Why is Deutsche Bank still allowed in our country?

 JUST ANOTHER REASON WHY I HATE THAT FRAUDULENT DEUTSCHE BANK - REMOVE THEM FROM OUR COUNTRY NOW! HAVEN'T THEY DONE ENOUGH DAMAGE OR DO WE WAIT FOR THEM TO BUILD PRISONS FOR US TOO?


Letter to CA Supreme Court from Michael T. Pines in Response and Opposition to the Requests to Depublish Glaski v. Bank of America N.A. Opinion

Posted on10 October 2013.
Letter to CA Supreme Court from Michael T. Pines in Response and Opposition to the Requests to Depublish Glaski v. Bank of America N.A. Opinion   

Michael T. Pines

1345 Encinitas Blvd., Ste 602E

Encinitas, Ca.  92024

619-534-9046 [CELL]

760-385-3482 [SKYPE]

michaelt.attyconsultant@gmail.com



October 10, 2013



Chief Justice Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye

and the Associate Justices

Supreme Court of California

350 McAllister St.

San Francisco, Ca. 94102



Re:  Request for Depublication

        Glaski v. Bank of America, N.A. et. Al.

       California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District – Case No. F0634556



TO:  The Honorable Chief Justice and Associates of The California Supreme Court



    I am writing in opposition to the request by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s request to depublish in the above matter. I will only address one issue – the wrongful conduct of counsel seeking depublication.



COUNSEL IS ACTING IMPROPERLY



Morgan Lewis Has A Conflict Because Deutsche Is Being Sued By The Very Investors It Purports To Act As A Trustee For



    A problem with the securitization of loans, is that the banks and their attorneys, that were, and are, involved in securitization serve no one but their own interests.  They have violated countless laws.  There are of course countless government and private cases pending regarding such. There are government actions, including criminal investigations against foreclosure law firms.



    In the instant matter, counsel purports to represent a trustee of a securitized trust (“Trust”) acting for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust (called Certificate Holders, because they are issued certificates, “Investors”).  This is false for many reasons. Deutsche is being sued by the Investors.  Most Investors were institutional investors and most all have sued in connection with the trusts they invested in. It is difficult to find which lawsuit was filed in connection with the specific WaMu Mortgage Pass-­Through Certificates Series 2005-­AR17 Trust, which is the Trust in the instant case.  However, undoubtedly given the virtually every Investor has filed suit against Deutsche, it is likely in one of the legal actions.  The banks have destroyed the retirement funds of countless public entities. (Just a few of the hundreds of such legal actions are: United States District Court, Southern District of New York, Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund v. Bank of America et. al., Case No. 12-cv-2865; United States District Court Western District Of Washington At Seattle; In Re: Washington Mutual  Master Case No.: C09-0037 [settled]; Royal Park Investments SA/NV v. The Goldman Sachs Group et al., Case No. 652732/2013, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York.)



    As set forth in the Court Of Appeal opinion, the securitized trust and REMIC are likely void. This is irrefutable, has been stated by many courts around the country, and class actions have already been certified on this basis.  (See, Order Granting Certification, and a few of the cases and commentaries, submitted herewith).



    In addition, in a striking case of “calling the kettle black”; Deutsche itself is claiming it was defrauded when it purchased loans from G.E. Capital. It is suing for the very same conduct Deutsche itself engaged in.  (Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Solely As Trustee For The Morgan Stanley Abs Capital I Inc.  Trust, Series 2007-He6, Et. Al. v.  Wmc Mortgage L.L.C., et. al. U.S. District Court, District of Connecticut, No. 3:13-cv-01347-CSH.)



    Bank Attorneys Have Been And Are Being Sanctioned



Attorneys all over the country have been, and are being sanctioned, sued, and disbarred for conduct such as Morgan Lewis has engaged in regarding this matter. There are so many cases and articles regarding the wrongful conduct of attorneys representing the “Too Big To Fail” banks, it would difficult if not impossible to provide them all.



It couldn’t have been said better than the eloquent court in, In Re Nosek.

  

In, In re Nosek, 386 B.R. 374 (Bankr. D. Mass 2008), Ameriquest Mortgage

Company (“Ameriquest”) claimed that it was the holder of Nosek’s mortgage, despite the fact that Ameriquest was the loan originator, had not held the note since November 30, 1997, and ended its mortgage servicer role as of March 31, 2005. Judge Joel B. Rosenthal placed blame on Ameriquest, the mortgage servicer, and Wells Fargo, the mortgage lender, for the mishandling of the Mortgage Assignment, stating: “It is the creditor’s responsibility to keep a borrower and the Court informed as to who owns the note and mortgage and is servicing the loan, not the borrower’s or the Court’s responsibility to ferret out the truth…That Ameriquest had no role after March 2005—well before the trial in Adversary Proceeding 04-4517, was unknown to the court.” Judge Rosenthal also did not allow Ameriquest to claim that PSAs give banks the inherent power to act in their own name on filing proofs of claim: “Ameriquest also seeks to hide behind the Pooling and Servicing Agreement by arguing that the document gave Ameriquest the power to act in its own name, including for the purpose of filing proofs of claim. That may be true but proofs of claim filed under a written power of attorney MUST have the power of attorney attached. Fed. R. Bank. P. 3001 and Official Form 10. No part of the agreement was attached to the proof of claim.” Judge Rosenthal also blamed Wells Fargo, the mortgage lender, for the mishandling of the Mortgage Assignment, stating “This Court will not allow Wells Fargo or any other mortgagee to shirk responsibility by pointing the finger at their servicers.” Judge Rosenthal imposed sanctions of $250,000 on Ameriquest and Wells Fargo, as well as sanctions on the law firms.



