Showing posts with label JP Morgan Chase. Show all posts
Showing posts with label JP Morgan Chase. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 30, 2013

Put Big Bank CEOs in Jail

Elizabeth Warren to Wall Street Regulators: Put Big Bank CEOs in Jail

| Wed Oct. 23, 2013 12:33 PM PDT
 
This past weekend, the Department of Justice slapped a record fine on JPMorgan Chase for packaging and selling the mortgage-backed financial products that helped cause the financial meltdown. But Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) wants the administration to know that fines are not enough. On Wednesday, she called on Wall Street regulators to hold all those responsible for the 2008 crisis accountable.
In a letter to the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Officer of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Warren lauded the overseer of the TARP bailout program for cracking down on financial industry players who wasted, stole, or abused the federal emergency funds doled out to banks during the financial crisis, and implied that the three banking regulators should also punish individuals who helped cause the financial meltdown.
Although the budget for TARP's inspector general was "a small fraction of the size of the budgets and staffs at your agencies," Warren pointed out, the program's watchdog has brought criminal charges against nearly 100 senior executives; obtained criminal convictions on 107 defendants, including 51 jail sentences; and suspended or banned 37 people from working in the banking industry.
How about you guys, Warren asked. She called on the Fed, the SEC, and the OCC to provide records on the number of people the agencies have charged criminally and civilly, the number of convictions and prison sentences they have obtained, the number of people banned or suspended from working in the industry, and the total amount of fines leveled against Wall Street ne'er-do-wells.
Warren knows the answer to most of these questions, but wants to shame the agencies into action. Yes, big banks have been forking over billions of dollars in civil settlements for bad behavior in the lead up to the crisis. There have been prosecutions of various smaller mortgage brokers, and some civil charges and settlements against executives who helped cause the crisis. But zero Wall Street CEOs are in jail for bringing down the economy, and no CEOs have faced criminal charges.
Earlier this year, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder seemed to concede that some banks are "too big to jail." But Warren doesn't buy it. "There have been some landmark settlements in recent weeks for which your agencies and others deserve substantial credit," Warren said in the letter. "However, a great deal of work remains to be done to hold institutions and individuals accountable for breaking the rules and to protect consumers and taxpayers from future violations."

Thursday, September 26, 2013

JPMorgan Chase Discussing $11 Billion Settlement To End Crisis-Era Mortgage Probes

Again, you need to dig  deeper, JP/Chase had a number of Washington Mutual loans given to them by the FDIC, and were charged off by JP/Chase. Than Chase made deals after claiming to own these loans with hedge funds selling them at pennies on the dollar and writing off second loans as paid and satisfied as part of the deal , so hedge funds could foreclose, and than JP/Chase turned around and later said to the homeowner, ( who they already told them they owned the loans) were sorry we made a mistake. NO !! Its time the banks and CEO start paying for this abuse, and its stop being the homeowner who is the one losing for a crime they didn't commit!!!!!!!! THIS IS NOT OVER till all the truth comes out.

JPMorgan Chase Discussing $11 Billion Settlement To End Crisis-Era Mortgage Probes

Posted:
WASHINGTON -- Federal and state authorities are discussing an $11 billion settlement with JPMorgan Chase that would resolve numerous allegations of mortgage-related improprieties in the years before the financial crisis, according to people familiar with the ongoing negotiations.
The deal, if struck, would settle claims brought by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the New York attorney general and end at least three separate investigations by U.S. attorneys' offices in New York, California and Pennsylvania. The potential deal would involve a $7 billion cash payment and $4 billion in mortgage modifications for troubled borrowers.
The negotiations are “developing by the hour," one person familiar with the talks said. It’s possible no deal will be struck, or that it could be much more limited and resolve only one or a few of the various probes.
The bulk of the $7 billion cash payment being discussed would go to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-backed mortgage giants regulated by FHFA. The agency, led by Edward DeMarco, claims Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were duped into buying junk mortgage-backed securities issued by JPMorgan and the financial companies it purchased in 2008, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual.
FHFA filed its lawsuit against JPMorgan and separately sued more than a dozen other leading financial institutions in September 2011. The agency is trying to reclaim billions of dollars in losses sustained by the two mortgage giants, which were rescued by taxpayers at the height of the financial crisis in 2008.
The rest of the funds would be split between shoring up the Federal Housing Administration, which has claims against the bank for allegedly defrauding taxpayers on FHA loans; New York state; the U.S. government; and distressed homeowners, who could apply for mortgage assistance.
FHA, a government agency inside the Department of Housing and Urban Development that insures loans traditionally made to first-time home buyers and others unable to stump up big down payments, is likely to tap the U.S. Treasury for a bailout as a result of depleted reserves caused by soured loans.
JPMorgan has been resisting such a large payment, government officials said. But JPMorgan has an incentive to settle as many government probes as possible by Oct. 11, when the bank reports third-quarter earnings. Already, the bank has cautioned investors that it expects to incur a significant cost due to the various government-driven legal claims it faces.
Equity analysts who cover JPMorgan for investors have said the bank’s legal liability could depress its stock price and future earnings.
The various government entities also have an incentive to strike a mass settlement rather than file separate cases in court that could take years to resolve, particularly if the current settlement involves reduced payments or lowered loan balances for troubled borrowers.
Representatives for the Justice Department, FHFA, JPMorgan, and New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman declined to comment.
JPMorgan faces a litany of accusations of mortgage-related misdeeds, according to its securities filings.
U.S. attorneys offices in California and Pennsylvania are investigating the bank’s allegedly misleading sales of mortgage-backed securities, according to securities filings and people familiar with the probes. In one case, federal prosecutors told JPMorgan in May that they had “preliminarily concluded” that the bank violated civil securities laws related to mortgage securities it packaged and sold from 2005 to 2007. A federal criminal investigation related to mortgage securities is pending.
Schneiderman last year sued the bank, alleging it misled investors when they purchased securities issued by Bear Stearns. Preet Bharara, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, has been probing the bank for possibly defrauding taxpayers on FHA loans, securities filings show.
In recent years, federal prosecutors and HUD have struck deals with Bank of America, Citigroup and Deutsche Bank, the German lender, to resolve allegations they defrauded taxpayers on FHA loans.
The current round of talks centered on JPMorgan intensified in recent days after federal prosecutors notified the bank they planned to file a civil lawsuit. The talks are being led by the Obama administration’s Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Working Group, the formal name for the federal and state agencies with a stake in investigating mortgage securities-related wrongdoing.
The administration has faced criticism, particularly from federal lawmakers, over the apparent lack of cases it has brought against leading financial institutions for alleged wrongdoing committed in the years leading up to the financial crisis.
Defense lawyers that represent big banks have said in recent months that the Justice Department has ramped up its investigations into their clients.

Thursday, September 19, 2013

Tell the SEC NO, not this time.. I did

Contact the SEC now and tell them no more slaps on the hands. 
 
