Washington Mutual loans and Chase

Well if anyone is interested, I know now, after a long hard struggle how at least JP Morgan /Chase does business, especially concerning the so called LOANS THEY NEVER HAD FROM WASHINGTON MUTUAL. Its quite the puzzle , but when you talk to bankers , that Chase screwed over , the puzzle unravels. For those of you who went to Chase and asked them to look for your note from WAMU and were dealing with Deutsche Bank , or Archbay at the time ( or possibly another bottom feeder ) what happens is ( in my case anyway) you have a department called home-lending Dept Of recovery, which is run by Mike Boyle, who researches  your notes. They decide on which notes were forgiven  that belonged to Washington Mutual ( first and second notes) because Chase wanted them off the books and not have to deal with them and that loss was cheaper than the court cost etc( they were learning this fast due to the claims they made with other Wamu notes , in courts across the country.). Now if you were a lucky candidate , one or both were written off, unless a bottom feeder like Deutsche Bank (or DB STRUCTURED PRODUCTS, Archbay, etc) WHO sold them illegally as NPLS to Hedge Funds  and had hoped to get away with it , but Deustche bank knowing they would soon be caught,( I did the research and when the Banks lawyers found out  I was digging, suddenly Chase received  phones calls from the other banks lawyer .Chase sent us a letter stating when and with who this conversation had taken place. This was also when Chase still insisted they owned BOTH my notes and would not release any information to the lawyer)  than Deutsche Bank,   than goes to Chase and pays Chase pennies on the dollar to get one of them notes and than Chase writes off the other note. I had a second Note that after Chase claiming to own BOTH my   Notes,the second Note  was suddenly written  off  as  SATISFIED and the first  Note was  sold to Deutsche, in an under handed deal, (mind ya AFTER Chase stated for months to own the first Notes as well NOW they claim they never had it and their is no proof because the note was sold and Chase destroyed the record. ). However,It doesn't end there ,than Chase writes an assignment dated years after the purchase ( mine was over 5 years later)Now, this is where it gets sticky , because if Chase NEVER had the first note now ,( 10 months later) like they claim, how could they possibly write an assignment of mortgage on a NOTE according to them they never had , so could never see? Wouldn't that be FRAUD by Chase? Than suddenly the bottom feeder claiming to own the note (who never had the paperwork in all these years ) comes forward with it , and Chase suddenly no longer has it and states it made a mistake it never owned the first loan,( because  it has now been sold and destroyed in Chase records) than congratulations , your puzzle is now solved. Chase who believes they can get away with it and has, with I am sure thousands of people, is now gonna get caught in its own web of deceit, because I plan on making this even more public , in order for  lawyers and courts and people who were abused to know how it works.

SO ,SHARE SHARE SHARE!!!

I Also posted it  here
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/dailybriefing/RBS-Set-for-Biggest-Loss-Since-2008-1040872-1.html#comments
 Please share so others will know.

The Great Chase WAMU $300 Billion Caper?

by Neil Garfield

Hiding in plain sight, Chase may indeed have taken control of the portfolio loans of Washington Mutual. The FDIC receiver clearly stated to me that there was no assignment of mortgages. He also said that he thought Washington Mutual was servicing about $1 Trillion in loans originated by WAMU or its originators (pretender lenders). And he said that it was estimated by him and the U.S. Bankruptcy Trustee that about 1/3 of those loans were portfolio loans --- I.e. Real loans paid for by WAMU. And of course, as previously reported here and elsewhere we now know that Chase acquired no loans as part of the merger with WAMU.

So the question is "What happened to the $300 Billion in loans that were real assets of WAMU?" Nobody has really asked and obviously no answer has been forthcoming --- especially not from Chase who was going around the country foreclosing on loans that it said it acquired "by merger" from WAMU.

Here is my theory: the loans are technically in the WAMU "estate" from the Bankruptcy proceedings. The U.S. trustee disclaimed any interest in some WAMU subsidiaries that probably have an interest in those loans. Those subsidiaries still exist. why? Meanwhile, Chase DID acquire the servicing rights of WAMU.

As the Servicer it receives payments from Borrowers who have no idea about the status of their loan. If Chase receives a payment on a loan that is subject to claims of securitization, we assume that it makes payments to the trust beneficiaries of the REMIC trust claimed to own the loan. That is a whole other subject for forensic auditing. Our focus for today is what does Chase do with payments on loans that are still WAMU loans. I theorize that one likely possibility is that Chase keeps the money because there is nobody claiming a right to receive the payments now that the WAMU Bank has ceased to exist. That would give them an income of around $20 Billion+ per year on loans that WAMU funded and Chase never bought. But that is the tip of the iceberg.

The loans kept as WAMU portfolio loans were probably subject to underwriting that was more in line with industry standards and probably had a much lower default rate than the loans that investors funded. So those loans had a definite value on the secondary market. Hence I postulate that Chase as authorized Servicer is acting as the owner. Without anyone making a claim, they have nobody to pay. So if they sold the WAMU portfolio loans as successor Servicer for WAMU loans, the proceeds of sale went to Chase and Chase then created numerous such transactions wherein they "sold" the mortgages they didn't own.

The sale proceeds are completely controlled by Chase. They no doubt did sell most of the loans by now and many of them were probably "assigned" to new REMIC trusts. Thus Chase, based upon estimates from those close to the WAMU estate and the Chase WAMU merger, generated more than $300 Billion in sales of loans it never owned or paid for, plus principal and interest payments received on those loans, probably totaling around $400 Billion between the merger and now. No wonder they are so eager to pay fines measured in the tens of billions, when they illegally obtained loans worth in the hundreds of Billions of dollars.

Who is the injured party? It would appear that the Bankruptcy Estate of WAMU, or the Trustee for the estate, is the injured party. They should have the $400 Billion. Why this was not apparent to the U.S. Trustee and the FDIC receiver I don't know. But isn't it peculiar that there is a $400 Billion hole in the deal that went entirely to Chase?

Of course this is conjecture not even an opinion, so far. I could be wrong. But in the chaos of the overnight mergers, it seems more likely that Chase found every way available to grab more money.

Well I warned you

 This is true. I paid off First Premier Bank CC in 2004, when owned by Washington Mutual. Recently I had letters arriving asking for settlements and people calling my family  telling them I could go to jail if I didn't pay. They updated it weekly on my credit report as well. I went to my VT AG who addressed this with them and guess what? They never responded .Chase and JP are selling these to recovery sites even if they were paid off.  

Chase and JP claim to own these and sell them and claim to own the notes and sell them and foreclose . Now , they are claiming they don't , and cry wolf cause they were caught and want to sue the FDIC.. ah NO ! You lied Chase and JP and its now time you face your karma! I warned you .

 

 

JP Morgan Sues FDIC for WAMU Cash Over Disputed Mortgage Bonds

by Neil Garfield

EDITOR'S NOTE: The dots are starting to get connected. Here JP Morgan who said they were the successor for everything that was WAMU turns out to be arguing that this didn't actually happen and that some money is still left in the WAMU "estate." The issue that is not raised is what else is in the WAMU estate? I content that there are numerous loans or claims to loans that were never transferred to anyone successfully and I think the FDIC and JPM both know that. Chase is trying to limit its exposure for bad bonds while at the same time claiming ownership or servicing rights for the underlying mortgages.

Which brings me to a central procedural point: if these cases are to be properly litigated such that the truth of the transaction(s) comes out, then it cannot be done on the rocket docket of foreclosures. It should be assigned to regular civil litigation or even better complex litigation because the issues cannot be addressed in the 5-10 minutes that are allowed on the rocket docket.

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• JPMorgan (JPM) has sued the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. for a portion of the $2.7B remaining in the FDIC receivership that liquidated Washington Mutual following the sale of its branches and deposits to JPMorgan for $1.88B during the financial crisis in 2008.
• The lawsuit is the latest development in the dispute between JPMorgan and the FDIC over who should assume Washington Mutual's legal liabilities, such as those related to the sale of problematic mortgage bonds.
• Meanwhile, JPMorgan has been sued by the State of Mississippi for alleged misconduct while going after credit-card users for missed payments. The bank's sins include pursuing consumers for money they didn't owe, Mississippi said.
• The state is the second to sue JPMorgan over the issue, the other being California, while 15 others are examining the matter. JPM is already in early settlement talks with 14 of them.

Read more at Seeking Alpha:
http://seekingalpha.com/currents/post/1470511?source=ipadportfolioapp_email

US Bank.. well I called this one awhile back :(

US Bank is popping up all over the place as the Plaintiff in judicial actions and the initiator of foreclosures in non- judicial states. It is one of the leading parties in the shell game that is mistaken for securitization of loans. But on its own website it admits against the interests that it has advanced in courts across the country, that it has NO POWER TO FORECLOSE or to pursue any other remedies.

US Bank pops up as the foreclosing party as trustee for some supposedly securitized asset pool masquerading as a REMIC trust ( which we all know now was breached in virtually every way, which is why the IRS granted a one year amnesty for the trusts to get their acts together --- an action of dubious legality).

