losses would work their way up the food chain tranche by tranche: B-2, B-1, M-7, and so on.
The $241 million A-1 tranche, 60% of which has already been repaid, was designed to be supersafe and quick-paying. It gets first dibs on principal paydowns from regular monthly payments, refinancings, and borrowers paying off their loans because they're selling their homes. Then, after A-1 is paid in full, it's the turn of A-2 and A-3, and so on down the line.
Moody's projected in a public analysis of the issue that less than 10% of the loans would ultimately default. S&P, which gave the securities the same ratings that Moody's did, almost certainly reached a similar conclusion but hasn't filed a public analysis and wouldn't share its numbers with us. As long as housing prices kept rising, it all looked copacetic.
Goldman peddled the securities in late April 2006. In a matter of months the mathematical models used to assemble and market this issue - and the models that Moody's and S&P used to rate it - proved to be horribly flawed. That's because the models were based on recent performances of junk-mortgage borrowers, who hadn't defaulted much until last year thanks to the housing bubble.

The fallout

Through the end of 2005, if you couldn't make your mortgage payments, you could generally get out from under by selling the house at a profit or refinancing it. But in 2006 we hit an inflection point. House prices began stagnating or falling in many markets. Instead of HPA - industry shorthand for house-price appreciation - we had HPD: house-price depreciation.
Interest rates on mortgages stopped falling. Way too late, as usual, regulators and lenders began imposing higher credit standards. If you had borrowed 99%-plus of the purchase price (as the average GSAMP borrower did) and couldn't make your payments, couldn't refinance, and couldn't sell at a profit, it was over. Lights out.
As a second-mortgage holder, GSAMP couldn't foreclose on deadbeats unless the first-mortgage holder also foreclosed. That's because to foreclose on a second mortgage, you have to repay the first mortgage in full, and there was no money set aside to do that. So if a borrower decided to keep on paying the first mortgage but not the second, the holder of the second would get bagged.
If the holder of the first mortgage foreclosed, there was likely to be little or nothing left for GSAMP, the second-mortgage holder. Indeed, the monthly reports issued by Deutsche Bank (Charts), the issue's trustee, indicate that GSAMP has recovered almost nothing on its foreclosed loans.
By February 2007, Moody's and S&P began downgrading the issue. Both agencies dropped the top-rated tranches all the way to BBB from their original AAA, depressing the securities' market price substantially.
In March, less than a year after the issue was sold, GSAMP began defaulting on its obligations. By the end of September, 18% of the loans had defaulted, according to Deutsche Bank.
As a result, the X tranche, both B tranches, and the four bottom M tranches have been wiped out, and M-3 is being chewed up like a frame house with termites. At this point, there's no way to know whether any of the A tranches will ultimately be impaired.
"[In hindsight,] I think we would not have rated it" had Moody's realized what was going on in the junk-mortgage market, says Nicolas Weill, the firm's chief credit officer for structured finance. Low credit scores and high loan-to-value ratios were taken into account in Moody's original analysis, of course, but the firm now thinks there were things it didn't know about.

Two small lessons from the market turmoil

Weill doesn't lay blame on any particular party, although in a Sept. 25 special report posted on Moody's website, he called for "additional third-party oversight that reviews the accuracy of the information provided by borrowers, appraisers, and brokers to originators" when it comes to junk issues. Or, as he calls them, "non-prime."
S&P, by contrast, says that it considers both its original rating and subsequent downward revisions correct. "We used the best information available at the time," says Vickie Tillman, S&P's chief rating officer.
If you read documents that Goldman filed with the SEC in connection with this offering, you discover that they warn about pretty much everything we've discussed so far and some things we haven't: the impact of falling house prices, the difficulty of foreclosing, the possible changes in credit ratings, the fact that more than half the mortgages were in California, Florida, and New York, all of which were overheated markets.
It's all disclosed. In capital letters. So no buyer - and this is aimed at sophisticated investors - can say he wasn't warned.
Goldman said it made money in the third quarter by shorting an index of mortgage-backed securities. That prompted Fortune to ask the firm to explain to us how it had managed to come out ahead while so many of its mortgage-backed customers were getting stomped.
Goldman's profits came from hedging the mortgage securities it keeps in inventory in order to make trading markets. It said in a recent SEC filing, "Although we recognized significant losses on our non-prime mortgage loans and securities, those losses were more than offset by gains on short mortgage positions."
As we interpret this - the firm declined to elaborate - Goldman made more on its hedges than it lost on its inventory because junk mortgages fell even more sharply than Goldman thought they would.
What is there to take away from our course in Junk Mortgages 101? Two things. First, you have to pay at least some attention to all those "risk factors" that issuers forever warn you about - especially when you're dealing with a whole new thing like junk mortgages issued en masse instead of by specialists.
Second, when you rely on the underwriter and the rating agencies to do all your homework for you, you don't have safety. You have only the illusion of safety.

Washington Mutual (WAMU) SEC Filings

Are you still looking fo ranswers about your Wamu loan, maybe this can help.