 

SEC Addresses: Headquarters and Regional Offices

The Securities and Exchange Commission has twelve offices across the country:

SEC Headquarters
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549
(202) 942-8088
contact form: https://tts.sec.gov/oiea/QuestionsAndComments.html
see also: Electronic Mailboxes at the Commission
Directions for Hand Deliveries & Pick-ups
Atlanta Regional Office
Rhea Kemble Dignam, Regional Director
950 East Paces Ferry, N.E.
Ste 900
Atlanta, GA 30326-1382
(404) 842-7600
e-mail: atlanta@sec.gov
State jurisdiction: Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama
Boston Regional Office
John Dugan, Acting Regional Director
33 Arch Street, 23rd Floor
Boston, MA 02110-1424
(617) 573-8900
e-mail:
boston@sec.gov
State jurisdiction: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island
Chicago Regional Office
Tim Warren, Acting Regional Director
175 W. Jackson Boulevard
Suite 900
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 353-7390
e-mail: chicago@sec.gov
State jurisdiction: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin
Denver Regional Office
Julie Lutz and Kevin Goodman, Acting Co-Regional Directors
1801 California Street, Suite 1500
Denver, CO 80202-2656
(303) 844-1000
e-mail: denver@sec.gov
State jurisdiction: Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming
Fort Worth Regional Office
David Woodcock, Regional Director
Burnett Plaza, Suite 1900
801 Cherry Street, Unit 18
Fort Worth, TX 76102
(817) 978-3821
e-mail: dfw@sec.gov
State jurisdiction: Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kansas (except for the exam program which is administered by the Denver Regional Office)
Los Angeles Regional Office
Michele Wein Layne, Regional Director
5670 Wilshire Boulevard, 11th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90036-3648
(323) 965-3998
e-mail: losangeles@sec.gov
State jurisdiction: Arizona, Hawaii, Guam, Nevada, Southern California (zip codes 93599 and below, except for 93200-93299)
Miami Regional Office
Eric I. Bustillo, Regional Director
801 Brickell Ave., Suite 1800
Miami, FL 33131
(305) 982-6300
e-mail: miami@sec.gov
State jurisdiction: Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico
New York Regional Office
Andrew Calamari, Regional Director
Brookfield Place
200 Vesey Street, Suite 400
New York, NY 10281-1022
e-mail: newyork@sec.gov
State jurisdiction: New York, New Jersey
Philadelphia Regional Office
Daniel M. Hawke, Regional Director
The Mellon Independence Center
701 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1532
(215) 597-3100
e-mail: philadelphia@sec.gov
State jurisdiction: Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, District of Columbia
Salt Lake Regional Office
Kenneth D. Israel, Jr., Regional Director
15 W. South Temple Street
Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 524-5796
e-mail: saltlake@sec.gov
State jurisdiction: Utah
San Francisco Regional Office
Michael S. Dicke, Co-Acting Regional Director
Kristin A. Snyder, Co-Acting Regional Director
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 2800
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 705-2500
e-mail: sanfrancisco@sec.gov
State jurisdiction: Washington, Oregon, Alaska, Montana, Idaho, Northern California (zip codes 93600 and up plus 93200-93299)
 
NO! This is letting them get away with it again. Its like them telling me they were the owner of my Long Beach Washington Mutual mortgage and a year later saying they made a mistake and  didn't own it and using the same damn excuses. NO, this needs to stop. I lost my home because of this abuse.. and I canbet  thousands more.
Let it stop now and this time  charges filed, for once work for the people and the investors, and not just let them off the hook.



You are subscribed to Press Releases from the Securities Exchange Commission. A new press release is now available.
09/19/2013 07:00 AM EDT

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged JPMorgan Chase & Co. with misstating financial results and lacking effective internal controls to detect and prevent its traders from fraudulently overvaluing investments to conceal hundreds of millions of dollars in trading losses.
The SEC previously charged two former JPMorgan traders with committing fraud to hide the massive losses in one of the trading portfolios in the firm’s chief investment office (CIO).  The SEC’s subsequent action against JPMorgan faults its internal controls for failing to ensure that the traders were properly valuing the portfolio, and its senior management for failing to inform the firm’s audit committee about the severe breakdowns in CIO’s internal controls.
JPMorgan has agreed to settle the SEC’s charges by paying a $200 million penalty, admitting the facts underlying the SEC’s charges, and publicly acknowledging that it violated the federal securities laws.
“JPMorgan failed to keep watch over its traders as they overvalued a very complex portfolio to hide massive losses,” said George S. Canellos, Co-Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.  “While grappling with how to fix its internal control breakdowns, JPMorgan’s senior management broke a cardinal rule of corporate governance and deprived its board of critical information it needed to fully assess the company’s problems and determine whether accurate and reliable information was being disclosed to investors and regulators.”
As part of a coordinated global settlement, three other agencies also announced settlements with JPMorgan today: the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.  JPMorgan will pay a total of approximately $920 million in penalties in these actions by the SEC and the other agencies.
According to the SEC’s order instituting a settled administrative proceeding against JPMorgan, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 established important requirements for public companies and their management regarding corporate governance and disclosure.  Public companies such as JPMorgan are required to create and maintain internal controls that provide investors with reasonable assurances that their financial statements are reliable, and ensure that senior management shares important information with key internal decision makers such as the board of directors.  JPMorgan failed to adhere to these requirements, and consequently misstated its financial results in public filings for the first quarter of 2012.
According to the SEC’s order, in late April 2012 after the portfolio began to significantly decline in value, JPMorgan commissioned several internal reviews to assess, among other matters, the effectiveness of the CIO’s internal controls.  From these reviews, senior management learned that the valuation control group within the CIO – whose function was to detect and prevent trader mismarking – was woefully ineffective and insufficiently independent from the traders it was supposed to police.  As JPMorgan senior management learned additional troubling facts about the state of affairs in the CIO, they failed to timely escalate and share that information with the firm’s audit committee.
Among the facts that JPMorgan has admitted in settling the SEC’s enforcement action:
  • The trading losses occurred against a backdrop of woefully deficient accounting controls in the CIO, including spreadsheet miscalculations that caused large valuation errors and the use of subjective valuation techniques that made it easier for the traders to mismark the CIO portfolio.
  • JPMorgan senior management personally rewrote the CIO’s valuation control policies before the firm filed with the SEC its first quarter report for 2012 in order to address the many deficiencies in existing policies.
  • By late April 2012, JPMorgan senior management knew that the firm’s Investment Banking unit used far more conservative prices when valuing the same kind of derivatives held in the CIO portfolio, and that applying the Investment Bank valuations would have led to approximately $750 million in additional losses for the CIO in the first quarter of 2012. 
  • External counterparties who traded with CIO had valued certain positions in the CIO book at $500 million less than the CIO traders did, precipitating large collateral calls against JPMorgan.
  • As a result of the findings of certain internal reviews of the CIO, some executives expressed reservations about signing sub-certifications supporting the CEO and CFO certifications required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
  • Senior management failed to adequately update the audit committee on these and other important facts concerning the CIO before the firm filed its first quarter report for 2012.
  • Deprived of access to these facts, the audit committee was hindered in its ability to discharge its obligations to oversee management on behalf of shareholders and to ensure the accuracy of the firm’s financial statements.
The SEC’s order requires JPMorgan to cease and desist from causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 13a-11, 13a-13, and 13a-15.  The order also requires JPMorgan to pay a $200 million penalty that may be distributed to harmed investors in a Fair Fund distribution.
The SEC’s investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Michael Osnato, Steven Rawlings, Peter Altenbach, Joshua Brodsky, Joseph Boryshansky, Daniel Michael, Kapil Agrawal, Eli Bass, Sharon Bryant, Daniel Nigro, and Christopher Mele.  The SEC appreciates the coordination of the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, Federal Reserve, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as well as the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.

Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist JPMorgan Chase

Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-And-Desist Order
 http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70458.pdf


Its also time they do an internal audit of all of Washington Mutual and Long Beach Loans that Chase has. Also the Washington Mutual (WAMU) SEC Filings, as well as Long Beach Mortgages
This is long overdue. 