On May 28, 2009, U.S. District Court Judge William G. Young upheld the sanctions against Ameriquest, but overturned the sanctions against Wells Fargo. Judge Young’s harshest criticisms were for the lawyers involved:



   “After 43 years at the bar, the saddest thing about this case is the conduct of the lawyers — all the lawyers. A careful reading of the briefs in this case reveals only a single recognition that counsel did anything amiss in their misrepresentations to the Bankruptcy Court. There’s blame aplenty, of course, each one blaming everyone else — including the hapless bankrupt homeowner. … How is it that our profession, the legal profession —which could have and should have strongly counseled against the self interested excesses that set up the collapse — instead has eagerly aided and abetted those very excesses? How could we (all of us who profess to be lawyers) have fallen so low?”

(emphasis added).



In a footnote regarding the arguments of Ameriquest’s national law firm

Judge Young stated: “This argument is singularly unpersuasive. It is tantamount to saying, ‘We’ve been making these misrepresentations for years. Until 2005, no one seemed to care.’”



    The lawyers were reported to their respective State Bars by the court, but in California, the Bar did nothing because of it’s own longstanding misconduct.



MORGAN LEWIS IS ITSELF LIABLE



U.S Supreme Court 2010 – Bank Attorneys Strictly Liable Even For Even Minor Technical Mistake In A Letter



Jerman V. Carlisle, Mcnellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich Lpa et al; U.S. Supreme Court, 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010) is a seminal Supreme Court case against attorneys representing banks.  Many amicus briefs were filed. 



The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) is a strictly liability statute and it is well settled that attorneys are included within the purview of it.



    In Jerman, the defendants, a law firm and one of its attorneys, filed a complaint in state court seeking to foreclose on the plaintiff’s property. They made a minor technical mistake. They attached to the complaint a notice stating, inter alia, that the debt would be assumed valid unless the plaintiff disputed the debt, “in writing” within thirty days of receiving the notice. The district court held that the collector’s notice violated section 1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA, but also held for defendants on the “bona fide error” defense, because the wording of the notice was based upon their error of law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.



The Supreme Court rejected the argument that Congress only meant to impose liability on collectors who know that their conduct is unlawful, citing the “common maxim, familiar to all minds, that ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally. The Court also reconfirmed strict liability.



In January 2013, The Sixth Circuit specifically held lawyers involved in foreclosure are “debt collectors” within the FDCPA.  The Sixth Circuit’s holding is consistent with decisions from other circuits that have found lawyers engaged in mortgage foreclosure can qualify as “debt collectors” under the FDCPA. Those circuits include the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits.



Previously in Wallace v. Washington Mutual et. al. 683 F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 2012) the court held that attorneys are liable when their clients don’t own the loan.



In Wallace, The district court found that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act because the failure to record an Assignment of Mortgage before filing a foreclosure action is not a deceptive practice under the Act.  On appeal the court said, the single issue before us is whether the filing of foreclosure action by the law firm claiming ownership of the mortgage by its client Washington Mutual constitutes a “false, deceptive or misleading representation” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act when the bank has not received a transfer of the ownership documents. We hold that the complaint states a valid claim and reverse the dismissal of the case.



The case before the Sixth Circuit involved an Ohio law firm Lerner Sampson & Rothfuss, which in 2008 filed foreclosure paperwork against homeowner Betty Wallace. Not until a month later was the mortgage actually assigned to LSR’s client Washington Mutual Bank FA from Wells Fargo Bank NA. 



By falsely claiming WaMu held the mortgage, LSR may have committed the sort of “false representation … to collect or attempt to collect any debt” that is prohibited by the FDCPA, the Sixth Circuit said.



The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has made clear that it agrees with this interpretation. On January 2, 2013, the CFPB’s final rule defining larger participants of a market for consumer debt collection became effective. In its background discussion of the rule, the CFPB noted its agreement with cases holding that an attorney or other person who enforces security interests can qualify as a debt collector under the FDCPA.



Most states, including California have a state statutory scheme similar to the FDCPA. (In California:  The Rosenthal Act).  Damages of all sorts, including any “actual” emotional and physical distress and unlimited punitive damages can be collected and attorney’s fees.  The Ninth Circuit has held the remedies are cumulative of the FDCPA.  Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 637 F.3d 939 (9th. Cir. 2011). 



Attorneys who try to hide their liability and/or are closely related to a debt collector have been sanctioned also.



Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that defendant debt collector’s president and chief operating officer (president), along with the debt collector’s lawyer, acted in bad faith by failing to disclose that the debt collector had a professional liability policy sufficient to cover plaintiff’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claims. Plaintiff brought a class action FDCPA suit against the debt collector and was awarded her fees and costs. The debt collector filed for bankruptcy and its insurer refused to cover the loss because the debt collector never tendered a timely claim. The district court found that the debt collector’s attorney and president acted in bad faith to deprive plaintiff of a recovery from the insurer and ordered them to pay plaintiff’s damages and fees owed by the debt collector as well as costs incurred litigating the bad faith issue.



The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sanction. The court noted that not only did the district court not believe the lawyer’s and president’s excuses for failing to disclose the insurance information, but also properly relied upon the facts that: (1) the debt collector had professional liability coverage for suits arising from its wrongful act, (2) the lawyer and president knew this, (3) during discovery the attorney failed to turn over documents reflecting the applicable insurance policy, and (4) the lawyer and president allowed the period for filing a timely claim to lapse. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the district court’s ruling that the attorney had a “peculiarly close relationship” with the debt collector to warrant holding him jointly responsible for his “client’s misdeeds in which he actively participated.” Anchondo v. Dunn, 2013 WL 599798 (10th Cir. Feb. 19, 2013).



CONCLUSION



    Counsel in this case should know better. It has a clear conflict. It is liable for violations of the FDCPA and other laws.  Because it has made false statements to this Court, and has a conflict of interest, it’s Request should be stricken or denied.



Respectfully,

Michael T. Pines

1 It is now commonly known that the Colorado Attorney General is conducting a criminal investigation of it’s largest foreclosure law firm. (See: http://blogs.denverpost.com/thebalancesheet/2013/09/11/judge-no-attorney-client-privilege-in-foreclosure-investigation/10871).

2 Royal Park Investments SA/NV said Deutsche Bank failed to disclose in offering documents that, among other things, by the time it sold RPI the last certificate in early 2007, it had taken a $4 billion to $5 billion short position in the MBS market, “essentially betting that the very same certificates they were selling would default at significant rates.”



“Indeed, defendants internally called RMBS investments such as those sold to plaintiff ‘pigs,’ ‘crap’ and ‘generally horrible’ at the time they sold the certificates to plaintiff,” RPI said, citing a U.S. Senate panel’s report on the financial meltdown.



The suit alleges that while RPI’s certificates “are now all rated at junk status or below, and are essentially worthless investments,” Deutsche Bank has “profited handsomely,” making a profit of about $1.5 billion on its shorting of the RMBS market.

Banks Won’t Take the Money: Insist on Foreclosure Even When Payment in Full is Tendered

We have seen a number of cases in which the bank is refusing to cooperate with a sale that would pay off the mortgage completely, as demanded, and at least one other case where the homeowner deeded the property without any agreement to the foreclosing party on the assumption that the foreclosing party had a right to foreclose, enforce the note or mortgage. There is a reason for that. They don't want the money, they don't even want the house --- what they desperately need is a foreclosure judgment because that caps the liability on that loan to repay insurers and CDS counterparties, the Federal Reserve and many other parties who paid in full over and over again for the bonds of the REMIC trust that claimed to have ownership of the loan.

This should and does alert judges that something is amiss and some of their basic assumptions are at least questionable.

I strongly suggest we all read the Renuart article carefully as it contains many elements of what we seek to prove and could be used as an attachment to a memorandum of law. She does not go into the issue of their being actual consideration in the actual transactions because she is unfamiliar with Wall Street practices. But she does make clear that in order for the sale of a note to occur or even the creation of a note, there must be consideration flowing from the payee on the note to the maker. In the absence of that consideration, the note is non-negotiable. Thus it is relevant in discovery to ask for the the proof of the the first transaction in which the note and mortgage were created as well as the following alleged transactions in which it is "presumed" that the loan was sold because of an endorsement or assignment or allonge. To put it simply, if they didn't pay for it, then it didn't happen no matter what the instrument or endorsement says.

The facts are that in many if not most cases the origination of the loan, the execution of the note and mortgage and the settlement documents were all created and recorded under the presumption that the payee on the note was the source of consideration. It was easy to make that mistake. The originator was the one stated throughout the disclosure and settlement documents. And of course the money DID appear at the closing. But it did not appear because of anything that the originator did except pretend to be a lender and get paid for its acting service. Lastly, the mistake was easy to make, because even if the loan was known or suspected to be securitized, one would assume that the assignment and assumption agreement for funding would have been between the originator or aggregator (in the predatory loan practice of table funding) and the Trust for the asset pool. Instead it was between the originator and an aggregator who also contributed no consideration or value to the transaction. The REMIC trust is absent from the agreement and so is the ivnestor, the borrower, the isnurers and the counterparties to credit default swaps (CDS).

If the loan had been properly securitized, the investors' money would have funded the REMIC trust, the Trust would have purchased the loan by giving money, and the assignment to the trust would have been timely (contemporaneous) with the creation of the trust and the sale of the the loan --- or the Trust would simply have been named as the payee and secured party. Instead naked nominees and disinterested intermediaries were used in order to divert the promised debt from the investors who paid for it and to divert the promised collateral from the investors who counted on it. The servicer who brings the foreclosure action in its own name, the beneficiary who is self proclaimed and changes the trustee on deeds of trust does so without any foundation in law or fact. None of them meet the statutory standards of a creditor who could submit a credit bid. If the action is not brought by or on behalf of the creditor there is no jurisdiction.

