US DOJ ask me about Deutsche Bank

As we are all aware, I am no fan of Deutsche Bank. I am still trying to figure out after all the damage this bank has done, with fraudlent mortgages and theft of homes they had no rights to are still being allowed to work in the United States! God know I have enough on them to hang them from the highest hills.. I wish the DOJ would ask me.

THIS IS THE TRUTH—-TELL EVERYONE—-GET IT OUT THERE—-

The only investors who put up any money for subprime trusts — were collection rights debt buyer “investors.”
The security pass-through tranches for cash flows were retained by the security underwriter. And, these pass-through tranches were based on fraud — these were NOT traditional MBS securities. Only received higher credit rating due to the support by the bottom-feeder “investor” debt buyers — who purchased collection rights — dirt cheap.
Security investors in these bogus trusts (repackaged into CDOs) — were never the creditor — and did not blindly invest in high risk pass-throughs — they chased high yields — at American homeowner expense. Without these high yield chasers — subprime securitization would never have come to market. Biggest demand for these “securities” — came from foreigners.
This is not to say that valid MBS security investors did not suffer. As the market collapsed due to the subprime fraud — all were brought down.
But, again, security investors are not the creditor — as security investors NEVER lend any money directly to any borrower. This is not the way it works. No SECURITY investor funded any mortgage. And, only debt buyer “investors” funded the refinance of subprime collection rights — fraudulently used in false securitizations. This is what collapsed the market. But, then again, the economy had been driven by this fraud for years. Of Congress would promote — and regulators turned a blind eye. .
Subprime securitizaton was a huge disaster. And, the fraud started — at origination.
We have been programmed to believe that the crisis was fraud upon “investors.” When it was the very debt buyer investors that perpetrated the fraud. There is a BIG difference between “investors” and “security investors” — IT IS NOT THE SAME.
Until the public realizes this — we will remain in a rabbit hole.

US investigates Deutsche Bank in foreclosure case

* Allegations Deutsche Bank filed false documents
* Inquiry could affect foreclosures across United States
* Testimony demanded from Deutsche Bank officials
By Scot J. Paltrow
NEW YORK, Jan 28 (Reuters) - A branch of the U.S. Department of Justice is investigating whether Deutsche Bank (DBKGn.DE) filed false documents and attempted to mislead a bankruptcy judge in a foreclosure action.
Although the investigation involves the case of only one homeowner in Connecticut, a court document filed on Jan. 26 by the United States Trustee's Office said it wants to elicit information about Deutsche Bank's practices in general in foreclosure cases.
The inquiry involves Deutsche Bank National Trust Co, the Deutsche Bank unit that acts as trustee for thousands of trusts that invested in mortgage-backed securities. The U.S. Trustees' Office is a division of the Department of Justice responsible for overseeing administration of bankruptcy cases.
In recent months, the office has stepped up efforts around the United States to block banks and law firms from using false or fabricated documents in home foreclosure actions. The effort follows disclosures in October 2010 of large-scale "robo-signing", the mass signing of foreclosure affidavits containing "facts" that had never been checked, and wide production of false mortgage assignments.
The Jan. 26 court motion stated that "The United States Trustee has reviewed the documents filed by Deutsche in this case and has concerns about the integrity of those documents and the process utilized by Deutsche in" filing to foreclose.
Jane Limprecht, spokeswoman for the U.S. Trustee's office, confirmed that the examination was part of a nationwide effort begun by the office in recent months to investigate suspected improper actions by banks and other mortgage servicers in foreclosure cases.
She declined to comment on the specific examination of Deutsche Bank in the case.
POSSIBLE SANCTIONS
April Charney, a Florida legal aid attorney who represents homeowners in foreclosure cases and who is an expert on mortgage securitizations, said that aside from possible sanctions against Deutsche Bank in this foreclosure case, the results could have significant effect on Deutsche Bank's practices in general, and on its ability to foreclose on large numbers of homeowners in default.
Lawyers for homeowners in foreclosure have alleged similar practices by Deutsche Bank in cases around the country.
Charney said the evidence elicited in the inquiry could apply to many other Deutsche Bank foreclosures by putting the bank on notice that its practices have not been legal, and that it may lack the basic authority even to bring many of the foreclosure cases.
The document said that Deutsche Bank never presented evidence in the case that it was ever authorized to serve as trustee for the trusts.
Mortgage assignments are needed to prove that a trust owns the mortgage and has authority to foreclose, but in many cases banks that originated the mortgages never gave the trusts the required assignments. The inquiry also could have an impact on other banks that act as trustees and mortgage loan servicers, if it establishes that the type of procedures used by Deutsche Bank were illegal.
The document was filed in federal bankruptcy court in Connecticut by Tracy Hope Davis, the U.S. Trustee for New York, Connecticut and Vermont.
The case involves Tiffany Kritharakis, a Norwalk, Connecticut, homeowner who filed for personal bankruptcy in June 2010. It seeks an order requiring Deutsche Bank to provide officials to testify in the inquiry, and making it turn over large quantities of documents, including on Deutsche Bank's policies for handling foreclosure cases.
Davis' motion states that Deutsche had filed to foreclose even though it had no proof that MAC Mortgages, the originator of the loan, had ever given ownership of the mortgage to Deutsche as trustee for the investors' trust.
It cited evidence that Deutsche had filed a false mortgage assignment in the case in an attempt to persuade the bankruptcy court that it owns the mortgage. Dated June 11, 2010, the assignment was by Sand Canyon Corp. to Deutsche.
Sand Canyon purportedly had acted as an intermediary between the loan originator, MAC, and Deutsche. But the motion noted that Sand Canyon had completely exited the mortgage business in 2008, and so in 2010 had no mortgages that it could assign.
It also alleged that the foreclosure action against Kritharakis was filed by a Texas attorney who is not licensed to practice law in Connecticut, and said there was no indication that the lawyer had made any effort to determine whether Deutsche had legal standing to foreclose.
If the U.S. Trustee inquiry determines that wrongdoing occurred, it could ask the bankruptcy judge to impose sanctions, including specific restrictions on Deutsche Banks' actions in foreclosure cases, and financial penalties.
John Gallagher, a Deutsche Bank spokesman, said the bank would not comment on details of the U.S. Trustees' motion.
But in an e-mailed statement he said that any steps taken in the case had been the responsibility of the loan servicer, not Deutsche Bank.
Servicers handle routine tasks, such as collecting mortgage payments, tracking defaults, and initiating foreclosure actions. But the court documents show that the foreclosure action, technically known as a "proof of claim," was filed by Deutsche Bank itself.
Lawyers expert on loan securitizations said that the servicers work for the trustees, which directly represent the interests of the mortgage trust investors. Gallagher did not say whether Deutsche Bank would contest the U.S. Trustee's motion.
The case is In re: Tiffany M. Kritharakis, Debtor, United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Connecticut, Bridgeport Division No. 10-51328 (Editing by Toni Reinhold)