Both US Bank and the the Pooling and Servicing Agreement will usually state flat out that the servicer makes all decisions and takes all actions relating to the borrower and the borrower's payments. There are several reasons for this one of which is the obvious conflict that could occur if the the servicer and the trustee were both bringing foreclosure actions.

But the other reason, the hidden one, is that the banks want to keep the court's attention on the borrower's contract and keep it away from the lender's contract which is quite different than the borrower's contract. And THAT will invite inquiry as to how or even if the two contracts are related or connected such that the mortgage encumbrance gives rights to the trust beneficiaries such that the collection and foreclosure efforts will inure to the benefit of the trust beneficiaries in the REMIC trust.

So why is US Bank violating both the content and intent of the PSA and its own website? In my own law firm I have two entirely different foreclosure cases --- one in which US Bank is the foreclosing party and the other where the servicer started the foreclosure action. Both loans are claimed to be in the same trust although one is in California and the other is in Florida. Why would Chase bank as servicer started an action? Even worse, why did Chase bank start the action as though it was the creditor and claim that there was no securitization?

I am not sure about the answers to these questions but I have some conjectures.

In the Florida case, US Bank is bringing the case because the servicer can't --- it knows and its records show non-stop servicer advances to the trust beneficiaries of the REMIC trust that supposedly was funded and who purchased or originated the loans in the trust. In the California case, even though the servicer advances are still present it is non-judicial so it is easier for Chase to slip by without even pausing because unless the homeowner brings a legal action to stop the foreclosure sale it just happens. And then it is over. But Chase is treading on thin ice here which is why it is now transferring the servicing rights ---- and therefore the rights to litigate --- to SPS who did not make the servicer advances.

Both Chase and US Bank are going into bankruptcy courts in Chapter 11 proceedings and demanding adequate protection payments while the bankruptcy is proceeding, knowing and withholding the fact that the creditor is being paid every month and there is no default from the creditor's point of view. This would be important information for the debtor in possession and the his attorney and the Judge to know. But it is withheld in the hope that the borrower/debtor will never discover the truth --- and in most cases they don't, unless they get a loan level account report based upon a solid securitization report which is based upon a good title report.

Both US Bank and Chase are wiling to endure awards of sanctions for misleading the court as a cost of doing business because the volume of complaints about their illegal and fraudulent activities is nearly zero when compared with the total of all state court, federal court and bankruptcy actions. But now they are treading on even thinner ice --- they are seeking to get turnover of rents with people who own multiple properties. Their arrogance apparently overcame their judgment. The owners of multiple properties frequently have substantial resources to litigate against the US Bank and Chase and now SPS. The truth is coming out in those cases.

Other Banks who say they are trustees simply direct the borrower or other inquirers to the servicer. But where US Bank is involved it is seeking profit at the expense of the trust beneficiaries and the owners of the real property involved. It seems to me that US Bank has gotten too cute by half and is now exposed to multiple actions for fraud. And I question whether the current revelations about US Bank BUYING the position of trustee has any legal support. I don't think it does --- not in the PSA, not in the statutes nor under common law.

Wamu Breaking news

Who knows what will happen when all is said and done.. Just might be that Karma will hit many, namely Deutsche Bank and JP Morgan and Chase. One can only hope.



Bloomberg News
DEC 3, 2013 12:58pm ET
Ex-WaMu CEO Said to be Near Settlement in Bank Failure


Former Washington Mutual Inc. Chief Executive Officer Kerry Killinger and two other bank officials are in settlement talks with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the last chapter in the government’s probe of the largest U.S. bank failure.

The regulator is weighing a settlement with Killinger, former chief operating officer Stephen Rotella and David Schneider, former head of the home-loan division, over claims they mismanaged the Seattle-based thrift, according to a person who was briefed and spoke on condition of anonymity because the talks aren’t public.

The person, who said the talks have entered the final stage, didn’t describe the terms being discussed. The details of a deal would need the approval of senior OCC officials.

Washington Mutual, which was the nation’s largest savings and loan and one of the largest subprime lenders, became a public symbol of the excesses of the housing bubble. The thrift and its subprime arm “engaged in a host of shoddy lending practices that contributed to a mortgage time bomb,” the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations said in a 2011 report.

The bank was seized by regulators in September 2008 after reporting that it faced $19 billion in losses from soured mortgages. JPMorgan Chase & Co. bought remnants of the thrift and has since struggled to unwind itself from liability for Washington Mutual’s faults.

In 2011, Killinger, Rotella and Schneider reached a $64 million settlement with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., which liquidated the bank. The FDIC sued the three executives for failing to tend to the thrift’s safety while they received more than $95 million in compensation from 2005 until its collapse. Most of their payments under the settlement were covered by Washington Mutual’s insurance policy.

The OCC’s separate investigation stems from the agency’s 2011 merger with the Office of Thrift Supervision, which had supervised Washington Mutual.

Daniel W. Turbow, a lawyer at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati who has represented Killinger, declined to comment. Rotella, now CEO of New York-based StoneCastle Cash Management LLC, didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment. Schneider, who until this year was CEO of Vericrest Financial Inc., an Irving, Texas, mortgage servicer, didn’t return a message left at a phone number listed to his name in New Jersey.

Bryan Hubbard, an OCC spokesman, declined to comment on the talks.

A Justice Department investigation into Washington Mutual ended in August 2011 without charges filed.

The report from the Senate panel, which is led by Senator Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat, found that Washington Mutual “produced hundreds of billions of dollars of poor quality loans that incurred early payment defaults, high rates of delinquency, and fraud.”

Killinger advised his bank’s board in June 2006 that the company should be “in position to grow its market share” in high-risk lending—including subprime loans—according to an internal memo published in the Senate investigation. The report said Killinger pushed a plan to “significantly curtail” low-margin, safer loans in a shift toward higher risk.

Two months earlier, Schneider had given a presentation suggesting the bank should almost double its subprime volume by 2008, according to the Senate report. Emails between Rotella and Killinger in 2005 showed Rotella also encouraging subprime and home equity loan growth, according to the report.

Killinger said in court filings in the FDIC lawsuit that examiners from the FDIC and OTS were stationed at the bank and were aware “in real time” of business decisions the FDIC later challenged. Killinger, Washington Mutual’s CEO for 18 years, told Levin’s panel in 2010 that his bank could have survived the crisis but U.S. officials denied Washington Mutual help offered to other financial firms.

The bank—in business for 119 years—had enjoyed a string of acquisitions and explosive growth in its final years, adopting a new advertising slogan in the months before its collapse: “Whoo hoo!” In U.S. history, the scale of its bankruptcy was eclipsed only by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.

JPMorgan, as part of its $13 billion settlement with the government last month, agreed it wouldn’t continue to press the FDIC to cover some of the losses from defective mortgage securities sold by Washington Mutual before it was acquired.

How and Why is US Bank becoming the trustee of all the REMIC Trusts?

Great question, seeings how they now have mine. Chase , is up to its neck in this one.

US bank is popping up as the substitute Plaintiff in cases I have where BOA claimed to be the trustee of the REMIC Trust by virtue of being a "successor by merger." Now I see them popping up where Chase was the Plaintiff. In all cases the bank originally filed under an assumed name by renting the name of someone else or by claiming to own the loan themselves. Now they are under the administration and under the coordination of what I believe to be the Chicago law firm that coordinated the first burst of Aurora strawmen when Aurora itself was a strawman for Lehman Brothers. The object I suspect is centralization of all the trustee positions into US Bank.

The next logical step would be bankruptcy to end of the claims for breach of fiduciary duty. But that option won't work because of the amount of assets and income US Bank is claiming now. So the only thing left for them to do is dilute the liability into virtually nothing. And the only way to do that is package up the income streams and, as you might have guessed, securitize those packages and sell the securitized packages with insurance and indemnification --- the same way they layered over the sale of the trustee positions from BOA. The object I can tell you from experience is to make it so complex that they create a grey area in the law or rather the appearance of a gray area just like they are doing successfully with the mortgages and the Foreclosures. They are nothing if not consistent.

There is, so far, one chink in the armor that I have detected or maybe two. The first is that the PSA does not generally give the Trustee of the REMIC Trust the power or even the right to inquire about Foreclosures although that hasn't stopped US bank from claiming to be the Plaintiff in foreclosure actions. The second is the issue of whether the sale of the trustee's position is allowed under the governing law (New York usually) since it is contrary to the express terms of provisions in the PSA. Those provisions identify the trustee and allow only for succession by merger, which is why the banks were all claiming that. The question of law that will be the battleground is whether homeowners have standing to challenge that sale and whether the courts are going to take a disliking to the sale by the trustee of its duties and revenue. As I explained yesterday, such a precedent will cause uncertainty and chaos in the marketplace not only with trusts. It will also be used to commoditize other things that we take for granted are not for sale.

All of this relates to an earlier post I made about the Pope's comment about the idolatry of money. His point is well taken. Instead of actions being taken that are acceptable under moral standards or legal standards, these banks have us thinking that somehow the world will be better if we put a metric or value on everything and anything, thus raising moral hazard as a goal rather than a limit on human behavior. And you might find them arguing that none of it matters because the trustee has no powers anyway. This would be a foolish argument that might invite the ire of the judiciary.