Thursday, September 12, 2013

Regulators Warn Banks Not to Flout $25B Foreclosure Deal


SEP 12, 2013 12:50pm ET

Regulators Warn Banks Not to Flout $25B Foreclosure Deal


When the largest U.S. banks agreed to pay $25 billion last year to settle claims of abusive foreclosure practices, they promised to stop seizing homes from borrowers who had completed applications for mortgage help.
Now regulators say lenders may be flouting the spirit of the deal by repeatedly asking for additional paperwork from borrowers seeking loan modifications and then foreclosing while treating the applications as incomplete.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the court-appointed monitor of the 2012 foreclosure settlement are among those moving to tighten oversight of the process known as dual-tracking, when borrowers facing the loss of their homes are simultaneously negotiating changes in their loans. Mortgage servicers who violate the rules or the terms of the deal could face sanctions including fines of $1 million per infraction.
“It is an important outstanding issue of unfinished business,” Joseph A. Smith Jr., the monitor, said in an interview.
Smith, who is responsible for ensuring Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo & Co., Ally Financial Inc. and Citigroup Inc. live up to their promises, said he is preparing to start measuring how well banks are communicating with borrowers about loan-workout applications. That could determine whether the servicers or homeowners are at fault for incomplete files.
Separately, the consumer bureau this week plans to complete proposed changes to pending mortgage-servicing rules aimed at tightening restrictions on dual-tracking, according to a person briefed on its work. The rules, to take effect in January, would cover all lenders, including those who aren’t parties to the settlement such as Ocwen Financial Corp. and Nationstar Mortgage Holdings.
Richard Cordray, director of the consumer bureau, said in an interview that he has personally met with the heads of the top 25 mortgage servicers, banks and non-banks alike, “to tell them face to face that this is a major priority for the bureau and that it’s something they need to focus on.”
Other U.S. and state agencies also have vowed to pursue banks that violate the settlement terms. U.S. Housing and Urban Development secretary Shaun Donovan has said that authorities would fine banks or “haul them back into court” if they failed to improve treatment of borrowers. New York attorney general Eric Schneiderman said he is preparing to sue Bank of America and Wells Fargo for breaching the terms of the settlement.
Paul Leonard, a senior vice president at the Housing Policy Council, a group representing mortgage servicers, said complaints about dual-tracking partly reflect a “misunderstanding” of what the settlement requires.
“Some people think that if there is any contact from the servicer to the borrower that any part of the foreclosure process stops,” Leonard said in an interview. “That is not the case.”
Bank of America “is in compliance with all standards related to dual-tracking,” spokesman Rick Simon said in an emailed statement.
Even as foreclosures decline and the housing market turns around, nearly 2.9 million borrowers have missed at least three mortgage payments and remain in danger of losing their homes, according to data compiled by the housing department. Loan modifications, which reduce monthly payments, are meant to help delinquent borrowers become current again.
Lenders have completed nearly five million mortgage workouts since 2009, about 1.2 million of them through the Home Affordable Modification Program, in which the U.S. Treasury offers incentive payments to lenders for each loan modified for a delinquent borrower. The median HAMP workout reduced borrowers’ monthly mortgage payments by nearly 40%, or $547, according to Treasury data.
During the same time period, servicers repossessed about 3.7 million homes, according to data compiled by RealtyTrac Inc.
While no national data has been published that measures the scope of dual-tracking, housing lawyers and advocates said that they continue to see homeowners who were wronged in the workout process.
“We’re hearing complaints from customers of every major servicer,” said Gary Klein, a Massachusetts attorney whose clients have sued Bank of America for failing to modify their mortgages.
U.S. District Judge Rya Zobel in Boston last week denied the request of homeowners in 26 states, including Klein’s clients, to be considered for class-action status because their claims were not similar enough. Still, Zobel said that Bank of America had a “Kafkaesque bureaucracy” that determined which documents homeowners had to submit and said the borrowers’ claims “may well be meritorious.”
John Bartholomew, an attorney with the Atlanta Legal Aid Society, said an example of the pattern is how Citigroup dealt with one of his clients, Gwendolyn Green, a drugstore employee in Loganville, Ga.
Green said in an interview that she fell behind on her mortgage payments after her former husband’s truck-parts business went bankrupt and they divorced. She first applied to Citigroup for a loan modification in October 2012. On July 1, the bank notified her she’d have one. Then came the bad news: Her monthly payment would be reduced by only $1.01, to $984.49.
Even though she began making the payments under the program, Green said, Citigroup notified her it still plans to seize the ranch home, which has an assessed value of $115,000, on Oct. 2.
Green said Citigroup repeatedly demanded paperwork she had already faxed multiple times, notably a document confirming her sole ownership of the home. She said she kept records to prove it.
“They keep asking for the same things over and over and over again,” Green said. “They change people who handle the case, and each time a new person comes on, they ask for the same things.”
Citigroup spokesman Mark Rodgers declined to discuss Green’s case other than to say that the bank “correctly followed strict guidelines set forth by governmental agencies” when dealing with her loan modification.
The HAMP program, under which Green applied for help, also bars dual-tracking. Still, the HAMP rulebook “does not say that foreclosure sales cannot be scheduled and postponed,” Rodgers said.
“There is no universe where Citi is allowed to schedule homeowners like Ms. Green for three consecutive foreclosures after they’ve accepted and are current on a trial modification,” Bartholomew said.
Like the national settlement, the consumer bureau’s rules, which were first published in January, will bar foreclosure when a homeowner has submitted a complete application for a loan modification. The new language to be inserted this week could also bar foreclosure if a servicer has told a borrower that an application is complete and subsequently discovers that more documentation is required.
The agency also has been soliciting public feedback about whether it needs to be even more prescriptive in defining what constitutes a finished application so that isn’t left up to the banks. Commenters including Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley responded that there should be a more uniform definition of when the paperwork is complete.
Cordray said the regulations will be “very specific” about the requirements.
“I would have been glad to be able to think that we could oversee the industry with looser rules, but I just don’t think we can,” Cordray said.
Katherine Porter, who monitors the mortgage settlement on behalf of California attorney general Kamala Harris, identified the lack of a concrete definition of a complete loan-assistance application as a “serious problem” in a June report.
Porter said she has received more than 3,300 complaints from homeowners that banks aren’t following the rules. The breakdowns usually involve communication failures between departments of the same bank or the incompatibility of computer systems containing different pieces of information about a loan file, she said in an interview.
The banks “do make calls. They do send letters,” Porter said. “And I think many of the consumers are really desperately trying to get their documents in. There’s a mismatch in the way that they’re communicating with each other.”
Porter said that if she had one wish, “I would wish for deep investment in better technology.”
Technology woes were at the root of Smith’s findings in a June report that monitored the settlement banks’ servicing practices. The report showed that Citigroup, Bank of America and Wells Fargo had failed to meet deadlines for notifying borrowers that their workout applications were incomplete.
“Areas in which our performance has temporarily fallen outside of the allowable thresholds did not result in inaccurate foreclosures or improper loan-modification denials, and corrective action plans for those areas are being submitted to the monitor and implemented,” Simon, the Bank of America spokesman, said.