Will we ever know the truth?

FIRST RULE: DO NOT TRUST THE GOVERNMENT

SECOND RULE: DO NOT TRUST THE BANKS THAT OWN THE GOVERNMENT

THIRD RULE: THE BANKS KICK DOWN ANY DOORS THEY CARE TO

FOURTH RULE: REMEMBER THE FIRST AND SECOND AND THIRD RULES

It’s long past time that Americans wake up and start paying very close attention to what has happened, and what continues to happen every single day in this country.
“Our” government has become totally, completely and entirely captive of the banks and institutions that have gutted this country and which have sucked the life’s earnings and life blood out of every single man, woman, child and unborn child of this formerly free nation called the United States of Amerika.
Don’t buy into the bullshit anymore that the two co-conspirators were working together for the good of the American people, they have all been conspiring to make insanely rich all those at the very top of the pyramid–by gutting the wealth and stealing blind from every Amerikan.
And if you dare to challenge them. If you dare to speak out, they do come back swinging….they come at you with the low and pathetic punches of cowards and bullies.
Because I dare to stand up and say the banks should not kick down the doors of my neighbors, that makes me a very real target.
And to all of you, you formerly free Amerikans who are now brothers and sisters in arms, living in a most dangerous nation, you must wake up and see what is happening all around you.
It’s not nearly enough that they gutted this nation and robbed us blind and sent the world heading straight into the abyss in 2008….that was just the start.   They continued to lie, cheat and steal from all Amerikans, and now take full reign to batter down the doors of any Amerikan they choose here in 2012.
What do you think?   Will they just back off…become civilized…respectful of our rights as Amerikans?   Will they just stop kicking down doors, drilling out locks, inspecting or winterizing property? Or will they simply become even more emboldened, more militant, more out of control?
But enough about that because, after all, no one at all cares about how the Amerikan on the street suffers.   Your story is not told in the millions of court cases pending all across this nation.   For the story, the real story, to be told, that story must be represented by entire rosters of the highest priced attorneys in the world.   Not just a squad of them, not just a gang of them, but an entire team.   Just look at all their names on all the pleadings that are attached here….the Masters of The Legal Universe…Gangs of Lawyers, Squads of Lawyers, Teams of Lawyers.
I know the whole WAMU/FDIC/JPMorgan deal is a dirty mess filled with nothing but garbage and more pain for all Amerikans.   I know, when I keep digging deeper and deeper into this evil mess, it will eventually be revealed that American taxpayers are on the hook for all of this…for amounts far greater than what has been previously disclosed.   Somewhere, buried in places they don’t want people like me talking about, they’ve cut additional Sweetheart Deals that serve their interests….at least in the short run.
Kick me. Bully me. Slap me around.   Thank you sir, may I please, please, please have another….it only strengthens my resolve.
But enough about all that….read through some of the details that have got me all fired up here tonight:
Let’s start first with an internal email:

Let’s say there is a contract between the thrift and the Parent and that is included
in the Books and Records (not something like ” accrued for on the books of the
Failed Bank,” which probably would fix the problem) of the thrift at the time of
closing. Any liability under that contract is then arguably a liability reflected in
the Books and Records. Therefore one would most likely conclude that liabilities
under that contract are assumed under 2.1. . . . In a normal P&A between
commercial parties this is not something a buyer would ever assume and it really
doesn’t make sense (nor frankly is it fair) here.

Then let’s get more into a massive lawsuit that pits Deutsche Bank against WAMU, the FDIC and JPMorgan Chase.   In the lawsuit, teams of lawyers, gangs of lawyers, platoons of lawyers are all arguing over one thing….allegations of widespread fraud and misrepresentation…and exactly who should pay for all the wrongdoing……
Washington Mutual Bank was the largest bank failure in history. AC ¶ 10. In April,
2010, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Investigations initiated an investigation into ” some of
the causes and consequences of the financial crisis,” focusing squarely on WaMu’s origination
and securitization of mortgage loans ” as a case study in the role of high risk loans in the U.S.
financial crisis.” Shulman Dec. Ex. A (Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Hearing before the
Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations, April 13, 2010, Hearing Ex. 1a); AC ¶ 65.
The Senate Subcommittee found that ” WaMu selected and securitized loans that it had
identified as likely to go delinquent, without disclosing its analysis to investors who bought the
securities,” and that WaMu ” securitized loans tainted by fraudulent information, without
notifying purchasers of the fraud that was discovered.” AC ¶ 69. The Senate Subcommittee
report, associated hearings and related documents (collectively, the ” Senate Record”) reflect a
pattern of non-compliance by WaMu with the Representations and Warranties.
On September 25, 2008, the Office of Thrift Supervision closed Washington Mutual
Bank and named the FDIC as Receiver. Shortly thereafter, the FDIC, in its corporate and
receivership capacities, and JPMC entered into a PAA to transfer substantially all of the assets
and liabilities of Washington Mutual Bank from the FDIC to JPMC.
The PAA described the assets purchased by JPMC as:
3.1 Assets Purchased by Assuming Bank. Subject to Sections 3.5, 3.6 and 4.8,
the Assuming Bank hereby purchases from the Receiver, and the Receiver hereby
sells, assigns, transfers, conveys, and delivers to the Assuming Bank, all right,
title, and interest of the Receiver in and to all of the assets (real, personal and
mixed, wherever located and however acquired) including all subsidiaries, joint
ventures, partnerships, and any and all other business combinations or
arrangements, whether active, inactive, dissolved or terminated, of the Failed
Bank whether or not reflected on the books of the Failed Bank as of Bank
Closing. Assets are purchased hereunder by the Assuming Bank subject to all
liabilities for indebtedness collateralized by Liens affecting such Assets to the
extent provided in Section 2.1. The subsidiaries, joint ventures, partnerships, and
any and all other business combinations or arrangements, whether active, inactive,
dissolved or terminated being purchased by the Assuming Bank includes, but is
not limited to, the entities listed on Schedule 3.1a. Notwithstanding Section 4.8,
the Assuming Bank specifically purchases all mortgage servicing rights and
obligations of the Failed Bank.
Under this transaction, the Purchase and Assumption (Whole Bank), the Potential
Acquirer whose Bid is accepted by the Corporation assumes the Assumed
Deposits of the Bank and all other liabilities but specifically excluding the
preferred stock, non-asset related defensive litigation, subordinated debt and
senior debt, and purchases all of the assets of the Bank, excluding those assets
identified as excluded assets in the Legal Documents and subject to the provisions
thereof.

The FDIC complains that the Trustee indiscriminately uses the term ” WaMu” to refer to
the FDIC and JPMC. However, when the FDIC is appointed receiver it ” steps into the shoes” of
the failed institution, which means that it assumes all of the rights and obligations of the defunct
bank. See O’Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1994). The FDIC succeeds to
only the same interests held by the failed institution, nothing more or less. See, e.g., Waterview
Mgmt., 105 F.3d at 701. WaMu had ongoing obligations and liabilities under the Governing
Documents, and ” by operation of law” the FDIC assumed all of those obligations and liabilities.
See 1821(d)(2)(A); see also AC ¶ 93. The FDIC had the option, within a reasonable time, to
repudiate the Governing Documents and pay damages. See 12 U.S.C. § § 1821(e)(1)-(3).34
In this case, however, it is indisputable that the FDIC chose not to repudiate the Governing
Documents. See, e.g., AC ¶ ¶ 14-17, 96. If the FDIC had repudiated the Governing Documents,
it could not have sold the related assets to JPMC as it now claims. If and to the extent that the
Court determines that the PAA did not transfer all of the obligations and liabilities under the  Governing Documents to JPMC without limitation, then the FDIC remains liable for those
breaches.