Add to that the mistake made by the courts as to the accounting, and you have a more complete picture of the transactions. The Banks and servicers do not want to reveal the money trail because none exists. The money advanced by investors was the source of funds for the origination and acquisition of residential mortgage loans. But by substituting parties in origination and transfers, just as they substitute parties in non-judicial states without authority to do so, the intermediaries made themselves appear as principals. This presumption falls apart completely when they ordered to show consideration for the origination of the loan and consideration for each transfer of the loan on which they rely.

The objection to this analysis is that this might give the homeowner a windfall. The answer is that yes, a windfall might occur to homeowners who contest the mortgage or who defend foreclosure. But the overwhelming number of homeowners are not seeking a free house with no debt. They would be more than happy to execute new, valid documentation in place of the fatally defective old documentation. But they are only willing to do so with the actual creditor. And they are only willing to do so on the actual balance of their loan after all credits, debits and offsets. This requires discovery or disclosure of the receipt by the intermediaries of money while they were pretending to be lenders or owners of the debt on which they had contributed no value or consideration. Thus the investor's agents received insurance, CDS and other moneys including sales to the Federal reserve of Bonds that were issued in street name to the name of the investment bankers, but which were purchased by investors and belonged to them under every theory of law one could apply.

Hence the receipt  of that money, which is still sitting with the investment banks, must be credited for purposes of determining the balance of the account receivable, because the money was paid with the express written waiver of any remedy against the borrower homeowners. Hence the payment reduces the account receivable. Those payments were made, like any insurance contract, as a result of payment of a premium. The premium was paid from the moneys held by the investment bank on behalf of the investors who advanced all the funds that were used in this scheme.

If the effect of these transactions was to satisfy the account payable to the investors several times over then the least the borrower should gain is extinguishing the debt and the most, as per the terms of the false note which really can't be used for enforcement by either side, would be receipt of the over payment. The investor lenders are making claims based upon various theories and settling their claims against the investment banks for their misbehavior. The result is that the investors are satisfied, the investment bank is still keeping a large portion of illicit gains and the borrower is being foreclosed even though the account receivable has been closed.

As long as the intermediary banks continue to pull the wool over the eyes of most observers and act as though they are owners of the debt or that they have some mysterious right to enforce the debt on behalf of an unnamed creditor, and get judgment in the name of the intermediary bank thus robbing the investors, they will continue to interfere with investors and borrowers getting together to settle up. Perhaps the reason is that the debt on all $13 trillion of mortgages, whether in default or not, has been extinguished by payment, and that the banks will be left staring into the angry eyes of investors who finally got the whole picture.

READ CAREFULLY! UNEASY INTERSECTIONS: THE RIGHT TO FORECLOSE AND THE UCC by Elizabeth Renuart, Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School --- Google it or pick it off of Facebook

The courts are finally getting it! I hope VT listens.

n the other hand we should not assume that they have arrived nor that this decision will have pervasive effects throughout California or elsewhere in the United States or other countries.

J.P. Morgan did suffer a crushing defeat in this decision. And the borrower definitely receive the benefits of a judicial decision that will allow the borrower to sue for wrongful foreclosure including equitable and legal relief which in plain language means reversing the foreclosure and getting damages. Probably one of the most damaging conclusions by the appellate court is that an examination of whether the loan ever made it into the asset pool is proper in determining the proper party to initiate a foreclosure or to offer a credit bid at a foreclosure auction.  The court said that alleged transfers into the trust after the cutoff date are void under New York State law which is the law that governs the common-law trusts created by the banks as part of the fraudulent securitization scheme.

Before you give them a standing ovation remember that it is possible for additional documentation to be created, fabricated and forged showing that despite the apparent violation of the cutoff date, the trustee has accepted the loan into the trust. This will most likely be a lie. I don't think there is any entity acting as trustee of a trust that doesn't know that it is under intense scrutiny and doesn't want to be subject to liability that could amount to trillions of dollars advanced by investors with the purchase of bogus mortgage-backed bonds that were presumably managed by the trustee but in reality not managed at all  because the bonds were worthless. This gave the banks the opportunity to claim that they owned the bonds and therefore had an insurable interest which gave rise to the whole problem with AIG and AMBAC and other insurers or parties who had guaranteed the bond, the loan or any loss (credit default swaps).

The fact that the loan in this case was definitely securitized is also interesting. Of course Washington Mutual was stating to everyone that it was not involved in the securitization of mortgage loans when in fact nearly all of the loans originated became subject to claims of securitization. This case explains why I never say that the loan was securitized or that the loan was in any particular trust, to wit: I don't believe that a funded trust exists with the ability to purchase loans and therefore I don't believe the loans are in any of the asset pools. So when people ask me how they can prove which trust their loan is actually in, I reply that they are asking the wrong question.