Here's a surprise Deutsche Bank - say it isn't so !! plus more of the Fabulous Fabs

MORE EMPTY TRUSTS. This time, it's Deutsche Bank
Royal Park Investments v. Deutsche Bank
Excerpt at 440: The need to fabricate or fraudulently alter mortgage assignment documentation provides compelling evidence that, in many cases, title to the mortgages backing the certificates plaintiff purchased was never properly or timely transferred. In fact, plaintiff has conducted investigations on the loans underlying several of the offerings at issue herein to determine whether the loans were properly transferred to the trusts. In each case investigated, the vast majority of loans underlying the offerings were not properly or timely transferred to the trusts. (Same law firm as in Phoenix Light below)


MORE EMPTY TRUSTS
Phoenix Light v. JPM, EMC & Bear Stearns
Excerpts: The need to fabricate or fraudulently alter mortgage assignment documentation provides compelling evidence that, in many cases, title to the mortgages backing the certificates plaintiffs purchased was never properly or timely transferred.
Plaintiffs reviewed the transfer history for 274 loans that were supposed to be timely transferred to this trust. Sixty-six (66) of the loans were not and have never been transferred to the trust. In addition, several other loans that were supposed to be transferred to the trust were transferred to entities other than the trust, but not to the trust. The remainder of the loans (approximately 140) were eventually transferred to the trust, but all such transfers occurred between 2008 and the present, well beyond the three-month time period required by the trust documents and far after the three-month period for the trust to maintain its tax-free REMIC status. In other words, none of the reviewed mortgage loans were timely transferred to the trust, a 100% failure rate


Promissory Notes Used to Build Houses for Groundhogs -- while American homeowners are being illegally thrown out of their debt-free homes. "After my brother-in-law died, I inherited a number of boxes filled with mortgages and stored them under my front porch where groundhogs made a nest of them."
Counterfeit Fortunes for Criminal Fraudsters and the Wicked Switch of Wall Street
Naked short selling of American mortgages and the counterfeiting that resulted are responsible for the present threat to homeowner rights. Dematerialization (computer scanning of mortgage notes) and shredding of documents have stripped the banks of their security interest in the loans. All foreclosures need to end until the truth is told.

I personally destroyed thousands of mortgage documents through the same process using a desk-top scanner. The banks have destroyed their ownership interest (security) in all the mortgages pre-dating the melt-down and beyond; the pink slip no longer exists.
The banks are involved in a systemic criminal theft-by-deception; they don't own the loans they are attempting to mine through foreclosure, refinance, modification, short-sale, deed-in-lieu and reverse mortgage; in each of these processes they are tricking borrowers into returning the signatures they destroyed, in some instances, decades ago. - Michael Keane

 This is a Five ***** read
 Homeowner Can Challenge Mortgage Assignment
The basic requirements of standing are that the plaintiff suffered an injury to a legally cognizable interest and is asserting his own legal rights rather than those of a third party. See id. at 6. Elesh unquestionably meets the first requirement; the recorded assignment constitutes a cloud on his title (the injury), and Deutsche Bank recently relied on the assignment to prosecute a foreclosure action against him.
ELESH v. MERS, Deutsche Bank


  This is a Five ***** read

 It is unforgivable that our own American judges have become co-conspirators to multiple felonies by taking the affirmative step of granting facially void judgments to help conceal the banks' use of counterfeit promissory Notes and other faked documents to steal trillions of dollars of homes in the United States --- and in plain view of the U.S. government, law enforcement and the public.
Your Mortgage Documents Might be Fake!


New Fraud Evidence Shows Trillions Of Dollars In Mortgages Have No Owner
Other evidence of widespread mortgage fraud has recently surfaced. Researchers looked at just one mortgage lender that was a major player in the subprime bubble. They found fraudulent misrepresentations of 9 percent of all loans sold off to financial firms seeking to package up loans into mortgage-backed securities, and in 93 percent of those misrepresentations, the lender knew it was lying about the nature of mortgages it was passing along. The researchers stress that the actual fraud rate is likely higher, as they only searched for two specific forms of misrepresentation.
Despite the growing mountain of evidence of fraud in both mortgage securitization and foreclosures, the federal government’s response has been feeble. The 2012 settlement has failed to stop bank abuses. A much-touted program to provide relief to homeowners failed to serve nearly as many as intended.












U.S. Bancorp's

U.S. Bank Sued Over Peregrine Role


WASHINGTON—U.S. regulators on Wednesday sued a unit of U.S. Bancorp USB -0.08% for allegedly facilitating the embezzlement of customer funds by the jailed founder of Peregrine Financial Group Inc., the collapsed futures brokerage.
The civil charges filed Wednesday by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission against U.S. Bancorp's U.S. Bank unit revolve around the bank's oversight of accounts used by Peregrine founder and Chief Executive Russell Wasendorf Sr. to siphon client funds from the firm over a period of almost 20 years.
The CFTC alleged that U.S. Bank "knowingly allowed and facilitated" Mr. Wasendorf's transfers of millions of dollars of customer funds out of the account to pay for his private jet, his restaurant and divorce settlement, according to the complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. Customer funds also were used as collateral on loans to fund Peregrine's $20 million headquarters building in Cedar Falls, Iowa, according to the complaint.
Associated Press
U.S. Bank parent U.S. Bancorp said it was duped by Mr. Wasendorf.  NOW THIS MIGHT BE SWALLOWABLE IF US BANK CORP, DIDN'T COMMIT SO MUCH FRAUDULENT ABUSE ON FORECLOSURES AND OTHER TRUSTEE HANDLING'S, THE ONE CASE I AM SURE MOST OF YOU ARE AWARE OF IS THIS :

Breaking News: U.S. Bank v. Ibanez Foreclosure Ruling Upheld

SO AS FAR AS USBANK CLAIMING ITSELF AS A VICTIM, TELL IT TO THE CHOIR.


U.S. Bank said in a statement that the charges were "without merit" and that it was a "victim of the same fraud—one that the CFTC failed to detect." LIAR
Mr. Wasendorf in February began serving a 50-year federal prison sentence after pleading guilty to charges that he stole $215 million from clients.
The complaint doesn't accuse U.S. Bank of direct knowledge of the fraud, but alleges the bank indirectly aided Mr. Wasendorf's misuse of funds by failing to protect customer money.
"The CFTC is saying here that if you hold customer accounts and you see money going to third parties or individuals, you better ask some questions because it very likely is indicating that those customer funds are being misused," said Gary DeWaal, principal of his own consulting firm and a former CFTC enforcement attorney.
The CFTC has stepped up its pursuit of cases involving customer funds amid criticism that it failed to adequately oversee protection of such money in cases such as MF Global Holdings Ltd., whose 2011 failure unveiled a roughly $1.6 billion shortfall in customer funds.
In April 2012, J.P. Morgan Chase JPM -0.76% & Co. agreed to pay $20 million, the largest settlement in a customer-fund protection case, to settle CFTC charges that it counted money that belonged to customers of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. as though it belonged to the firm. J.P. Morgan didn't admit or deny wrongdoing.
The CFTC complaint details a long and close relationship between U.S. Bank and Mr. Wasendorf, one that the CFTC says enabled him to hide movements of millions of dollars of customer funds and model his forgeries on documents prepared by a local banker in the Cedar Falls branch to create fraudulent bank statements. The agency alleges U.S. Bank treated the accounts as Peregrine's commercial checking account, and knew that Mr. Wasendorf was misusing the funds, according to the complaint.
At Mr. Wasendorf's request, any information or account inquiries had to be directed to the local banker, referred to in the complaint as "Banker A." The CFTC said U.S. Bank "knew that Wasendorf's mandates" concerning the account "were highly unusual" and alleges that bank personnel, including Banker A, "believed it was important to maintain Wasendorf's and Peregrine's goodwill in order to protect the bank's relationship with them," the complaint states.
Hope Timmerman, a banker in the Cedar Falls branch, has been identified in earlier court documents as the person who handled the Peregrine accounts. Ms. Timmerman still works for the bank and a spokesman said that an internal investigation found no employee misconduct.
Ms. Timmerman didn't respond to requests for comment.
The agency is seeking monetary penalties, among other relief. The trustee liquidating the firm also is weighing potential claims against U.S. Bancorp and J.P. Morgan. Both banks held customer accounts, the complaint said. J.P. Morgan declined to comment.
Mr. Wasendorf said in a confession found after his suicide attempt last July that he used basic computer software to make "very convincing forgeries" of statements on its account at U.S. Bank, and earlier bank accounts, as well as forgeries of official correspondence from the bank.
imageJarrad Cole/The Wall Street Journal
P.O. Box 706 at the Cedar Falls post office, which Russell Wasendorf Sr. said he used to thwart auditors.
Auditors routinely attempt to verify bank balances by sending confirmation forms directly to the banks. To thwart the auditors, Mr. Wasendorf supplied them with a false address for sending the forms to the bank—P.O. Box 706 in a Cedar Falls post office, which Mr. Wasendorf controlled, he said in his confession.
Mr. Wasendorf said in his confession he kept others inside Peregrine from learning about the real bank balances by insisting on being the only one authorized to open mail from the bank.
U.S. Bancorp said it was duped by Mr. Wasendorf, who intercepted regulatory communications that were intended for the bank. "As he has admitted, Wasendorf actively deceived the bank," the bank said in a statement. "Banks are not responsible for losses generated by customers who are fraudsters."
"Wasendorf stole vast sums of customer money, but his crimes do not excuse U.S. Bank from its own independent responsibilities," David Meister, the CFTC's director of enforcement, said in a statement.
—Matthias Rieker contributed to this article.