The bottom line is that they are trying to undermine the whole standing issue and the relevance of ownership of the loan. Under the standards being set by the banks if you can find any debtor then anyone can collect from the debtor if they get to him first. In short, this is nuts.

 by Neil Garfield

Wamu, Chase and the decision that can change lives

Sadly I have said this all along.

Shack Blasts Chase, Fannie Mae for Bad Faith on Wamu Merger

It is obvious that documents were produced for Shack to issue these rulings. The affidavits to which he refers should be obtained in their entirety. There is lots to take away from this decision, but most important, is that Chase never acquired the loans from WAMU. The loans originated or acquired by WAMU were already sold to investors, trusts and Fannie or Freddie. The issue with Fannie and Freddie of course is that they were merely fronting for "private label" securitizations hiding behind the veil of the GSE's who were mere guarantors and not lenders. I'd like to see any agreement and transactional documents showing the alleged purchase by Fannie, but it is presumed in the Shack Order and Findings.

It is also obvious that the finding that Chase was not the owner of the debt at any time came from an admission from both a Fannie Mae representative in an affidavit from an alleged Fannie Mae representative. We should direct discovery in Chase cases to that person in Fannie Mae who says they acquired the subject debt and that Chase merely received the servicing rights in the Chase-WAMU merger.

Note that Fannie Mae is considered by Shack to have acted in bad faith, and that Fannie was less than forthcoming in its description of itself stating that they might be the owner or they might be the trustee (pursuant to the Master Trustee Agreement published in 2007) for a securitized trust. Note also that Fannie at no time was chartered as a lender. Thus it could not originate any loans and never did so. The vagueness with which Fannie Mae addresses the issue of ownership shows that the hiding and non-disclosure in bankruptcy courts and state courts continues across the country.

The admission from Fannie that they "might" be the Master trustee for allegedly securitized assets (debts arising out of fictitious transactions on paper that looked like mortgage loans) is both alarming and encouraging. The rush to foreclosure is partially explained by this chaotic pile of fraudulent paper trails.

When you take into account the non stop servicer advances, you can see what the parties are hiding --- that the real creditor on those debts, has been paid all the interest they were expecting, that the principal is being paid in settlements with pennies on the dollar, and that the default alleged in notices from servicers and informing the borrower of the right to reinstate were defective, to wit: that the amount stated as required to cure the alleged default was and remains incorrect. The amount should have been reduced by third party payments including but not limited to the servicer advances which were not loans, and thus could only be characterized as PAYMENT, which is the ultimate defense against a lawsuit or any enforcement mechanism designed to collect a debt.

The dirty little secret is that they diverted title and money from the investors and converted what could have been a secured loan into an unsecured loan. The advances and payments by third parties satisfied the debt that arose when the borrower took the loan. They in turn MIGHT have claims for contribution or unjust enrichment but they are most certainly not protected by a pledge of collateral either as mortgage or assignment of rents or anything else.

Note that it could not have acquired loans except with money from what were represented as securitized trusts with Fannie as master Trustee. Therefore there are no circumstances under which Fannie or Freddie could be owners of the the debt with rights to enforce except upon the only event in which money is paid by Fannie for the loan --- a guarantee payment AFTER FORECLOSURE) that is the only transaction permitted under its charter. This point was missed by Shack or ignored by him, because he had bigger fish to fry --- the lawyers for Chase itself with a copy of the order to be served upon Jamie Dimon, the head of Chase.
The fact is that with the WAMU bankruptcy, seizure by OTS and appointment of FDIC, there were no assignments, agreements of sale or even a permission slip under which Chase could or did acquire loans from WAMU. But that didn't stop Chase from claiming exactly that in tens of thousands of foreclosures.
In cases where Chase is allegedly at the root of title through the merger with WAMU, it would be appropriate to site to the Shack case, get the case documents, get a Title and Securitization report (see http://www.livingliesstore.com) and lawyers should look into a motion for summary judgment, or a motion for involuntary dismissal with prejudice. Even where Chase might allege that it is filing the foreclosure as a representative of Fannie or Freddie, the basis for that allegation needs to be in their pleading or it is not an ULTIMATE fact upon which relief could be granted. Discovery should be aimed at getting the documents upon which Chase allegedly relies in showing that it has the authority to represent Fannie --- and don't stop there. The truth is that nearly all the so-called Fannie and Freddie loans were veils for the private label securitization in which the money was diverted from the trust, as was the title, leaving Fannie and Freddie as well as the investors and the buyers holding nothing.

In cases where the statute of limitations has already run, the dismissal of the foreclosure action, is barred in most cases from ever being brought again by anyone. But the dismissal against Chase should be with prejudice in all events because it isn't the creditor and therefore does not satisfy the statutory requirements in Florida, and I presume all other states, to submit a credit bid at auction in lieu of cash.
The Judges are beginning to understand that by applying basic contract law, they can clear their dockets. It is up to us to help them. The offer of a loan was met with acceptance by the borrower but the loan never occurred. The transfers also had offer and acceptance but again no money because the investors' money was used (outside the trust) directly to fund the origination or acquisition of the loan. This was part of a larger scheme to defraud to investors whose money was to have been deposited into the trust and then used to fund origination or acquisition of the he loans within 90 days (the cutoff).

The investment bank fraudulently induced (see complaints filed by investors, insurers, government guarantee entities etc.) the investors to give them money for an investment into a controlled trust when in fact they diverted the money for their own purposes, taking outsized fees for themselves as the toxic loans materialized to "support" the alleged investment into loans. That is the "mismanagement" part of investors' allegations --- diversion of money into a PONZI scheme.

The investment bank fraudulently diverted title to the loans to strawman entities or were --- sometimes even by name (see American Brokers Conduit) --- mere conduits for undisclosed third party lenders. The argument that the parties managed to hide this from the borrower long enough for the statute of limitations to run out on TILA claims is an affront to the court system and to the statutory scheme enacted by Congress to protect borrowers from predatory lenders and "steal" deals where huge fees were taken, rather than earned, without disclosure to the Borrower.

So the first element of fraud alleged by investors is diversion of the the money. The second is diversion of the paperwork that would have protected the investors at least to some extent. In this scheme title to the loan papers was intentionally diverted from the owners of the the debt, thus rendering the so-called mortgage documents unenforceable --- all alleged by investors, insurers and other co-obligors who have discovered to their chagrin that each of them paid the investment bank 100 cents on the the dollar on each loan multiple times.

And yet borrowers continue to seek modifications, which means they are not looking for free houses. Even knowing they are dealing with criminals the borrowers are willing to start paying these thieves if the terms can be adjusted to give them the benefit of the bargain that was intended at origination of the purchase money mortgage or refinancing or second mortgage or HELOC.

That leaves the servicers and their lawyers being the only ones who want Foreclosures because they want a free house and/or they want the foreclosure to recapture Servicer advances to the creditors --- advances that vastly reduce the amount owed and which cure the alleged borrower default. That has now become a foreclosure folly in which the servicers and their lawyers are the only parties who want it. The investors don't care because they are getting settlements for the fraud of the investment banks for creating unenforceable loan documents (that are frequently enforced anyway because of judicial ignorance) and diversion of investor money.

In the end, the "clean hands" that Shack talks about are clearly absent from both Servicer and government sponsored entities and as judge Shack states in his decision, wrongdoers should not be permitted to profitf or their wrongdoing. If that means a windfall to the borrower, so be it. It can be likened to the old usury laws and the current usury laws where the principal of the debt is wiped out and the fraudster is hit with a judgment for three times the principal, three times the interest or both.

Trouble Connecting the Dots?

It still baffles me how I had all these evil banks - American home, countrywide, BOA, long beach, wamu, DB , chase, and still the Judge didn't get the connection on how I was a victim. Priceless. 

Matt Weidner reports that he went to court on a case where IndyMAc was the plaintiff. IndyMac was one of the first banks to collapse. It was found that they owned virtually zero mortgages and had "securitized" the rest which is to say they never loaned the money or got paid off by a successor. Now the servicing rights on IndyMac have been sold. So when the time came for trial he finds the lawyer fighting with his own witness. It seems that she would not say she worked for IndyMac because she didn't. That meant there was no corporate representative present to testify for the plaintiff. case over? Not according to what we have seen where IndyMac foreclosures continue to be rubber stamped by Judges who do not understand the gravity of the situation.

The precedent being set is for anyone who knows about a default to race to the courthouse with a complaint to foreclose after fabricated a notice of default and asserting themselves as the successor to whoever the borrower was paying. The borrower doesn't know the difference and generally doesn't care because they mistakenly think they are screwed no matter what. So the pretender lender that was collecting takes it time partly because they are simply collecting fees on "non-performing" loans. Meanwhile our creative criminal goes in and alleges that he is the holder of a lost note, submits affidavits, but of course stays away from the essential allegation that there ever was a transaction between himself and the borrower. These days Judges don't seem to require that.