What is being played out here in this case and hundreds of thousands of other cases is a representation by the foreclosing entity that the trust owns the loan when in fact it never owned the loan nor could it because the money that was advanced by investors was never deposited into the trust. We have the same banks representing to regulatory authorities and insurers that it is the bank and not the trust that owns the loan even though the bank merely made the loan using money advanced by investors who believed that they were buying mortgage-backed bonds. The truth is they were merely making a deposit into an account maintained by the investment bank. The resulting transactions do not qualify for exemption as securities or insurance under the 1998 law. Nor do they qualify for REMIC treatment under the Internal Revenue Code.

In other words if you take a close look and actually follow the path of the money and the path of the paper you will find that despite the pronouncements from the Department of Justice and other agencies, this is a simple fraud case using a Ponzi model. The hallmark of a Ponzi model is that it collapses as soon as the investors stop buying the bogus securities. If the government cares to do so it can freely prosecute the individuals and companies involved without any air of exemption under the 1998 law because none of the parties followed the securitization path presumed by the 1998 law. So we are back to this, to wit: a security is a security and subject to SEC regulations and insurance is an insurance contract subject to insurance regulators, and fraud is fraud subject to recovery of restitution, compensatory damages, punitive damages, treble damages etc.

You should remember when reading this decision that the appellate court was not ruling in favor of the borrower granting the substantive relief the borrower  was seeking. The appellate court merely reversed the trial court decision to dismiss the borrower's claims. That only means that the borrower now as an opportunity to prove the elements of quiet title, wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, cancellation of instruments and relief under California's version of unfair business practices. But the devil is in the details and proving the case requires aggressive discovery and aggressive preparation for trial. It is highly probable that the case will settle. The bank will probably be willing to pay almost any amount of money to avoid a judgment setting forth the elements of a wrongful foreclosure and how the bank violated the law.

The Bank will attempt to avoid any final order that undermines the value of loans that are subject to claims of securitization, because those loans supposedly support the value of the bogus mortgage-backed bonds sold to investors.  Any such final order would also undermine the balance sheet of J.P. Morgan and any other major bank carrying the mortgage bonds as assets on their balance sheet. If those assets are diminished, then the bank is not as well funded as it has been reporting. In fact, those assets might well vanish completely from the balance sheet of those banks, causing the banks to be seized by the FDIC and broken up into smaller pieces for regional and community banks to pick up. Hence this decision represents a risk factor that could eliminate the legal fiction created by smoke and mirrors from Wall Street banks, to wit: it is not the borrowers who are deadbeats, it is the banks who are broke and whose management has run off with billions and perhaps trillions of dollars that should be in the United States economy. The absence of that money lies at the root of our unemployment and low economic activity.

This Glaski case has many of the elements that we have been discussing for years. Fabricated documents, forgeries, perjury, false affidavits and no money trail to backup the story painted by the fabricated documents. And of course it has our old friend Washington Mutual Bank And the supposed take over by Chase Bank that never actually happened.

And it involves the issue of assignments and the fact that the assignment is not the transaction itself but only a report of a transaction. If the borrower proves that the transaction reported in the assignment or other instrument of conveyance never occurred, or if the borrower is successful in shifting the burden of proof to the bank to show that it did occur, the assignment will have no value whatsoever unless the transaction is present, to wit: that someone actually purchased the loan through the payment of money or other valuable consideration that was received by a party who actually owned the loan.

Thus even if Chase Bank were able to show that it entered into a transaction in which the loans were transferred (something we can find no evidence of which the FDIC receiver says never occurred) that would only be the equivalent of a quit claim deed, to wit: whoever received the consideration for the transfer of the loans was merely conveying any interest they had even if they had no interest at all. Hence the transactions by which Washington Mutual allegedly came to be the owner of the loan must be examined in the same way as the transaction between the Washington Mutual bankruptcy estate and chase bank.

You should also take note that the decision was published with the admonition that it is  "not to be published in the official reports."  this is further indication that the court is concerned about the far-reaching effects of the decision and essentially tells trial judges that they do not have to follow it. So for those who wish to point to this decision and say "game over" we are not there yet. But I do think that we passed the halfway point and we are probably in the fifth or sixth inning of a nine inning game. Translating that to time, I would estimate that it's going to take another three or four years to clean up this mess and that it might take several decades to clean up the title corruption that was created by the banks.

http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2013/08/01/glaski-v-bank-of-america-ca5-5th-appellate-district-securitization-failed-ny-trust-law-applied-ruling-to-protect-remic-status-non-judicial-foreclosure-statutes-irrelevant-because-sa/

BANKS EDGE CLOSER TO THE ABYSS

I wish VT Judges had this knowledge , like the ones here and in NY.

For the second time in as many weeks a trial judge has ordered the pretender lender to execute a permanent modification based upon the borrowers total compliance with the provisions of the trial modification.This time Wells Fargo (Wachovia) was given the terms of the modification, told to put it in writing and file it. If they don't sanctions will apply just as they will be in the Florida Panhandle case we reported on last week.