Tuesday, September 10, 2013

JPM: The Washington Mutual Story


Josh Rosner (@JoshRosner) is co-author of the New York Times Bestseller “Reckless Endangerment” and Managing Director at independent research consultancy Graham Fisher & Co. He advises regulators, policy-makers and institutional investors on banking and financial services (a more complete bio appears at the end of this column).
This is part 2 of 5; Yesterday evening, we published the Introduction. We will be releasing a different part each evening and morning culminating in the release of Rosner’s complete report on Friday morning. On that date, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations will release their final report on JPM’s CIO Group (aka the London Whale).
~~~
We will address under-appreciated but material fundamental issues in a forthcoming report. Consistent with the purpose of this report we felt it important to consider outstanding internal control, headline and other extraordinary items that could materially impact JPM’s profitability and potentially highlight further breakdowns in controls.
Washington Mutual: a Story of Opacity and Impunity

Perhaps no other example illustrates JPMorgan’s scorched-earth legal approach better than the disputes over the estate of Washington Mutual (WaMu), which the firm acquired from the FDIC in September 2008. JPMorgan portrays its purchase of WaMu during the depths of the financial crisis as a patriotic act performed by a well-run bank. Its public statements and regulatory filings tell a different tale.
In August 2009, Deutsche Bank, as trustee for about $92 billion of notional WaMu securitizations, filed suit against the FDIC demanding the repurchase of billions of dollars of mortgages that they argued violated representations and warranties in the pooling agreement. The FDIC moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that JPMorgan had assumed the liabilities in the WaMu purchase. Consequently, Deutsche Bank amended its complaint to add JPMorgan[i]. JPMorgan is protected by a broad gag order that has sealed away, from public view, any internal communications on Washington Mutual. We have had to rely on public information and information provided as a result of freedom of information requests.
After several years of agreeing with the FDIC’s position and acknowledging that it acquired the mortgage liabilities of Washington Mutual[ii], JPMorgan appears to have changed its mind when it realized the enormity the industry’s mortgage putback risks[iii]. JPMorgan is now boldly demanding indemnification from the FDIC Insurance Fund.
JPMorgan, which in the aftermath of the financial crisis, accepted more than $391 billion of government emergency program support[iv], is seeking to shift losses on over $190 billion of Washington Mutual-related mortgage securities onto the FDIC – claiming that for a mere $1.9 billion it bought nearly all of the positive value of WaMu and was able to stick the public with essentially all of the ongoing losses. If the firm fails in these efforts it could be stuck with settlement costs on claims of between $3 and $5 billion. Unfortunately, a continued lack of clarity about the firm’s reserves coupled with recent plaintiff-friendly court rulings that may increase putback settlement costs make it difficult to assess whether JPMorgan is adequately reserved.
Since it began to deny its obligation, JPMorgan has repeatedly tried getting the FDIC to agree that it has approval to settle and then send the FDIC the bill.  The arrogance, impunity and extent to which lengths JPM’s lawyers go in attempts to saddle the FDIC with its own losses are amazing. In a strongly worded letter of response to JPM’s repeated attempts to fool the FDIC into stating or implying it accepted consent, the FDIC strongly states that it has not consented to any actions or inactions by JPM and that “insomuch as these assertions may have become boilerplate language in correspondence from this firm, please consider this letter to be the FDIC’s standing rebuttal” [v]. Still, recent press reports suggest that JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank are engaged in settlement talks and that JPM’s strategy may be to settle with the Deutsche Bank (Trustee) investors, indemnify those investors and have them file a claim against the FDIC for indemnification.
Even beyond losses on the $92 billion of original principal balance for which Deutsche Bank is trustee, there are losses associated with another $100 billion of WaMu mortgage securities over which either JPMorgan or the FDIC will ultimately be required to settle.
The Acquisition

In early 2008, JPMorgan began to do due diligence on Washington Mutual with an eye to acquiring the troubled but still solvent firm, but because of the potential for big losses at WaMu, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon chose not to move forward with an acquisition[vi]. Three months later, WaMu was bankrupt. As the FDIC began to plan for the closing and sale of WaMu, it offered bidders five possible transaction structures[vii], each with different levels of acquired liabilities.
On September 23 and 24, 2008, the FDIC negotiated over JPMorgan’s bid, which was for the acquisition of all of WaMu’s assets and liabilities except for the preferred stock, subordinated debt and senior debt of the bank[viii]. The deal structure that JPMorgan chose also required that the winning bid come at the least cost to the FDIC.

During the talks, JPMorgan sent an e-mail[ix] to the FDIC expressing concerns and seeking clarity about the “liabilities assumed by the assuming bank”[x] and expressed concern over the broadness of the provision[xi]. In a Q&A document released during the initial invitation to bid process, the FDIC made it clear that the obligations associated with mortgage securitizations would pass to the buyer[xii], their position did not change and JPMorgan did not receive the desired changes to the standard indemnification to protect itself against the liabilities associated with Washington Mutual’s mortgage securitizations. It couldn’t have been clearer that JPMorgan understood the liabilities it was accepting.
The FDIC did make limited changes to the standard bidding form, indemnifying the bank for up to $500 million for damages brought by Washington Mutual or third parties.[xiii] The agency also agreed to provide JPMorgan indemnification against mortgage-borrower (but not investor) claims[xiv], a frequent cause for concern in the fall of 2008.
On September 25, 2008, the FDIC announced that JPMorgan acquired the banking operations of Washington Mutual at no cost to the FDIC’s insurance fund [xv].  In an SEC filing that evening, JPMorgan said it “acquired all deposits, assets and certain liabilities of Washington Mutual’s banking operations from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), effective immediately. Excluded from the transaction are the senior unsecured debt, subordinated debt, and preferred stock of Washington Mutual’s banks. JPMorgan Chase will not be acquiring any assets or liabilities of the banks’ parent holding company (WM) or the holding company’s non-bank subsidiaries. As part of this transaction, JPMorgan Chase will make a payment of approximately $1.9 billion to the FDIC”[xvi].
Clearly, the FDIC and JPMorgan both intended and believed that all liabilities not specifically excluded were transferred. Had the FDIC believed otherwise it would have considered its potential exposures to retained liabilities in its announcement and, if there were other bidders, in its decision to award Washington Mutual to JPMorgan. After all, the FDIC has a statutory obligation to approve the least costly resolution.
Acknowledgment of WaMu Liabilities
When JPMorgan announced its earnings for the fourth quarter of 2008, Dimon proudly claimed that JPMorgan was “doing its part” to help stabilize the financial markets and hasten recovery. We assumed risk and expended resources to assimilate Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual.”[xvii] The comments make for a great patriotic sound-bite but deserve further scrutiny in light of the bank’s subsequent claim that it never acquired WaMu’s mortgage liabilities. After all, since the bank bought WaMu’s assets at book value and wrote the loan book down by $31 billion, it is hard to understand what risk it took if it didn’t acquire the liabilities relating to Washington Mutual’s securitization activities.