Judgment is entered for our creative criminal and he becomes by court order, the creditor who can submit a credit bid at auction. He makes the non-cash bid at the auction and presto he just got himself a free house which he sells at discount on the open market. He only needs to do a few of those before he vanishes with a few million dollars. In fact, we have learned that such "foreclosures" are going on now sometimes creatively named such that it looks like the name of a bank. That is why I have been saying for 7 years that  the foreclosures, if they are allowed to proceed, will eventually create chaos in the marketplace.

You might ask why the banks don't raise a big stink about this practice. The answer is that there are only a few such scams going on at the moment. And the banks are relying on the loopholes created in pleading practice to get their own foreclosures through the same way as our criminal because they really don't own the loan or even the servicing rights. Yup! That is called a syllogism: if the creative criminal is a criminal for doing what he did, then the bank or anyone else who engages in the same behavior is also a criminal.

And that is why the justice department and regulators are ramping up their investigations and charges, getting ready to indict the bankers who thought they were untouchable. If you read the reports of securities analysts, you will see three types of authors -- those who obviously have drunk the Kool-Aide and believe Bank of America and Chase hinting the stock is a good buy, those who are paid to plant pretty articles about the banks, and supposedly declining foreclosures and increasing housing prices, and those who have looked at the jury conviction of Countrywide, looked at the pace of settlements, and looked at the announcements that there are many more investigations and charges to be resolved, and who have seen the probability of indictments, and they conclude that BOA is soon going to be on the chopping block for sale in pieces and the same will happen with Chase, Citi and maybe even Wells.

While the media is not paying attention to the impending doom of the mega banks, the market is discounting the stock and the book value of these companies is dropping like a stone because real investment analysts under stand that much of what is being carried on the books as assets, is really worthless garbage. Charges of fraud are announced practically everyday, saying that the banks defrauded investors, defrauded Fannie and Freddie, and defrauded each other, as well as insurance companies and counterparties on credit default swaps. In other words it is pretty well settled that the sale of mortgage bonds was a sweeping fraudulent scheme and that the word PONZI scheme is accurate, not some conspiracy theory as I was treated back in 2007-2010.

So now that we know that there was complete fraud at one end of the stick (where the funding for the origination and acquisition of mortgages took place), the question is why is anyone looking at foreclosures as inevitable or proper or even possible. It is the same stick. If one end is burning then it is quite likely that the other end will be burning soon and that is exactly what I predict for the coming months.

Having been in court multiple times over the last month representing clients seeking to retain their homes it is readily apparent that the Judges are changing their minds about whether the foreclosure is inevitable or that collection by these creative criminals is wise or legal --- i.e., whether the enire exercise involves an arrogant willingness to commit perjury. Since the mortgages were part of the scheme and the part where the lender appeared with the money is covered in fraud, it is certainly reasonable to assume that the the fraudulent schemes included the origination and transfer of mortgage paper. And that is exactly the case.

If it wasn't the case there never would have been fraud at the top because the investors would be on the note and mortgage and some some nominee of the broker dealer ("BANK") or they would have been on a recorded assignment closed out within 90 days of the start of the REMIC trust, which would have been funded by money from investors paid to the investment bank (broker dealer) who then forwarded the net proceeds tot he Trust. None of that ever happened, though, which is how the fraud was enabled.

Practice Hint: I like to demonstrate by drawing a large "V" where the bottom is the closing agent, the left side is the money trail and the right side is the paper trail --- and showing that they never meet. That means the paper trail is a fictional story about transactions that never occurred. The money trail is actual facts and data showing actual transactions where money exchanged hands but there was no documentation. The "Trust" was never funded with money or assets, so the money went straight down the left side from the investors at the top of the left side to the closing agent, who applied the investors money to close a transaction that was documented as though the originator had loaned the money. The same reasoning applies to transfers and assignments.

The core of the cases filed by the banks is that the Note is prima facie evidence that a transaction occurred. It is entitled to a presumption of validity. But where the borrower denies the transaction ever occurred, and files the right discovery to get evidence of the wire transfers and canceled checks, the banks go wild because they know their entire case will not only fall apart but subject them to prosecution.

Which brings us to Marshall Watson, who seeks to be licensed again to practice law, and David Stern who is about to be disbarred forever. The good news is that they were disciplined for fabrication and forgery of documents. The bad news is that the inquiry stopped there and nobody ever asked why it was necessary to fabricate or forge documents.

FRAUD! In Foreclosure Court Indymac/Onewest Doesn’t Own Notes and Mortgages, But “They” Continue To Foreclose Anyway
http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-1051166/

-Suspended Ft. Lauderdale foreclosure mill head seeks return
http://therealdeal.com/miami/blog/2013/10/24/suspended-fort-lauderdale-foreclosure-mill-head-seeks-return/

Florida Bar referee calls for ex-foreclosure king’s disbarment
http://therealdeal.com/miami/blog/2013/10/30/florida-bar-referee-calls-for-ex-foreclosure-kings-disbarment/

Looking for answers

Hi everyone,
This is a long shot , but hoping someone will know . I am looking for employees of Dana Capital , mostly a man named Joe. He would of worked for them in 2004. I want to know if he knows if my note was securitized . I am sure he will.

Dana Capital Group

Category: Mortgage Brokers 

8001 Irvine Center Drive
Irvine, CA 92618

I am also looking for investors for this security

Roosevelt Mortgage ( bought the loans from Archbay Mortgage LLC 2010B) This would be in Jan- Feb of this year. The actual sale was Dec.29. 2012.
Rushmore - Servicer
US Bank Corp - Trustee 

Inside this security is a loan , stating its worth 180,000.00 , this is NOT true, the house is worth 116,000.00. Their are 3 liens on this house, one is a US FEDERAL Lien for 201,000.00, Plus 32,000.00 Tax lien ( not for the house) and a 19,000.00 lien for Beneficial. 

Their is also , questions concerning the actual ownership of this loan. It was originally with Long Beach Mortgage in 2004- 2010. According to land records. However DB Structured Products claimed to of bought it in Sept 2006, but their is no assignment, no land records , nothing they proved to of bought it. In 2010 Deutsche Bank sold it to Archbay holdings LLC 2010B, with a robo signed document, yet, never showed how they were able to sell it, when no land records showed they owned it . ( title now no good) Than in 2011 Chase  claims to own it, ( received by Washington Mutual) Archbay and Deutsche Bank lawyers also have a robo signed assignment signed 6 years after the fact , stating it came from Chase, which Chase has also denied in doing, and was to be sent back to a M.E. Wilderman at Orion Financial group. ( 2nd title defect) Archbay never showed how they were able to buy it, also , why would they request an emerg assignment from Chase , if they in fact had all the required paperwork to buy it? Why robo signed? Why an incomplete assignment? Why if Chase did this , they state they didn't?  Now it was sold to Roosevelt mortgage Dec 29, 2012. 

I want to buy the house and pay in cash . Or I go to federal court and everyone loses. This house has been in foreclosure since May 2006, my only fault was taking on this loan when I didn't have to , and all I wanted was to know who owned it to pay for it. I never asked for a free ride , every work out was walked away from , not by me.

Please contact me , if you can help in this matter.

These cases could help save your homes from fraud

How to chase Chase

2. RESOURCES — Pleadings, Orders, and Exhibits

On this page you will find descriptions and links to various pleadings, orders, and exhibits filed by attorneys as well as individuals representing themselves. Where the outcome is known, that information is included. These documents are public records and are made available for your information, but their accuracy, competency, and effectiveness have not been verified. Only a judge can rule on a pleading and only an appellate court opinion that is certified for publication can be cited as precedent. That said, it can be both educational and entertaining to see how the great race is unfolding in the historic controversy of People v. Banks. For an entertaining public outing of history's all-time greatest pickpockets, go see the documentary "Inside Job."

Federal Court

Javaheri v. JPMorgan Chase, 9th Cir. Court of Appeal, No. 12-56566 (CV10-8185 ODW)

Otis D. Wright II, Judge, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Los Angeles
Douglas Gillies, attorney for Daryoush Javaheri
Plaintiff sued to halt two foreclosures initiated by JPMorgan Chase. Judge Otis D. Wright denied Chase's motion to dismiss five causes of action - wrongful foreclosure, quiet title, violation of Cal Civ. Code Sec. 2923.5, quasi contract, and declaratory relief, but later Summary Judgment was entered in favor of Chase in the two cases. Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

• Brief of Appellant 6/25/2013

Gillies v. JPMorgan Chase (Gillies 3), 9th Cir. No. 13-55296 (CV12-10394 GW)

George Wu, Judge, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Los Angeles
Douglas Gillies, Plaintiff in pro per
Plaintiff sued Chase in state court (Gillies 1) to halt a foreclosure initiated by JPMorgan Chase on the grounds that he could not find a recorded Notice of Default in the County Recorder's office. Chase produced a recorded NOD with plaintiff's name misspelled. The trial court ruled that a NOD had been recorded, sustained Chase's demurrer, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeal affirmed.
Chase recorded a second Notice of Trustee’s Sale (“NOTS”) with Plaintiff’s name misspelled and Plaintiff sued again in state court (Gillies 2) alleging that the NOD and NOTS did not provide constructive notice because they could not be properly indexed. The trial court sustained a motion to strike on the basis of res judicata and the Court of Appeal affirmed. In all, California courts ruled that a NOD had been recorded and the indexing issue was barred by res judicata.
Chase recorded a third NOTS with a misspelled name on November 8, 2012. Plaintiff filed a complaint in Federal District Court against Chase for attempting to sell his property at a trustee's sale without knowing the identity of the lender, note holder, or beneficiary. He alleged that subsequent to filing the NOD, Chase had invested thousands of dollars pursuing a strategy of executing a defective foreclosure based on intentionally stating a fictitious name for the trustor in a recorded Notice of Default and three recorded Notices of Trustee’s Sale, when it simply could have requested that the lender contact Plaintiff and ask him to sign a correctly spelled document. The District Court dismissed the Complaint with prejudice on the grounds that the action was precluded by the demurrer in state court, and Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The key issue is the scope of the doctrine of res judicata.