Washington Mutual (WAMU) SEC Filings

1/12/07  3/28/08WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates/WaMu Series 2007-HE1 U.S. SEC # 1385019 4/5/07  3/28/08WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates/WaMu Series 2007-HE2 U.S. SEC # 1389138
4/26/07  3/28/08WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates/WaMu Series 2007-HE3 U.S. SEC # 1397612 6/7/07  3/28/08WaMu Asset-Backed Certificates/WaMu Series 2007-HE4 U.S. SEC # 1401898
1/26/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR1 U.S. SEC # 1350323 8/21/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR10 U.S. SEC # 1370359
8/22/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR11 U.S. SEC # 1370360 9/25/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR12 U.S. SEC # 1374624
9/25/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR13 U.S. SEC # 1374625 10/23/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR14 U.S. SEC # 1374626
10/24/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR15 U.S. SEC # 1374627 11/17/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR16 U.S. SEC # 1379744
11/20/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR17 U.S. SEC # 1379745 12/19/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR18 U.S. SEC # 1383018
12/20/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR19 U.S. SEC # 1383019 2/3/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR2 U.S. SEC # 1350324
2/10/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR3 U.S. SEC # 1352798 3/31/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR4 U.S. SEC # 1355536
4/27/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR5 U.S. SEC # 1360258 6/2/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR6 U.S. SEC # 1364489
6/9/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR7 U.S. SEC # 1364476 6/30/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR8 U.S. SEC # 1367734
7/13/06  5/16/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2006-AR9 U.S. SEC # 1367735 1/19/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY1 U.S. SEC # 1385021
2/14/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY2 U.S. SEC # 1389140 2/23/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY3 U.S. SEC # 1389141
3/23/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY4 U.S. SEC # 1392110 4/24/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY5 U.S. SEC # 1396434
5/22/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY6 U.S. SEC # 1400091 6/22/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-HY7 U.S. SEC # 1402110
1/24/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA1 U.S. SEC # 1385020 2/21/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA2 U.S. SEC # 1389139
3/24/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA3 U.S. SEC # 1392111 4/25/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA4 U.S. SEC # 1396435 5/23/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA5 U.S. SEC # 1400092 6/25/07  3/28/08WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2007-OA6 U.S. SEC # 1402111
2/28/05  11/13/07WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp U.S. SEC # 1317069 2/11/00  11/9/07Wamu Partners II LP U.S. SEC # 1105038 1/14/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR1
U.S. SEC # 1314534 7/25/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR10 U.S. SEC # 1334142 8/24/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR11
U.S. SEC # 1337031 8/25/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR12 U.S. SEC # 1337123 10/24/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR13
U.S. SEC # 1342264 10/25/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR14 U.S. SEC # 1342368 11/21/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR15
U.S. SEC # 1345039 11/22/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR16 U.S. SEC # 1345116 12/19/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR17
U.S. SEC # 1347345 12/7/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR18 U.S. SEC # 1346065 12/14/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR19 U.S. SEC # 1346793 1/24/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR2 U.S. SEC # 1315296 2/22/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR3
U.S. SEC # 1318666 3/22/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR4 U.S. SEC # 1321432 4/22/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR5
U.S. SEC # 1324712 4/26/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR6 U.S. SEC # 1325096 6/22/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR7 U.S. SEC # 1331029 7/14/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR8 U.S. SEC # 1333176 7/20/05  3/30/06WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2005-AR9
U.S. SEC # 1333701 8/25/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortage Pass Thru Cert Ser 2003-S8 U.S. SEC # 1261237 2/24/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortage Pass Thru Cert Series 2003-Ar3
U.S. SEC # 1220366 12/19/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Thr Certs Ser 2003-Ar12 U.S. SEC # 1274023 7/23/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cer Ser 2003-Ar8
U.S. SEC # 1256337 8/23/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert 2002-Ar10 U.S. SEC # 1182560 1/24/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates 2002-S1
U.S. SEC # 1165932 10/28/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates 2002-S7 U.S. SEC # 1201847 3/25/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate Series 2002-Ar4
U.S. SEC # 1169893 10/27/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Ser 2003-S12 U.S. SEC # 1268291 11/9/01  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2001-Ar3
U.S. SEC # 1162063 8/27/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar11 U.S. SEC # 1183265 9/20/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002 Ar12
U.S. SEC # 1191294 9/24/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar13 U.S. SEC # 1192220 9/23/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002 Ar14
U.S. SEC # 1191853 10/23/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar15 U.S. SEC # 1200829 10/24/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar16
U.S. SEC # 1201113 10/23/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar17 U.S. SEC # 1200828 2/26/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-S2