In a Jan. 9, 2009, SEC filing, Freddie Mac disclosed that “JPMorgan Chase will assume Washington Mutual’s recourse obligations to repurchase any of such mortgages that were sold to Freddie Mac with recourse. With respect to mortgages that Washington Mutual sold to Freddie Mac without recourse, JPMorgan Chase has agreed to make a one-time payment to Freddie Mac with respect to obligations of Washington Mutual to repurchase any of such mortgages that are inconsistent with certain representations and warranties made at the time of sale[xviii].” This filing, like several filings made by JPMorgan, demonstrate that the firm had recognized its obligations to repurchase WaMu-related mortgages sold to the GSEs[xix]. If, as JPMorgan now contends, these repurchase obligations were the rightful liabilities of the FDIC, then one must ask how the firm could legally have settled them on behalf of the FDIC. In fact, section 12.2(f) of the Purchase Agreement specifically protects the FDIC from paying for liabilities it did not assume by requiring that it consent to any settlement that would result in an indemnification obligation. 
Further supporting the argument that JPMorgan acquired the WaMu liabilities are SEC filings and presentations to shareholders by JPMorgan. In connection with 2010 earnings, the bank warned that “we and certain of our subsidiaries, as well as entities acquired by us as part of the Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual and other transactions, have made such representations and warranties in connection with the sale and securitization of loans (whether with or without recourse… Our obligations with respect to these representations and warranties are generally outstanding for the life of the loan, and relate to, among other things, compliance with laws and regulations; underwriting standards; the accuracy of information in the loan documents and loan file; and the characteristics and enforceability of the loan…. if a loan that does not comply with such representations and warranties is sold, we may be obligated to repurchase the loan and bear any associated loss directly, or we may be obligated to indemnify the purchaser against any such loss. Accordingly, such repurchase and/or indemnity obligations …acquired by us as part of the Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual and other transactions…could materially and adversely impact our results of operations and financial condition.” The essence was repeated in other filings as well[xx].
In November 2011, Judge Denise Cote[xxi]of the Southern District of New York  found that “JPMorgan does not directly contest the Amended Complaint’s detailed allegations that it has assumed WaMu Bank’s liabilities with respect to the securitizations at issue here.  Indeed, as the plaintiff points out, JPMorgan itself has publicly referenced its liability for ‘repurchase and/or indemnity obligations arising in connection with sale and securitization of loans’ by, among others, WaMu.  The FDIC has likewise opined that ‘the liabilities and obligations’ arising from WaMu’s sale of mortgage-backed securities ‘were assumed in their entirety by JPMC [(JPMorgan Chase)] under the P&A Agreement, thereby extinguishing any potential liability by FDIC Receiver.’ Thus, for the purposes of this motion, there is no dispute that JPMorgan is a proper defendant with respect to FHFA’s WaMu- related claims.” Did this finding cause JPMorgan to increase its litigation reserves? We do not know because their disclosures are inadequate.
Lack of Clarity on Reserving Policy
On the first quarter of 2010 earnings call, JPMorgan’s Michael Cavanagh noted that the bank had put up representation and warranty reserves for WaMu exposures related to both GSEs but acknowledged that the reserves were difficult to decipher, were in several pockets and he then informed investors that JPM would not give any more meaningful guidance or detail[xxii]. In a November 2010 presentation at a Bancanalysts Association of Boston Conference, a JPMorgan senior executive provided details of the Company’s “Private Label  Repurchase Risk Exposure” broken out by Chase, Bear and WaMu and by product type. Nowhere in this presentation did the firm disavow the liabilities or suggest that they were the liabilities of the FDIC[xxiii].
In January 2010, recognizing that JPMorgan’s disclosures were inadequate for investors’ ability to analyze its risks, the SEC sent a letter to Michael Cavanagh directing the bank to provide greater detail[xxiv] of their repurchase obligations. Again, rather than providing investors with the class-leading transparency JPMorgan often claims, the bank responded to the letter, in redacted form[xxv], requesting confidential treatment of certain portions of their response.
While, in the past the bank repeatedly acknowledged its acquisition of WaMu repurchase liabilities and initially included those in discussions of repurchase reserves, it appears those policies have not been consistent over time. Where earlier WaMu-related repurchase liabilities appear to have resulted in increased repurchase reserves it seems that once JPMorgan decided to assert that the WaMu repurchase liabilities as the FDIC’s obligation, the comparability of their already weak disclosures became even less analyzable.
New Mortgage Suits
In the past few months, a new round of mortgage-related suits were filed against the firm. investors, regulators, prosecutors, and insurers have filed a new round of claims against the bank related to billions of dollars’ worth of securities backed by residential mortgages.
On February 5, 2013, in the matter of Assured Guaranty v. Flagstar[xxvi], U.S. Southern District Court Judge Jed Rakoff appears to have created precedent by handing down a decision to allow staistical analysis provided by Assured’s independent auditor, rather than loan-by-loan analysis, to be a basis for findings of breaches to PSAs and Reps and Warranties in pooled mortgage loans. The auditor found that 606 of the sample of 800 loans across the trusts were found to have material breaches. While the ruling will likely be appealed, the reality is that it significantly heightens the risks to JPM and other defendants in putback litigations. It may also lead JPM to determine that they need to increase reserves.
In November 2012, CIFG Assurance sued JPM over more than $100 million of losses it sustained in CDOs. U.S. Bank, as Trustee, also filed suit[xxvii], claiming breaches of certain terms and conditions of the Pooling and Servicing Agreements (defining the parties’ obligations to each other) of an RMBS with $698 million of original principal balances suffered losses of $358 million. In a sample of the loans that defaulted, the plaintiffs claim that 74% had one or more breaches. Mortgage insurer Syncora Guarantee also filed suit[xxviii] claiming that, as a result of misrepresentations on almost 85% of the loans involved in the deal, Syncora has had to pay more than $94 million in claims to investors on losses of more than $111 million. The National Credit Union Administration Board filed suit against JPM on WaMu-related losses on almost 50 RMBS deals. In the filing, the NCUA demonstrates the massive difference between the expected losses and the actual losses in these deals[xxix]. This follows an NCUA suit filed against JPM relating to $3.6 billion of “faulty” securities related to JPM’s Bear Stearns acquisition.
In October 2012, the New York Attorney General, Eric Schneiderman, filed suit against JPM related to alleged misrepresentations in RMBS securities offerings, which are claimed to have resulted in $22.5 billion losses of the $87 billion in original principal value[xxx].
On February 4, 2013, related to a suit filed against JPMorgan by Dexia, Dexia released hundred of e-mails and employee interview transcripts suggesting that JPM received independent underwriter reports showing that between 8% and 20% of the loans sampled for inclusion in pools did not meet underwriting guidelines. Rather than disclose these defects to investors, JPM overrode the independent determinations to create a “final, sanitized version.”[xxxi]