• Complaint
• Chase's Motion to Dismiss
• Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
• Chase's Reply
• Order Granting Motion to Dismiss
• Brief of Appellant filed in the 9th Circuit on 8/27/2013

Naranjo v. SBMC Mortgage, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103735, Case No. 11-cv-2229-L(WVG)

M. James Lorenz, District Judge, U.S. District Court, Southern District of California
Penelope Bergman, Deborah Gutierrez, Los Angeles, CA, attorneys for Carmen Naranjo
"The vital allegation in this case is the assignment of the loan into the WAMU Trust was not completed by May 30, 2006 as required by the Trust Agreement. This allegation gives rise to a plausible inference that the subsequent assignment, substitution, and notice of default and election to sell may also be improper. Defendants wholly fail to address that issue. This reason alone is sufficient to deny Defendants' motion with respect to this issue."
The case was settled on June 21, 2013. Happy Solstice, Carmen.

• Order Denying DBMC's Motion to Dismiss 7/24/2012
• Naranjo's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 3/12/2012
• Order for Settlement Process 6/21/2013

Ansanelli v. JPMorgan Chase, 2011 WL 1134451, Case No. CV10-03892 (WHA)

William Alsup, District Judge, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California
Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy, Burlingame, CA, attorneys for Angela Ansanelli
Chase took over servicing two Ansanelli loans after it purchased WaMu's assets. Plaintiffs tried to negotiate a loan modification and landed in loan mod hell. Chase moved to dismiss the SAC, and plaintiff's lawyers prevailed on almost every count. The court refused to dismiss causes of action for breach of contract, fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, RESPA, and unfair business practices (Cal. B&P Code sec. 17200).
Additional motions were filed, plaintiffs filed a Fourth Amended Complaint on May 12, 2011, and defendants filed an Answer. At a mediation session on June 22, 2011, the case was settled.

• Second Amended Complaint 2/3/2011
• Order Denying Motion to Dismiss 3/28/2011
• Fourth Amended Complaint 5/12/2011

Bakenie v. JPMorgan Chase, Case No. SACV12-0060 JVS
U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Santa Ana)
Joseph Arthur Roberts, Newport Beach, CA, attorney for Ernest Bakenie
Plaintiff alleges that Chase is engaged in the business practice of deceiving bankruptcy judges, creditors, debtors, and attorneys as to Chase's status as a secured creditor in thousands of bankruptcy cases filed nationwide.
Through fabricated assignments, endorsements and affidavits that purport to transfer Deeds of Trust, notes and the rights to money due under thousands of non-negotiable promissory notes, Chase is playing "hide-and-seek" with debtors and judges.
The 171-paragraph complaint seeks an order vacating all Bankruptcy orders, claims and awards granted based on Chase's misrepresentations and deceptive business practices.

• Class Action Complaint filed 1/13/2012

Balderas v. Countrywide, Case No. 10-55064
Opinion by Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Kevin Griffin, Griffin Johnson LLP, Dana Point, CA, attorney for Victor Balderas
Plaintiffs alleged that Countrywide gave them defective copies of the TILA Notice of Right to Cancel, which remained at the bank rather than were given to Plaintiffs. Therefore they were entitled to rescind within three years, rather than three days of signing the papers.
Chief Judge Kozinski's opinion begins, "The Balderases allege that they are immigrants who were rooked by a bank that signed them up for loans it knew they couldn't afford, on terms they didn't agree to."
The opinion continues:

Webster's New International Dictionary defines "deliver" as "to give or transfer" and "to yield possession or control of." Webster's New International Dictionary 693 (2d ed. 1939). We interpret "deliver" to mean that the consumer must be allowed to keep the notice. When you have pizza delivered, you don't sign for it and let the deliveryman take it back to the restaurant. And when a newspaper boy delivers a paper, he doesn't show you the headlines and then return it to the printer.

Countrywide claims that the Balderases didn't allege enough facts to rebut the signed notice's presumption of delivery. But presumptions are not rebutted by allegations; they are rebutted by evidence. And the time for presenting evidence has not yet arrived. Complaints need only allege facts with sufficient specificity to notify defendants of plaintiffs' claims. Here, the Balderases pleaded that the notice they were given was defective...

As we've said before, "so long as the plaintiff alleges facts to support a theory that is not facially implausible, the court's skepticism is best reserved for later stages of the proceedings when the plaintiff's case can be rejected on evidentiary grounds." In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litigation, 536 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, the Balderases clearly alleged in their complaint that they were never given a Notice of Right to Cancel that complied with TILA. If they can prove up this allegation at trial, they'll win. A complaint containing allegations that, if proven, present a winning case is not subject to dismissal under 12(b)(6), no matter how unlikely such winning outcome may appear to the district court.

• Opinion 12/29/2011

Carswell v. JPMorgan Chase, Dist. Ct. No. CV10-5152; 9th Circuit No. 11-55423
George Wu, Judge, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Los Angeles
Douglas Gillies, attorney for Margaret Carswell
Plaintiff sued to halt a foreclosure initiated by JPMorgan Chase and California Reconveyance Co. on the grounds of failure to contract, wrongful foreclosure, unjust enrichment, RESPA and TILA violations, and fraud. She asked for quiet title and declaratory relief. Chase responded with a Motion to Dismiss. At a hearing on September 30, 2010, Judge Wu granted defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to amend. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint was filed on October 18. It begins:

It was the biggest financial bubble in history. During the first decade of this century, banks abandoned underwriting practices and caused a frenzy of real estate speculation by issuing predatory loans that ultimately lowered property values in the United States by 30-50%. Banks reaped the harvest. Kerry Killinger, CEO of Washington Mutual, took home more than $100 million during the seven years that he steered WaMu into the ground. Banks issued millions of predatory loans knowing that the borrowers would default and lose their homes. As a direct, foreseeable, proximate result, 15 million families are now in danger of foreclosure. If the legions of dispossessed homeowners cannot present their grievances in the courts of this great nation, their only recourse will be the streets.

Chase responded with yet another Motion to Dismiss, Carswell filed her Opposition to the motion, and at hearing on January 6, 2011, Judge Wu asked Plaintiff for an Offer of Proof. Her Offer of Proof included written argument, 19 exhibits, and a powerpoint presentation. Judge Wu granted Chase's Motion to Dismiss, and Carswell appealed to the 9th Circuit (Case No. 11-55423).
After a hearing on November 7, 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the District Court's order of dismissal.

• Notice of Intent to Preserve Interest 1/28/2010
• First Amended Complaint 10/18/2010
• Declaration of Margaret Carswell 7/13/2010
• Transcript of Hearing 9/30/2010 re: Motion to Dismiss
• Chase's Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint 10/27/2010
• Chase's Request for Judicial Notice 10/27/2010
• Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 12/03/2010
• Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice 12/03/2010 - Congressional Oversight Panel's Report
• Transcript of Hearing 1/6/2011 re: Motion to Dismiss
• Judge Wu's Order Dismissing FAC 1/06/2011
• Plaintiff's Offer of Proof 1/28/2011
• Declaration of Margaret Carswell 1/28/2011
• Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-19 re: Offer of Proof
• Plaintiff's Exhibit 20 re: Offer of Proof - Powerpoint presentation
• Chase's Response to Offer of Proof 1/31/2011
• Judge Wu's Final Order of Dismissal 2/15/2011
                  - - -
  
• Appellant Margaret Carswell's Opening Brief 9/23/2011
• Appellee JPMorgan Chase's Answering Brief 10/21/2011
• Margaret Carswell's Reply Brief 11/4/2011
• Opinion of 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 11/21/2012