Remember that before the trial modification begins the pretender lender is supposed to have done all the underwriting required to validate the loan, the value of the property, the income of the borrower etc. That is the responsibility of the lender under the Truth in Lending Act.

Of course we know that cases were instead picked at random with a cursory overview simply because there was no intention to ever give a permanent modification. Borrowers and their attorneys have known this for years. Government, always slow on the uptake, is starting to get restless as more and more Attorneys General are saying that the Banks are not complying with the intent or content of the agreement when the banks took TARP money.

The supreme irony of this case is that Wells Fargo didn't want the TARP money and was convinced to take it and accept the terms of HAMP because if only the banks that really need it took the money it was argued that this would start a run on the banks named that had to take TARP. The other ironic factoid here is that the whole issue of ownership of the loans blew up in the face of the government officers around the country that thought TARP was a good idea --- only to find out that the "toxic assets" (TARP - "Toxic Asset Relief Program") were not defaulting mortgages.

1. So instead of telling the banks they were liars and going after them the way Teddy Roosevelt did 100 years ago, they changed the definition of toxic assets to mean mortgage bonds.
2. This they thought would take care of it since the mortgage bonds were the evidence of "ownership" of the  "underlying" home loans.
3. Then the government found out that the mortgage bonds were not failing, they were merely the subject of a declaration from the Master Servicer (a necessary and indispensable party to all mortgage litigation, in my opinion) that the value of the bond had fallen ,thus triggering payment from insurers, counterparties on credit default swaps etc to pay up to 100 cents on the dollar for each of the bonds ---
4. which means the receivable account from the borrower had been either extinguished or reduced through third party payment.
5. But by cheating the investors out of the insurance money (something the investors are taking care of right now in the courts), they thought they could keep saying the loans were in default and the mortgage bond had been devalued and thus the payment of insurance was legally valid.
6. BUT the real truth is that the loans had never made into the asset pools that issued the mortgage bonds.
7. So the TARP definitions were changed again to "whatever" and the money kept flowing to the banks while they were rolling in money from all sides --- investors, insurers, CDS counterparts, sales of the note to multiple asset pools (REMICs) and then sales of the note to the Federal Reserve for 100 cents on the dollar.
8. This leaves the loan receivable account in many cases in an overpaid status if one applies generally accepted accounting principles and allocates the Federal, insurance and CDS money to the bonds and the "underlying" loans.
9. So the Banks took the position that since the money was not coming in to cover the loans (because the loans were not in the asset pool that issued the mortgage bond and therefore the mortgage bond was NO evidence of ownership of the loan) that therefore they could apply the money any way they wanted, and that is where the government left it, to the astonishment and dismay of the the rest of the world. that is when world economies went into a nose dive.

The whole purpose of the mega banks in in entering into trial modification was actually to create the impression that the mega banks were modifying loans. But to the rest of us, the trial modification was supposed to to be last hurdle before the disaster was finally over. Comply with the payment schedule, insurance, taxes, and everything else, and it automatically becomes your permanent modification.

Not so, according to Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Chase, Citi and their brothers in arms in the false scheme of securitization. According to them they could keep the money paid by the borrower to be approved for the trial modification, keep the money paid by the borrower to comply with the terms of the trial modification and then the banks could foreclose making up any excuse they wanted to deny the permanent modification. The sole straw upon which their theory rests is that they were only obligated to "consider" the modification; according to them they were NEVER required to make it such that the modification would become permanent unless the bank expressly said so, which in most cases it does not.

When you total it all up, the Banks received a minimum of $2.50 for each loan "out there" regardless of who owns it. Under the terms of the promissory note signed by the borrower, that means the account is paid in full and then some. If the investor has not stepped up to file a competing claim against the borrower's new claim for overpayment, then the entire overage should be paid to the borrower.

The Banks want to say, like they did to the government, that the trial modification is nothing despite the presence of an offer, acceptance and consideration. To my knowledge there are at least two judges in Florida who think that is a ridiculous argument and knowing how judges talk amongst themselves behind closed doors, I would expect more of these decisions. If the borrower applies for and is approved for trial modification and they comply with the trial provisions, a contract is formed.

The foreclosure defense attorney in Palm Beach County argued SIMPLE contract. And the Judge agreed. My thought is that if you are in a trial modification get ready to hire that attorney or some other one who gets it and can cover your geographical area. Once that last payment is made, and in most cases, the payment is continued long after the trial modification period is officially over, the Bank has no equitable or legal right to deny the permanent modification.

The only caveat here is whether the Judge was correct in stating the amount of principal due without hearing evidence on third party payments and ownership of the loan. WHY WOULD THE BANK WANT LESS MONEY IN FORECLOSURE RATHER THAN MORE MONEY IN A MODIFICATION? The answer is that out of the $2.50 they received for the loan, they would be required to refund $2.50 because the Bank was supposed to be an intermediary, not a principal in the transaction. So the balance quoted by the judge without evidence was quite probably wrong by a mile.

If there is any balance it is most likely a small fraction of the original principal due on the promissory note. And, as we have been saying for years, it is most likely NOT due to the party that is entering into the modification. This last point is troubling but "apparent authority" doctrines might cover the problem.