U.S. SEC # 1168244 5/24/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-S3 U.S. SEC # 1174299 9/24/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-S6
U.S. SEC # 1192222 1/27/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar1 U.S. SEC # 1216057 3/20/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar4 U.S. SEC # 1223995
4/23/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar5 U.S. SEC # 1228782 5/21/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar6
U.S. SEC # 1234822 3/25/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-S2 U.S. SEC # 1224460 4/23/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003 S3
U.S. SEC # 1228787 5/22/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003 S4 U.S. SEC # 1235349 7/22/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-S7
U.S. SEC # 1255906 2/11/04  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-Ar1 U.S. SEC # 1279818 7/23/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR10
U.S. SEC # 1298239 8/23/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR11 U.S. SEC # 1301259 10/25/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR12
U.S. SEC # 1306918 11/22/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR13 U.S. SEC # 1309383 12/17/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR14
U.S. SEC # 1311881 4/28/04  3/30/05WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR2 U.S. SEC # 1288748 4/26/04  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004 Ar-3
U.S. SEC # 1288639 5/21/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR4 [ formerly WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-CB1 ]
U.S. SEC # 1291435 5/21/04  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-Ar5 U.S. SEC # 1291434 5/26/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR6
U.S. SEC # 1291950 6/23/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR7 U.S. SEC # 1295182 6/24/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR8
U.S. SEC # 1295374 7/22/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-AR9 U.S. SEC # 1298122 5/24/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-CB1
U.S. SEC # 1291463 6/22/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-CB2 U.S. SEC # 1294965 8/23/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-CB3
U.S. SEC # 1301258 10/25/04  5/27/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-CB4 U.S. SEC # 1306922 4/29/04  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-Rs2
U.S. SEC # 1288883 5/25/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-S2 U.S. SEC # 1291737 6/23/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates/Series 2004-S3
U.S. SEC # 1295156 12/20/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Ser 2002-Ar19 U.S. SEC # 1211522 2/24/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Ser 2003-S1
U.S. SEC # 1220308 12/19/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Series 2002-S8 U.S. SEC # 1211244 9/22/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Ser 2003-Ar10 U.S. SEC # 1264256
9/22/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Ser 2003-S10 U.S. SEC # 1264257 10/23/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Ser 2003-S11 U.S. SEC # 1268053
9/22/03  3/30/05 Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Ser 2003-S9 U.S. SEC # 1264258 5/22/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Series 2003-S5 U.S. SEC # 1235345
2/23/04  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certs Series 2004-S1 U.S. SEC # 1281095 11/25/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Thru Certificates Series 2002-Ms8 U.S. SEC # 1207425
11/25/02  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass Thru Certificates Series 2002-Ms9 U.S. SEC # 1207426 2/24/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Pass-Thru Cert Series 2003-Ar2 U.S. SEC # 1220259
11/22/02  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Cer Se 02 Ar18 U.S. SEC # 1207209 6/21/02  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Ce Se 02 Ar7 U.S. SEC # 1176128
6/23/03  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Ce Se 03 S6 U.S. SEC # 1245821 7/26/02  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Ce Se 2002-Ar9 U.S. SEC # 1178854
7/26/02  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Pa Th Ce Se 2002 S5 U.S. SEC # 1178842 8/22/03  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Ps Th Ce Se 03 Ar9 U.S. SEC # 1261111
11/21/03  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mo Ps Th Ce Se 03 S13 U.S. SEC # 1271056 6/23/03  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Mor Pas Th Ce Se 03 Ar7 U.S. SEC # 1245823
10/27/03  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Corp Wamu Series 2003-Ar11 U.S. SEC # 1268283 2/25/02  3/30/05Washington Mutual Mort Sec Wamu Mor Pa Th Ce Se 2002 Ar2 U.S. SEC # 1168200
8/22/01  6/24/04Wamu Mor Pass Thru Cert Ser 2001-Ar1 U.S. SEC # 1157920 10/9/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2001-Ar2 U.S. SEC # 1160537
11/13/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2001-Ar4 U.S. SEC # 1162155 10/25/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2001-S10 U.S. SEC # 1161529
11/28/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2001-S11 U.S. SEC # 1162828 2/22/02  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-Ar3 U.S. SEC # 1168097
4/27/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Series 2001-5 U.S. SEC # 1139304 7/27/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Cert Series 2001-S8 U.S. SEC # 1145954
12/13/01  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Thru Certificate Series 2001-Ar6 U.S. SEC # 1163589 4/23/02  6/24/04Wamu Mortgage Pass Thru Certs Series 2002-Ars U.S. SEC # 1171948
5/24/02  3/31/03Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2002-S4 U.S. SEC # 1174300 6/27/03Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-Ar7 U.S. SEC # 1249359
12/7/01CSFB Mor Sec Corp Wamu Mor Bk Pa Thr Cer Ser 2001-Ar5 U.S. SEC # 1163340 5/13/99  11/13/00Wamu Partners U.S. SEC # 1056574
5/21/04  3/30/05WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-CB1 [ now WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2004-AR4 ] U.S. SEC # 1291435
3/25/03  3/30/05Wamu Mortgage Passs Through Certificates Series 2003-S2 [ now Wamu Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2003-S2 ] U.S. SEC # 1224460