Khast v. Washington Mutual, JPMorgan Chase, and CRC, Case No. CV10-2168 IEG

Irma E. Gonzalez, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court, Southern District of California
Kaveh Khast in pro se
A loan mod nightmare where Khast did everything right except laugh out loud when WaMu told him that he must stop making his mortgage payments for 90 days in order to qualify for a loan modification. As Khast leaped through the constantly shifting hoops tossed in the air, first by WaMu, then by Chase, filing no less than four applications, Chase issued a Notice of Trustee's Sale.
Khast filed a pro se complaint in federal court which included a request for a Temporary Restraining Order. The District Court granted a TRO to stop the sale. The court wrote that the conduct by WAMU appeared to be "immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers," and thus satisfied the "unfair" prong of California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus.&Prof.Code §17200. Plaintiff stated that he possessed documents which supported his contention that Defendant WAMU instructed him to purposefully enter into default and assured him that, if he did so, WAMU would restructure his loan. Accordingly, Plaintiff demonstrated that he was likely to succeed on the merits of his claim.
The court also relied upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel, whereby a promisor is bound when he should reasonably expect a substantial change of position, either by act or forbearance, in reliance on his promise. He who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.
At a later hearing, the court denied a preliminary injunction when Chase argued that WaMu's immoral conduct was a liability that was not assumed by Chase under the Purchase and Assumption Agreement dated September 25, 2008. The court's TRO on October 26 nevertheless provides borrowers with ammunition to raise claims of unfair competition and promissory estoppel.
Plaintiff's claims under TILA were dismissed because the 3-year Statute of Limitations had passed and Plaintiff did not allege facts in support of suspending the limitations period under the doctrine of equitable tolling. The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act did not apply because mortgagees, servicers, and trustees are not "debt collectors" subject to FDCPA. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367 over Plaintiff's state law claims.

• Complaint 10/10/2010
• Temporary Restraining Order 10/26/2010
• Order Denying Injunction 12/9/2010
• Order of Dismissal 3/16/2011

Saxon Mortgage v. Hillery, Case No. C-08-4357
Edward M. Chen, U.S. Magistrate, Northern District of California
Thomas Spielbauer, attorney for Ruthie Hillery Hillery obtained a home loan from New Century secured by a Deed of Trust, which named MERS as nominee for New Century and its successors. MERS later attempted to assign the Deed of Trust and the promissory note to Consumer. Consumer and the loan servicer then sued Hillery. The court ruled that Consumer must demonstrate that it is the holder of the deed of trust and the promissory note. In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 653 (S.D. Oh. 2007) held that to show standing in a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must show that it is the holder of the note and the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed. For there to be a valid assignment, there must be more than just assignment of the deed alone; the note must also be assigned. "The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident...an assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity." Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872).
There was no evidence that MERS held the promissory note or was given the authority by New Century to assign the note to Consumer. Without the note, Consumer lacked standing. If Consumer did not have standing, then the loan servicer also lacked standing. A loan servicer cannot bring an action without the holder of the note. In re Hwang, 393 B.R. 701, 712 (2008).

• Order Granting Hillery's Motion to Dismiss dated 12/09/2008

Serrano v. GMAC Mortgage, Case No. 8:09-CV-00861-DOC
David O. Carter, Judge, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Los Angeles Moses S. Hall, attorney for Ignacio Serrano
Plaintiff alleged in state court that GMAC initiated a non-judicial foreclosure sale and sold his residence without complying with the notice requirements of Cal. Civil Code Sec. 2923.5 and 2924, and without attaching a declaration to the 2923.5 notice under penalty of perjury stating that defendants tried with due diligence to contact the borrower. Defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice, and described in detail the defects in the Complaint with directions how to correct the defects. Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint on 4/01/2010.

• Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Without Prejuduce 3/18/2010
• Second Amended Complaint for Wrongful Foreclosure 4/01/2010

Sharma v. Provident Funding, Case No. 3:2009-cv-05968
Vaughn R Walker, Judge, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California
Marc A. Fisher, attorney for Anilech and Parma Sharma
Defendants attempted to foreclose and plaintiffs sued in federal court, alleging that defendants did not contact them as required by Cal Civ Code § 2923.5. In considering plaintiffs' request for an injunction to stop the foreclosure, the court found that plaintiffs had raised "serious questions going to the merits" and would suffer irreparable injury if the sale were to proceed. Property is considered unique. If defendants foreclosed, plaintiffs' injury would be irreparable because they might be unable to reacquire it. Plaintiffs' remedy at law, damages, would be inadequate. On the other hand, defendants would not suffer a high degree of harm if a preliminary injunction were ordered. While they would not be able to sell the property immediately and would incur litigation costs, when balanced against plaintiffs' potential loss, defendants' harm was outweighed.
The court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from selling the property while the lawsuit was pending.

• Complaint for Wrongful Foreclosure 12/21/2009
• Points & Authorities In Support of TRO
• Plaintiff's Declaration in Support of TRO
• Order Granting Preliminary Injunction 1/08/10

Federal Bankruptcy Court

In re Salazar, No. 10-17456 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2011) Chap. 13
Margaret M. Mann, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, San Diego, CA
Francisco J. Aldana, attorney for Eleazar Salazar
600 B Street, Suite 2130, San Diego, California 92101
Cal Civil Code 2932.5 applies to Deeds of Trust as well as mortgages. It requires that if the foreclosing beneficiary has acquired its claim by assignment, it must record its assignment of the Deed of Trust before the trustee's sale.
MERS was not the beneficiary at the time of the foreclosure, even if it was initially the nominal beneficiary under the DOT. The DOT does not grant MERS any authority apart from a nominal role. MERS is not an extra-judicial commercial alternative to California's exhaustive nonjudicial foreclosure law (Civil Code sections 2020-2955). This Court joins the courts in other states that rejected MERS' offer of an alternative to the public recording system (citing In re Agard, below)
"The Court rejects the claim that MERS' limited role in the DOT provides it carte blanche authority over the nonjudicial foreclosure process."

• Salazar's Memo of Points & Authorites in Opposition to Relief from Stay
• Opinion Denying Relief from Automatic Stay 4/12/2011

In re Agard, No. 10-77338, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 488, at *58-*59 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011) Chap. 7
Robert E. Grossman, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Central Islip, NY
George Bassias, Astoria, NY, attorney for Ferrel Agard
21-83 Steinway, Astoria, NY 11105
gbassias@yahoo.com
The membership rules of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, or MERS, don't make it an agent of the banks that own the mortgages. "MERS's theory that it can act as a 'common agent' for undisclosed principals is not supported by the law," Grossman wrote. "MERS did not have authority, as 'nominee' or agent, to assign the mortgage absent a showing that it was given specific written directions by its principal."
"MERS and its partners made the decision to create and operate under a business model that was designed in large part to avoid the requirements of the traditional mortgage-recording process," Grossman wrote. "The court does not accept the argument that because MERS may be involved with 50 percent of all residential mortgages in the country, that is reason enough for this court to turn a blind eye to the fact that this process does not comply with the law."
"Without more, this court finds that MERS's 'nominee' status and the rights bestowed upon MERS within the mortgage itself, are insufficient to empower MERS to effectuate a valid assignment of mortgage," the judge wrote. "MERS's position that it can be both the mortgagee and an agent of the mortgagee is absurd, at best."
Grossman said parties coming to him to seek to lift the automatic ban on legal claims in cases involving MERS will have to show they own both the mortgage and the note.
MERS appealed Judge Grossman's order on March 8, 2011.

• Opinion Denying Relief from Automatic Stay 2/11/2011

In re: Hwang, 396 B.R. 757 (2008), Case No. 08-15337 Chapter 7
Samuel L. Bufford, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Los Angeles
Robert K. Lee, attorney for Kang Jin Hwang
As the servicer on Hwang's promissory note, IndyMac was entitled to enforce the secured note under California law, but it must also satisfy the procedural requirements of federal law to obtain relief from the automatic stay in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. These requirements include joining the owner of the note, because the owner of the note is the real party in interest under Rule 17, and it is also a required party under Rule 19. IndyMac failed to join the owner of the note, so its motion for relief from the automatic stay was denied.
Reversed on July 21, 2010. District Court Judge Philip Gutierrez reversed the Judge Bufford's determination that IndyMac is not the real party in interest under Rule 17 and that Rule 19 requires the owner of the Note to join the Motion.

• Opinion Denying Relief from Automatic Stay 10/29/2008
• District Court Reversal of Judge Bufford's Order 7/21/2010

In re: Vargas, Case No. 08-17036 Chapter 7
Samuel L. Bufford, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Los Angeles
Marcus Gomez, attorney for Raymond Vargas

• Motion for Stay 7/03/2008
• Order Denying MERS Relief from Stay 10/21/2009
• First Amended Adversary Complaint Case No. 09-01135-SB 1/15/2010
• Opposition to MERS Motion to Dismiss Complaint 2/24/2010

In re: Walker, Case No. 10-21656 Chapter 11
Ronald H. Sargis, Judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Sacramento
Mitchell L. Abdallah, attorney for Rickie Walker
MERS assigned the Deed of Trust for Debtor's property to Citibank, which filed a secured claim. Debtor objected to the claim. Judge Sargis ruled that the promissory note and the Deed of Trust are inseparable. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the Deed of Trust alone is a nullity. MERS was not the owner of the note, so it could not transfer the note or the beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust. The bankruptcy court disallowed Citibank's claim because it could not establish that it was the owner of the promissory note.