Every time a loan does NOT go into foreclosure, the Banks' representation of defaults and the value of the loan (in order to trigger insurance and other third party payments)  come under question and the prospect of disaster for the Bank rises, to wit:  refunding trillions of dollars in insurance and CDS money as well as money received from co-obligors on the bond (the finished product after the note was moved through the manufacturing process of a false securitization scheme).

Every time a loan is found NOT to have actually been purchased by the asset pool (REMIC, Trust etc.) because there was no money in the asset pool and that the investors merely have an equitable right to claim the note and mortgage under constructive trust or resulting trust theories, the validity of the mortgage encumbrance fades to black. There is no such thing as an equitable mortgage lien or an equitable lien of any sort. And there is plenty of good sense and many law review articles as well as case decisions that explain why that is true.

151729746-Posti-Final-Judgment-062513

PRACTICE HINT FOR ATTORNEYS: Whether you are litigating or negotiating, send a preservation letter to every possible party or witness that might be involved. That way when you ask for production, they can't say they destroyed or lost it without facing severe consequences. It might even stop the practice of the Banks trashing all documents periodically as has been disclosed in the whistle-blower affidavits from BOA and other banks.

BOA, Deutsche Bank, Countrywide

FOR the last two weeks, a justice in New York State Supreme Court has heard testimony in one of the most pivotal cases of the financial crisis. The hearings will tell whether Bank of America can extinguish legal liability for more than a million Countrywide Financial loans by paying $8.5 billion in cash and agreeing to loan servicing improvements in a settlement struck with 22 investors in 2011.

But the case, being heard by Justice Barbara R. Kapnick, extends far beyond the impact of the settlement on Bank of America’s balance sheet. It is also laying bare an industry practice that has put investors in mortgage securities at a disadvantage and reduced their financial recoveries in the aftermath of the home loan mania.

The practice at issue involves trustee banks overseeing the vast and complex mortgage pools bought by pension funds, mutual funds and others. Trustees like Bank of New York Mellon were paid by investors to make sure that the servicers administering these mortgage deals, known as trusts, treated them properly. Trustees receive nominal fees — less than a penny on each dollar of assets — for the work.

But when mortgages soured, trustees declined to pursue available remedies for investors, such as pushing a servicer to buy back loans that did not meet quality standards promised when the securities were sold.

In other words, this case highlights a problem with trustees: they are a dog that could have barked but didn’t.

Before mortgage securities were undone by troubled loans, trustee inaction was not an issue. Trustees collected their fees at minimal effort and investors were satisfied.

But because trustees are hired by the big banks that package and sell the securities, their allegiances are divided. Sure, investors are paying the fees, but if a trustee wants to be hired by sellers of securities in the future, being combative on problematic loan pools may be unwise.

Trustee practices are under the microscope in Justice Kapnick’s courtroom because Bank of New York Mellon is the trustee overseeing all 530 Countrywide mortgage deals covered by the proposed $8.5 billion settlement. The trustee is supporting the deal between Bank of America and the 22 investors that include BlackRock, Pimco and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Losses by all investors in the securities are projected at $100 billion.

While lawyers for BlackRock and Pimco were negotiating this deal, other investors in the securities were not at the bargaining table. Nevertheless, they must abide by the settlement’s terms.

Some outside investors, including the American International Group, have objected, saying $8.5 billion is inadequate given the mountain of problem loans it covers. Lawyers for A.I.G. contend that Bank of New York put its interests ahead of other investors outside the settlement process. Had the trustee been more aggressive with Bank of America, the servicer administering the troubled securities, investors would have received more money in a settlement, A.I.G.’s lawyers say.

Bank of New York Mellon argues that the settlement is reasonable and that it has always acted in the best interests of all investors. 

But over the last two weeks, arguments and testimony have shed light on behind-the-scenes dealings during the settlement negotiations with Bank of America. Some of these details raise questions about the trustee’s assertiveness on behalf of all investors.

A crucial issue: the trustee didn’t request individual loan files from Bank of America to help determine how many mortgages had problems and, therefore, whether $8.5 billion was a reasonable recovery. A trustee has the right to request those files for investors who cannot get them on their own.

When loan files have been examined, recoveries have been far greater. Last year, for example, Deutsche Bank agreed to reimburse Assured Guaranty, a bond insurer, for 80 percent of losses on eight residential mortgage securities it had insured.

Asked about the basis for the $8.5 billion settlement, Kent Smith, a Pimco executive with experience in loan servicing, testified on June 7 that it came in part from an estimated percentage of problematic loans that was provided to the investors by Bank of America. But on cross-examination, he said the estimate was far lower than it would have been if Bank of New York Mellon had examined specific loan files.

The estimate, 36 percent, meant that just over one-third of the loans had violated underwriting representations and warranties made to investors. But a review of the loan files would have pushed the figure as high as 65 percent, he testified.

Additional testimony raised questions about fairness during the settlement talks. The 22 investors who struck the deal held at least 25 percent — a required threshold for taking action — in only 215 trusts, less than half the 530 covered by the settlement. No other investors had an advocate at the bargaining table. Asked who was representing investors outside the negotiating group, an in-house lawyer for Bank of New York Mellon said he did not know.