[ii] http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2289737617x0xS950123-10-102689/19617/filing.pdf J P MORGAN CHASE & CO, “FORM 10-Q (Quarterly Report).” Last modified 2010. http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2289737617x0xS950123-10-102689/19617/filing.pdf. “From 2005 to 2008, Washington Mutual sold approximately $150 billion of loans to the GSEs subject to certain representations and warranties. Subsequent to the Firm’s acquisition of certain assets and liabilities of Washington Mutual from the FDIC in September 2008, the Firm resolved and/or limited certain current and future repurchase demands for loans sold to the GSEs by Washington Mutual, although it remains the Firm’s position that such obligations remain with the FDIC receivership. Nevertheless, certain payments have been made with respect to certain of the then current and future repurchase demands, and the Firm will continue to evaluate and pay certain future repurchase demands related to individual loans. In addition to the payments already made, the Firm has a remaining repurchase liability of approximately $250 million as of September 30, 2010, relating to unresolved and future demands on the Washington Mutual portfolio. After consideration of this repurchase liability, the Firm believes that the remaining GSE repurchase exposure related to the Washington Mutual portfolio presents minimal future risk to the Firm’s financial results.”
[iv] http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321506.pdf p.131 United States Government Accountability Office, “FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Policies and Processes for Managing Emergency Assistance.” Last modified 2011. http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321506.pdf .  p. 131.
[v] Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Identification Claims Letter.” Last modified 2012. http://www.scribd.com/doc/127203581/Fdic-Letter-to-Jpm-05-011-2012.
[vi]http://wmish.com/joshua_hochbergs_joke/epic_fail/4366/JPM_EX00004075.PDF Morgan Chase and Company, “Letter: (Fw: Meeting with Emilio Botin).” Last modified 2008. http://wmish.com/joshua_hochbergs_joke/epic_fail/4366/JPM_EX00004075.PDF.  (See: “Asked why did JP Morgan not buy Wamu and instead TPG injected the capital Jamie replied he thinks the potential losses are higher than TPG estimating plus their losses are limited to their initial equity investment unlike for JPMorgan or any other USA bank which has to mark to market and assign/inject additional capital accordingly”)
[vii] http://wmish.com/joshua_hochbergs_joke/epic_fail/4405/JPMCD_000001550.00001.pdfWashington Mutual Bank, “Various Documents.” http://wmish.com/joshua_hochbergs_joke/epic_fail/4405/JPMCD_000001550.00001.pdf.
All liabilities are assumed except the preferred stock.
All liabilities are assumed, except the preferred stock and the subordinated debt.
All liabilities are assumed except the preferred stock, the subordinated debt and the senior
 debt.
The acquirer assumes all deposits and secured liabilities.
All insured deposits and secured liabilities are assumed.

[viii] Insert link to p. 31 of Deutsche Bank Response to FDIC and JPM Motions (See: “Under this transaction, the Purchase and Assumption (Whole Bank), the Potential Acquirer whose Bid is accepted by the Corporation assumes the Assumed Deposits of the Bank and all other liabilities but specifically excluding the preferred stock, non-asset related defensive litigation, subordinated debt and senior debt, and purchases all of the assets of the Bank, excluding those assets identified as excluded assets in the Legal Documents and subject to the provisions thereof.”)
[ix] p. 31 of Deutsche Bank Response.
[x] http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/Washington_Mutual_P_and_A.pdf
(See p.8) Whole Bank, “PURCHASE AND ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT.” Last modified 2008. http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/Washington_Mutual_P_and_A.pdf . (See: p. 8)
[xi] See p. 32 Deutsche Bank Response (See: ” Let’s say there is a contract between the thrift and the Parent and that is included in the Books and Records (not something like “accrued for on the books of the Failed Bank,” which probably would fix the problem) of the thrift at the time of closing. Any liability under that contract is then arguably a liability reflected in the Books and Records. Therefore one would most likely conclude that liabilities under that contract are assumed under 2.1. . . . In a normal P&A between commercial parties this is not something a buyer would ever assume and it really doesn’t make sense (nor frankly is it fair) here.”)
[xii] Deutsche response p. 33 (See: “9. Are the off-balance sheet credit card portfolio and mortgage securitizations included in the transaction? Do you expect the acquirer to assume the servicing obligations? If there are pricing issues associated with the contracts (e.g., the pricing is disadvantageous to the assuming institution), can we take advantage of the FDIC’s repudiation powers to effect a repricing?
Answer: The bank’s interests and obligations associated with the off-balance sheet credit card portfolio and mortgage securitizations pass to the acquirer. Only contracts and obligations remaining in the receivership are subject to repudiation powers.”)
[xiii] http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/Washington_Mutual_P_and_A.pdfWhole Bank, “PURCHASE AND ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT.” Last modified 2008. http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/Washington_Mutual_P_and_A.pdf.  (See: Section 12.1(a)(9) )
[xiv] Ibid. (See: “any liability associated with borrower claims for payment of or liability to any borrower for monetary relief, or that provide for any other form of relief to any borrower . . . related in any way to any loan or commitment to lend made by the Failed Bank prior to failure, or to any loan made by a third party in connection with a loan which is or was held by the Failed Bank, or otherwise arising in connection with the Failed Bank’s lending or loan purchase activities”)
[xv] http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08085.html Gray, Andrew. Federal deposit Insurance Corporation, “JPMorgan Chase Acquires Banking Operations of Washington Mutual.” Last modified 2008. http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08085.html .
[xvii] http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2313711404x0x264159/4c69348f-3ee3-4117-bc1b-45a61e2963a4/4Q08-Earnings-Press-Release-Final.pdf  JP Morgan Chase and Company, “JPMORGAN CHASE REPORTS FULL-YEAR 2008 NET INCOME OF $5.6 BILLION, OR $1.37 PER SHARE, ON REVENUE OF $67.3 BILLION; FOURTH-QUARTER 2008 NET INCOME OF $702 MILLION, OR $0.07 PER SHARE.” http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2313711404x0x264159/4c69348f-3ee3-4117-bc1b-45a61e2963a4/4Q08-Earnings-Press-Release-Final.pdf .
[xviii] http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026214/000102621409000005/f71045e8vk.htm  US Securities and Exchange Commission, “FORM 8-K, CURRENT REPORT, Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .” Last modified 2009. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026214/000102621409000005/f71045e8vk.htm .