• Objection to CitiBank Proof of Claim 4/06/2010
• Declaration in Support of Objection 4/06/2010
• Points & Authorities in Support of Objection 4/06/2010
• Order Disallowing CitiBank Claim 5/20/2010

Washington Mutual Inc. Bankruptcy, Case No. 08-12229 Chapter 11
Mary F. Walrath, Judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Delaware
The Washington Mutual, Inc. Chapter 11 Voluntary Bankruptcy Petition was filed by WaMu on September 26, 2008 in Deleware. The filing fee was $1,039. As of the end of February 2012, 11,050 documents had been filed.

California State Court

Mabry v. Aurora Loan Services
185 Cal.App.4th 208, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201 (4th Dist. June 2, 2010)
California Court of Appeal, 4th District, Division 3
California Supreme Court, Petition for Review denied August 18, 2010.
Moses S. Hall, attorney for Terry and Michael Mabry
The Mabrys sued to enjoin a trustee's sale of their home, alleging that Aurora's notice of default did not include a declaration required by Cal. Civil Code §2923.5, and that the bank did not explore alternatives to foreclosure with the borrowers. The trial court refused to stop the sale. The Mabrys filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandate and the Court of Appeal granted a stay to enjoin the sale. Oral argument was heard in Santa Ana on May 18, 2010.
Aurora argued that a borrower cannot sue a lender that fails to contact the borrower to discuss alternatives to foreclosure before filing a notice of default, as required by §2923.5, because §2923.5 does not explicitly give homeowners a "private right of action." Aurora also argued that a declaration under penalty of perjury is not required because a trustee, who ordinarily files the notice of default, could not have personal knowledge of a bank's attempts to contact the borrower. Nobody mentioned that the trustee is not authorized by the statute to make the declaration. §2923.5 states that a notice of default "shall include a declaration from the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent that it has contacted the borrower..."
The Court of Appeal ruled that a borrower has a private right of action under § 2923.5 and is not required to tender the full amount of the mortgage as a prerequisite to filing suit, since that would defeat the purpose of the statute. Under the court's narrow construction of the statute, §2923.5 merely adds a procedural step in the foreclosure process. Since the statute is not substantive, it is not preempted by federal law. The declaration specified in §2923.5 does not have to be signed under penalty of perjury. The borrower's remedy is limited to getting a postponement of a foreclosure while the lender files a new notice of default that complies with §2923.5. If the lender ignores the statute and makes no attempt to contact the borrower before selling the property, the violation does not cloud the title acquired by a third party purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Therefore §2923.5 claims must be raised in court before the sale. It is a question of fact for the trial court to determine whether the lender actually attempted to contact the borrower before filing a notice of default. If the lender takes the property at the foreclosure sale, its title is not clouded by its failure to comply with the statute. Finally, the case is not suitable for class action treatment if the lender asserts that it attempted to comply with the statute because each borrower will present "highly-individuated facts."
In a petition for review to the California Supreme Court, the Mabrys noted that more than 100 federal district court opinions have considered §2923.5 and an overwhelming majority have rejected a private right of action under the statute. The petition for review was denied.
After the case was remanded to the trial court, Mabry's motion for preliminary injunction was granted. The trial court found that the Notice of Default contained the form language required by the statute, i.e. that the lender contacted the borrower, tried with due diligence to contact the borrower, etc. However, the declaration on the Notice of Default was not made under panalty of perjury, and therefore had no evidentiary value to show whether the defendant satisfied §2923.5

• Court of Appeal's Stay of Foreclosure Sale 11/25/2009
• Opinion of Court of Appeal, Fourth District 6/2/2010
• Petition for review, California Supreme Court 7/13/2010. Denied 8/18/2010.
• Order Granting Preliminary Injunction Orange County Superior Court 12/17/2010.

Lange v. JP Morgan Chase, Washington Mutual, Alta Community Investment, and Seaside Capital Fund
California Court of Appeal, 2nd District   Case #B233670
Roger Senders, trial attorney
Douglas Gillies, appellate attorney for Susan Lange
Susan Lange was paying Chase $6384 per month to stay in her home under a trial loan modification agreement when she came home to find a Notice to Quit posted on her front door. Without giving notice to Susan, Chase had conducted a Trustee's Sale. The property was purchased by Alta Community Investment, founded by Todd Kaufman, and Seaside Capital Fund, owned by Luke McCarthy. However, Todd Kaufman was not your typical bona fide purchaser of distressed properties. He had designed and managed WaMu's securitization division. He left WaMu during the mortgage meltdown and founded Alta Community Investment so he could buy and sell distressed houses.
Two days later, Lange received a knock on the door from Nancy Mura, who was sent to Lange's home to persuade the residents to move immediately. Mura told Lange that if she didn't get out right away, Luke McCarthy would pay her a visit and he would be "very unpleasant" if he had to come. "He never loses these things."
The trial court sustained demurrers filed by Chase, Alta, and Seaside. Susan Lange appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, stating, "Alta and Seaside sent someone to her door asking her to vacate after the foreclosure sale, but this is not extreme and outrageous."

• Third Amended Complaint
• Susan Lange's Opening Brief - Cal. Court of Appeal 6/8/2012
• Alta's Responsive Brief 8/9/2012
• Chase's Responsive Brief 8/13/2012
• Susan Lange's Reply Brief 9/24/2012
• Opinion of Court of Appeal, Second District 2/11/2013

Susan Lange's hearing in the Cal. Court of Appeal on 12/12/2012 (31 min.) Download MP3 (right click)

Herrera v. Deutsche Bank
California Court of Appeal, 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 3rd District (May 31, 2011)
Herrera was originally an unpublished opinion, but after receiving a request from the public, the Court ordered on June 28, 2011, that the opinion would be published in part.
A trial court errs in taking judicial notice of disputed facts contained within recorded documents.
A matter ordinarily is subject to judicial notice only if the matter is reasonably beyond dispute. "Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning." Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374. While courts take judicial notice of public records, they do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein. Love v. Wolf (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 378, 403. "When judicial notice is taken of a document . . . the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable." StorMedia, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9.
In Herrera, the Substitution of Trustee recited that Deutsche Bank "is the present beneficiary under" the 2003 deed of trust. This fact was hearsay and disputed. Therefore, the trial court could not take judicial notice of it. Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106. Nor would taking judicial notice of the Assignment of Deed of Trust establish that the Deutsche Bank was the beneficiary under the deed of trust. A recitation that JPMorgan Chase Bank is the successor in interest to Long Beach Mortgage Company, through Washington Mutual, is hearsay. Plaintiffs disputed the truthfulness of the contents of all of the recorded documents.
A supporting declaration must be made on personal knowledge and "show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated." Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d). Deborah Brignac's declaration did not affirmatively show that she can competently testify that the bank is the beneficiary under the deed of trust. At most, her declaration shows she can testify as to what the Assignment of Deed of Trust "indicates." The factual contents of the assignment were hearsay and defendants offered no exception to the hearsay rule to make these factual matters admissible.
At oral argument, defendants contended that the recorded documents were actually business records and admissible under the business record exception. However, Brignac did not provide any information in her declaration establishing that the sources of the information and the manner and time of preparation would indicate trustworthiness. (Evid. Code, § 1271 (d).
A declaration that the Substitution of Trustee by Deutsch Bank made CRC trustee would require admissible evidence that the bank was the beneficiary under the 2003 deed of trust and thus had the authority to substitute the trustee. Because defendants failed to present facts to establish that the bank was beneficiary and CRC was trustee under the 2003 deed of trust, and therefore had authority to conduct the foreclosure sale, triable issues of material fact remain.

• Herrera Opinion of Court of Appeal, Third District 5/31/2011

Gillies v. California Reconveyance Co. and JPMorgan Chase (Gillies 1)
California Court of Appeal, Case # B224995, 2nd District, Division 6
Douglas Gillies, Appellant in pro per
Gillies sued on November 25, 2009, to enjoin a trustee's sale, alleging that CRC's Notice of Default (NOD) did not include a declaration required by Cal. Civil Code §2923.5, the NOD mailed to the homeowner was not a copy of the recorded NOD, and the Notice of Default was not recorded in the County Recorder's Office. Defendants filed a Demurrer and attached a recorded NOD in which the name of the trustor was misspelled. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and the case was dismissed. Gillies appealed.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's demurrer, and wrote, "Gillies points out that the notice of default misspells his first name Dougles, instead of the correct Douglas. But no reasonable person would be confused by such a minor error. Gillies last name is spelled correctly and the notice contains the street address of the property as well as the assessor's parcel number."

• Appellant's Opening Brief
• Response Brief filed by Chase Bank and California Reconveyance
• Appellant's Reply Brief
• Decision of Court of Appeal
• Appellant's Petition for Rehearing - filed April 21; denied April 23, 2011

Gillies filed a second lawsuit against CRC on July 13, 2011 (Gillies 2).