Then there’s an e-mail from Jason H. P. Kravitt, Bank of New York Mellon’s outside counsel, recounting how he told Bank of America that on one important point its and the trustee’s “self-interest” were aligned — neither wanted the Countrywide securities to go into default. If they did default, the trustee would have been forced to increase its oversight of Bank of America, adding to its costs. If the trustee did not sue the bank, investors could. 

Referring to a default, Mr. Kravitt said he told a Bank of America lawyer, “We don’t want it either, Chris.”

Asked about these matters, Kevin Heine, a Bank of New York Mellon spokesman, said, “We believe an $8.5 billion bird-in-the-hand settlement with significant servicing improvements is a far better result for all investors than the likely outcome following years of costly litigation.”

Trustees argue that they do not make enough money overseeing these loan pools to act on investors’ behalf. But this could be resolved if the Securities and Exchange Commission allowed or encouraged trustees to use trust assets to pay for loan reviews or litigation.

Justice Kapnick’s decision is not expected for months, and will affect only this settlement. But the revelations in her courtroom send a message to investors who might have expected trustees to protect their interests with more vigor. 

A note from livinglies

 by Neil Garfield

Editor's Comment: Finally the questions are spreading over the entire map of the false securitization of loans and the diversion of money, securities and and property from investors and homeowners. Read the article below, and see if you smell the stink rising from the financial sector. It is time for the government to come clean and tell us that they were defrauded by TARP, the bank bailouts, and the privileges extended to the major banks. They didn't save the financial sector they crowned it king over all the world.

Nowhere is that more evident than when you drill down on the so-called "trustees" of the so-called "trusts" that were "backed" by mortgage loans that didn't exist or that were already owned by someone else. The failure of trustees to exercise any power or control over securitization or to even ask a question about the mortgage bonds and the underlying loans was no accident. When the whistle blowers come out on this one it will clarify the situation. Deutsch, US Bank, Bank of New York accepted fees for the sole purpose of being named as trustees with the understanding that they would do nothing. They were happy to receive the fees and they knew their names were being used to create the illusion of authenticity when the bonds were "Sold" to investors.

One of the next big revelations is going to be how the money from investors was quickly spirited away from the trustee and directly into the pockets of the investment bankers who sold them. The Trustee didn't need a trust account because no money was paid to any "trust" on which it was named the trustee. Not having any money they obviously were not called upon to sign a check or issue a wire transfer from any account because there was no account. This was key to the PONZI scheme.

If the Trustees received money for the "trust" then they would be required under all kinds of laws and regulations to act like a trustee. With no assets in a named trustee they could hardly be required to do anything since it was an unfunded trust and everyone knows that an unfunded trust is no trust at all even if it exists on paper.

Of course if they had received the money as trustee, they would have wanted more money to act like a trustee. But that is just the tip of the iceberg. If they had received the money then they would have spent it on acquiring mortgages. And if they were acquiring mortgages as trustee they would have peeked under the hood to see if there was any loan there. to the extent that the loans were non-confirming loans for stable funds (heavily regulated pension funds) they would rejected many of the loans.

The real interesting pattern here is what would have happened if they did purchase the loans. Well then --- and follow this because your house depends upon it --- if they HAD purchased the loans for the "trust" there would have no need for MERS, no trading in the mortgages, and no trading on the mortgage bonds except that the insurance would have been paid to the investors like they thought it would.

If they HAD purchased the loans, then they would have a recorded interest, under the direction as trustees, for the REMIC trusts. And they would have had all original documents or proof that the original documents had been deposited somewhere that could be audited,  because they would not have purchased it without that. Show me the note never would have gotten off the ground or even occurred to anyone. But most importantly, they would clearly have mitigated damages by receipt of insurance and credit default swaps, payable to the trust and to the investment banker, which is what happened.

No, Reynaldo Reyes, it is not "Counter-intuitive." It was a lie from start to finish to cover up a PONZI scheme that failed like all PONZI schemes fail as soon as the "investors" stop buying the crap you are peddling. THAT is what happened in the financial crisis which would have been no crisis. Most of the loans would never have been approved for purchase by the trusts. Most of the defaults would have been real, most of the debts would have been real, and most importantly the note would be properly owned by the trust giving it an insurable interest and therefore the proceeds of insurance and credit default swaps would have been paid to investors leaving the number of defaults and foreclosures nearly zero.

And as we have seen in recent days, there would not have been a Bank of America driving as many foreclosures through the system as possible because the trustee would have entered into modification and mitigation agreements with borrowers. Oh wait, that might not have been necessary because the amount of money flooding the world would have been far less and the shadow banking system would be a tiny fraction of the size it is now --- last count it looks like something approaching or exceeding one quadrillion dollars --- or about 20 times all the real money in the world.

At some point the dam will break and the trustees will turn on the investment banks and those who are using the trustee's name in vain. The foreclosures will stop and the government will need to fess up tot he fact that it entered into tacit understandings with scoundrels. When you sleep with dogs you get fleas --- unless the dog is actually clean.