[xix] http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000095012310016029/e82150e10vk.htm (See p5 US Securities and Exchange Commission, “Form 10-K, Annual report pursuant to section 13 or 15(d) ofThe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (JPMorgan Chase & Co.).” Last modified 2009. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000095012310016029/e82150e10vk.htm . (See p.5 “If a loan does not comply with such representations or warranties is sold or securitized, we may be obligated to repurchase the loan and bear any associated loss directly, or we may be obligated to indemnify the purchaser against any such losses. In 2009, the costs of repurchasing mortgage loans that had been sold to government agencies such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae increased substantially, and could continue to increase substantially further. Accordingly, repurchase and/or indemnity obligations to government-sponsored enterprises or to private third-party purchasers could materially and adversely affect our results of operations and earnings in the future.”) and p14 and P18 http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/0x0x419854/b4dfc42d-8093-4e2e-a3cb-5fb51c17216b/BAC-ML%20Presentation_FINAL_11.17.10.pdf and p.14, p.18 and JP Morgan Chase and Company, “BAC-ML Banking and Financial Services Conference.” Last modified 2010. http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/0x0x419854/b4dfc42d-8093-4e2e-a3cb-5fb51c17216b/BAC-ML Presentation_FINAL_11.17.10.pdf .
(example: “The Firm resolved and/or limited repurchase risks associated with certain WaMu GSE loan sales ― minimal future risk”)
[xx] http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000119312509249391/d424b7.htm  (See:P. JP Morgan Chase and Company, “PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (October 16, 2007).” Last modified 2007. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000119312509249391/d424b7.htm .  (See: p. S -7 “We and certain of our subsidiaries, as well as entities acquired by us as part of the Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual and other transactions, have made such representations and warranties in connection with the sale and securitization of loans (whether with or without recourse), and we will continue to do so as part of our normal Consumer Lending business. Our obligations with respect to these representations and warranties are generally outstanding for the life of the loan, and relate to, among other things, compliance with laws and regulations; underwriting standards; the accuracy of information in the loan documents and loan file; and the characteristics and enforceability of the loan.
A loan that does not comply with such representations and warranties may take longer to sell, or may be unsaleable or saleable only at a significant discount. More importantly, if a loan that does not comply with such representations and warranties is sold, we may be obligated to repurchase the loan and bear any associated loss directly, or we may be obligated to indemnify the purchaser against any such loss. Accordingly, such repurchase and/or indemnity obligations arising in connection with the sale and securitization of loans (whether with or without recourse) by us and certain of our subsidiaries, as well as entities acquired by us as part of the Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual and other transactions, could materially increase our costs and lower our profitability, and could materially and adversely impact our results of operations and financial condition.”) and http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/847571171x0x415409/c88f9007-6b75-4d7c-abf6-846b90dbc9e3/BAAB_Presentation_Draft_11-03-10_FINAL_PRINT.pdf(JP Morgan Chase and Company, “BANCAN LYSTS ASSOCIATION OF BOSTON CONFERENCE.” Last modified 2010. http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/847571171x0x415409/c88f9007-6b75-4d7c-abf6-846b90dbc9e3/BAAB_Presentation_Draft_11-03-10_FINAL_PRINT.pdf(See: P24-26 “Private label Repurchase risk exposure.”)
[xxii] http://seekingalpha.com/article/198755-jp-morgan-chase-amp-co-q1-2010-earnings-call-transcript?part=single Seeking Alpha, “JP Morgan Chase & Co. Q1 2010 Earnings Call Transcript.” Last modified 2010. http://seekingalpha.com/article/198755-jp-morgan-chase-amp-co-q1-2010-earnings-call-transcript?page=1. (See: “Let me make this simple. In the investment bank, retail and corporate we have put up rep and warranty reserves and litigation reserves for GSEs and all other mortgages including private securities. We have tried to do it diligently. Some of those numbers ran through the investment bank this quarter. We have broken out the numbers in retail and we have put the numbers in corporate. A lot of the numbers in corporate relate to WaMu. We are not going to give any other information. We think we properly accrued for reps and warranties whether they come through on the rep and warranty line or the litigation line. There are legitimate claims that some of these mortgages were [properly] done. It is going to be done mortgage by mortgage. Other than that we think we have done a pretty good job recognizing the problem early.”)
[xxiii] http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/847571171x0x415409/c88f9007-6b75-4d7c-abf6-846b90dbc9e3/BAAB_Presentation_Draft_11-03-10_FINAL_PRINT.pdf(See: P24-26 “Private label ― Repurchase risk exposure”) Scharf, Charlie. JPMorgan Chase & Co, “BANCANALYSTS ASSOCIATION OF BOSTON CONFERENCE.” Last modified 2010. http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/847571171x0x415409/c88f9007-6b75-4d7c-abf6-846b90dbc9e3/BAAB_Presentation_Draft_11-03-10_FINAL_PRINT.pdf .  (See: p.24-26 “Private label ― Repurchase risk exposure.”)
[xxiv] http://www.scribd.com/doc/33507476/SEC-Letter-to-JPM-Re-More-Disclosure-on-Buybacks-Jun-17-2010 Security and Exchange Commission, “SEC Letter to JPM, Re More Disclosure on Buybacks.” Last modified 2010. http://www.scribd.com/doc/33507476/SEC-Letter-to-JPM-Re-More-Disclosure-on-Buybacks-Jun-17-2010.  (See: The specific methodology employed to estimate the allowance related to various representations and warranties, including any differences that may result depending on the type of counterparty to the contract; Discuss the level of allowances established related to these repurchase requests and how and where they are classified in the financial statements; Discuss the level and type of repurchase requests you are receiving, and any trends that have been identified, including your success rates in avoiding settling the claim; Discuss your methods of settling the claims under the agreements. Specifically, tell us whether you repurchase the loans outright from the counterparty or just make a settlement payment to them. If the former, discuss any effects or trends on your nonperforming loan statistics. If the latter, discuss any trends in terms of the average settlement amount by loan type; and Discuss the typical length of time of your repurchase obligation and any trends you are seeing by loan vintage”)
[xxv] http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000095012310020146/filename1.htm Rauchenberger, Louis. JPMorgan Chase & Co., “Mr. Amit Pande, Accounting Branch Chief Division of Corporation Finance United States Securities and Exchange Commission Letter.” Last modified 2010. http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000095012310020146/filename1.htm.  The Firm informed the SEC that:
Their potential rep and warranties violations generally surface and are resolved within approximately 24 – 36 months of the loan’s origination date.
After the Firm’s acquisition of certain residential loan assets and liabilities of Washington Mutual Bank from the FDIC in September 2008, the Firm reached agreements with the Agencies to limit the Agencies’ repurchase demands with respect to certain Washington Mutual Bank loan repurchase liabilities.
As of December 31, 2009, the Firm’s allowance related to breaches of reps and warranties (the “Allowance”) was $1.7 billion. [Redacted]
[xxvii] http://www.structuredfinancelitigation.com/files/2012/11/US-Bank-Summons.pdf  “SACO I Trust 2006-3, issuer of the SACO I TRUST 2006-3 MORTGAGE-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-3, v. EMC Mortgages.” Last modified 11/8/12. http://www.structuredfinancelitigation.com/files/2012/11/US-Bank-Summons.pdf.
[xxix] http://www.ncua.gov/News/Press/NW20130104MorganComplaint.pdf p.36-50 NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION BOARD v. J.P. Morgan Chase. Last modified 2013. http://www.ncua.gov/News/Press/NW20130104MorganComplaint.pdf.   p. 36-50
[xxx] McLaughlin, David, and Chris Dolmetsch . Bloomberg BusinessWeek, “NY Attorney General Says More Suits Will Follow JPMorgan.” Last modified 2012.  http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-01/jpmorgan-sued-by-n-dot-y-dot-for-fraud-over-mortgage-securities.