Gillies v. California Reconveyance Co. (Gillies II)
California Court of Appeal, Case # B237562, 2nd District, Division 6
Douglas Gillies, Plaintiff in pro per
Gillies sued CRC a second time to enjoin a trustee's sale, alleging that the Deed of Trust did not correctly state the name of trustor, as required by Cal. Civil Code §2924, and that CRC did not attempt to contact the borrower to explore alternatives to foreclosure before filing the Notice of Default. The court granted a Temporary Restraining Order to stop the sale but declined to issue a preliminary injunction.
CRC filed a Motion to Strike the Complaint on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Gillies opposed the motion arguing that res judicata does not apply because the Complaint alleges new facts and new theories and the earlier dismissal following a demurrer was not a judgment on the merits. When Judge de Bellefeuille dismissed the complaint in Gillies II, she suggested that it should be resolved by the court of appeal.
Plaintiff filed an appeal on November 16, 2011, Case # B237562. The Second Appellate District, Div. 6, ruled in an unpublished opinion that the action was barred by the doctrine res judicata.

• Complaint and Application for TRO
• CRC's Motion to Strike
• Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Strike
• CRC's Reply
• Order Striking Complaint and Judgment of Dismissal
• Gillies' Opening Brief in the Cal. Court of Appeal, May 4, 2012, No. B237562
• CRC's Respondent's Brief Brief
• Gillies' Reply Brief
• Decision of Court of Appeal, September 6, 2012
• Petition for Review - California Supreme Court, October 16, 2012, No. S206021
• CRC's Answering Brief - California Supreme Court, November 10, 2012
• Gillies' Reply Brief - California Supreme Court, November 13, 2012

Gillies filed a third lawsuit against Chase in Federal District Court on December 5, 2012 (Gillies 3) alleging that Chase could not identify the Lender and was therefore not authorized to commence foreclosure. Chase's wholly owned subsidiary, CRC, had recorded a Deed of Trust that did not correctly state the name of trustor, followed by a Notice of Default and three Notices of Trustee's Sale. A spelling discrepancy is a clerical error. CRC's remedy could be found in the Adjustable Rate Note, which states in Paragraph 12 that in the event of a clerical error, "I agree, upon notice from the Note Holder, to reexecute any Loan Documents that are necessary to correct any such Errors." The Note Holder can request that the Trustor amend the Deed of Trust to correct a clerical error. Chase and CRC did not follow this simple remedy because they cannot identify or located the Note Holder.

Cabalu v. Mission Bishop Real Estate
Superior Court of California, Alameda County
Brian A. Angelini, attorney for Cecil and Natividad Cabalu

• Complaint to Set Aside Trustee's Sale -filed August 2009

Davies v. NDEX West, Case No. INC 090697
Randall White, Judge, Superior Court of California, Riverside County
Brian W. Davies, in pro per

• Complaint for Fraud dated 4/08/2010

Edstrom v. NDEX West, Wells Fargo Bank , Case No. 20100314
Superior Court of California, Eldorado County
Richard Hall, attorney for Daniel and Teri Anne Edstrom
A 61-page complaint with 29 causes of action to enjoin a trustee's sale of plaintiffs' residence, requesting a judicial sale instead of a non-judicial sale, declaratory relief, compensatory damages including emotional and mental distress, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and rescission.

• Complaint to Stay Foreclosure 5/24/2010
• Order to Show Cause 5/25/2010

Moreno v. Ameriquest
Superior Court of California, Contra Costa County
Thomas Spielbauer, attorney for Gloria and Carlos Moreno
Complaint for declaratory relief and fraud against lender for misrepresenting the terms of the loan, promising fixed rate with one small step after two years both orally and in the Truth In Lending Statement. Loan was actually variable rate with negative amortization. Morenos would have qualified for fixed rate 5% for 30 years, but instead received an exploding 7% ARM. Notary rushed plaintiffs through signing of documents with little explanation. Complaint requests a declaration the note is invalid, unconscionable and unenforceable and the Notice of Trustees Sale is invalid.

• Complaint for Fraud dated January 2008

Other State Courts

Niday v. GMAC, Case No. CV10020001
Oregon Court of Appeals
July 18, 2012
Jeff Barnes, attorney for Rebecca Niday
In sum, we conclude that the "beneficiary" of a trust deed for purposes of the OTDA is the person named or otherwise designated in the trust deed as the person to whom the secured obligation is owed--in this case, the original lender. We further conclude that, because there is evidence that the beneficiary assigned its interest in the trust deed without recording that assignment, there is a genuine issue of material fact on this summary judgment record as to whether ORS 86.735(1), a predicate to nonjudicial foreclosure, has been satisfied. We emphasize, however, that our holding concerns only the requirements for nonjudicial foreclosure. Cf. ORS 86.710 (beneficiary of the trust deed retains the option of judicial foreclosure). And the import of our holding is this: A beneficiary that uses MERS to avoid publicly recording assignments of a trust deed cannot avail itself of a nonjudicial foreclosure process that requires that very thing--publicly recorded assignments.

• Opinion decided 7/18/2012 that if evidence indicates the beneficiary assigned its interest through MERS without recording the transfer, nonjudicial foreclosure is not available.

JPMorgan Chase Bank v. George, Case No. 10865/06
Arthur M. Schack, Supreme Court Judge, Kings County, New York
Edward Roberts, attorney for Gertrude George

• Order Vacating Foreclosure Sale and Dismissing Chase's Complaint decided 5/04/2010

Florida Judge tosses foreclosure lawsuit

Homeowners dispute who owns mortgage by Steve Patterson
St. Augustine Record
June 15, 2010
Changing stories about who owns a mortgage and seemingly fresh evidence from a long-closed bank led a judge to throw out a foreclosure lawsuit. It's the second time in as many months that Circuit Judge J. Michael Traynor has dismissed with prejudice a foreclosure case where homeowners disputed who owns the mortgage. Lawyers representing New York-based M&T Bank gave three separate accounts of the ownership, with documentation that kept changing.
"The court has been misled by the plaintiff from the beginning," the judge wrote in his order. He added that documents filed by M&T's lawyers seemed to contradict each other and "have changed as needed to benefit the plaintiff."
The latest account was that Wells Fargo owned the note, and M&T was a servicer, a company paid to handle payments and other responsibilities tied to a mortgage. To believe that, the judge wrote, the "plaintiff is asking the court to ignore the documents filed in the first two complaints." He added that Wells Fargo can still sue on its own, if it has evidence that it owns the mortgage.
More and more foreclosure cases are being argued on shaky evidence, said James Kowalski, a Jacksonville attorney who represented homeowners Lisa and Larry Smith in the fight over their oceanfront home. "I think it's very representative of what the banks and their lawyers are currently doing in court," Kowalski said.
He said lawyers bringing the lawsuits are often pressed by their clients to close the cases quickly. But it's up to lawyers to present solid evidence and arguments. "We are supposed to be better than that," Kowalski said. "We are supposed to be officers of the court."

Exhibits

Department of Treasury and FDIC Report on WaMu, 4/16/2010
The Offices of Inspector General for Department of the Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation released its evaluation of the regulatory oversight of Washington Mutual on April 16. The table of contents tells the story. WaMu pursued a high-risk lending strategy which included systematic underwriting weaknesses. They didn't care if borrowers could pay back their loans. WaMu did not have adequate controls in place to manage its reckless "high-risk" strategy. OTS examiners found weaknesses in WaMu's strategy, operations, and asset portfolio but looked the other way.

• Evaluation of Federal Oversight of WaMu released 4/16/2010

OCC Advisory Letters
How could the regulators allow this breakdown to happen? Was it really fraud when banks arranged loans for homeowners who would inevitably go into defrault, sold them to Wall Street to be bundled into securities, then purchased insurance so that the bank would collect the unpaid balances when the borrowers lost their homes? Did anybody really know that repealing Glass-Steagall and permitting Wall Street banks to get under the covers with Main Street banks would cause so many borrowers to lose their homes? The Glass-Steagall Act, enacted in 1933, barred any institution from acting as any combination of an investment bank, a commercial bank, and an insurance company. It was repealed in 1999, and the repercussions have been immense.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued Advisory Letter 2000-7 only months after Glass-Steagall was repealed. It warned regulators to be on the lookout for indications of predatory or abusive lending practices, including Collateral or Equity Stripping - loans made in reliance on the liquidation value of the borrower's home or other collateral, rather than the borrower's independent ability to repay, with the possible or intended result of foreclosure or the need to refinance under duress. Proving fraud is a painstaking process. Getting inside the mind of a crook requires a careful foundation, and admissable evidence is not always easy to obtain. Many courts will take judicial notice of official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States. See Cal Evidence Code Sec. 452(c).
Here is a set of smoking guns in the form of a series of Advisory Letters issued by OCC:

• OCC Advisory Letter 2000-7 July 25, 2000
• OCC Advisory Letter 2000-9 August 29, 2000
• OCC Advisory Letter 2002-3 March 22, 2002
• OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2 February 21, 2003
• OCC Advisory Letter 2003-3 February 21, 2003
• Guidance from OCC, FDIC, OTS, and Federal Reserve October 4, 2005