If the FDIC did not repudiate and retained WaMu’s obligations and liabilities under the
Governing Documents, it is not only liable for WaMu’s breaches, but it is also responsible for
any breaches of the Governing Documents that arose after it became receiver. FIRREA does not
authorize the FDIC to breach contracts. See, e.g., Waterview Mgmt., 105 F.3d at 701; Sharpe,
126 F.3d at 1155. The FDIC discovered and/or had notice of WaMu’s breaches and, during its
brief capacity as WaMu’s successor-in-interest, owed Notice Obligations to the Trustee for those
breaches. See AC ¶ ¶ ¶ 49, 75, 95. Further, even if JPMC now possesses the records, the FDIC
is still liable, as successor to WaMu, for failing to perform the Notice Obligations or honor the
Trustee’s Access Rights or to require and cause JPMC, as the FDIC’s successor, to do so. See
AC ¶ 98. Finally, the FDIC must fulfill WaMu’s Repurchase Obligations under the Governing
Documents, including any such obligations that arose on its watch.

wamuadhoc

DEUTSCHE BANK V. JPMORGAN CHASE, WAMU, FDIC
DEUTSCHE BANK V. JPMORGAN CHASE, WAMU, FDIC
And especially here….
KIM V JPMC-1

Finding Little Evidence Of Foreclosure Fraud

SERIOUSLY WOULD YOU EXPECT ANYTHING LESS FROM A REPUBLICAN BASED PROPAGANDA MAGAZINE? Where do they come up with this shit? No evidence of robo signed documents I have 13 of them! They should take notes from Huffington Post about what real journalists are , this guy is a total ..excuse me.. fuck up!

Finding Little Evidence Of Foreclosure Fraud, Feds Give Up

(Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Over at the Huffington Post they’re still talking about “rampant foreclosure fraud.” But I was always skeptical of claims banks were stealing houses from innocent homeowners. One big problem with that theory: Banks lose money on virtually every house they take back in foreclosure.  And now the federal government seems to agree.
With a pair of terse notices yesterday, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency basically admitted that its elaborate process for turning up evidence of fraud in hundreds of thousands of loan files was a waste of money.

Regulators Cut $8.5B Foreclosure Deal With BofA, Citi, JPMorgan, Others Steve Schaefer Forbes Staff

Mortgage Settlement Talks Look Like Tobacco II Daniel Fisher Forbes Staff

With the $8.5 billion settlement with Bank of America, Citi and other lenders, the government  abandoned the Independent Foreclosure Review and switched to a system of direct grants to foreclosed borrowers, details to come. In a statement, Comptroller of the Currency Thomas J. Curry said “it has become clear that carrying the process through to its conclusion would divert money away from the impacted homeowners and also needlessly delay the dispensation of compensation to affected borrowers.”
The New York Times reported today concerns grew “in the upper echelons of the comptroller’s office” at the cost of the loan reviews, which consumed up to 20 hours per file at $250 an hour. Banks spent $1.5 billion on this snipe hunt without turning up meaningful examples of fraud, the Times reports. That money could have been handed out to borrowers in the form of a $5,000 check for each file.
The outcome shouldn’t come as a surprise. After I wrote a piece critical of the parallel mortgage settlement  with state attorneys general last year, comparing it to the deeply flawed tobacco settlement,  I was barraged with comments from critics accusing me of downplaying foreclosure fraud. I responded with one simple question: Has there been a single case in the past five years of a homeowner who was current on his mortgage being foreclosed through fraud?

Silence. I did get a lot of legal gobbledygook from marginally competent lawyers who, as it turns out, were the real crooks in the foreclosure crisis. For excessive fees, they offered underwater borrowers the false hope they could somehow keep their homes without paying for them, either by challenging the foreclosure paperwork or convincing a judge that the national registry system known as MERS was not the legitimate party to foreclose. Those tactics mostly failed. The Federal Trade Commission has a website devoted to protecting borrowers from the real scammers in the foreclosure crisis, and prosecutors have found plenty of fraud.  Last September North Carolina AG Roy Cooper, for example, sued three foreclosure assistance firms for charging upfront fees and delivering nothing in return.
The reality is robosigning couldn’t have been the cause of foreclosure fraud because robots can’t engage in the self-interested behavior that underlies fraud. Robosigning was just an acknowledgement that in a large, modern lending institution only the central computer registry of mortgages contains all the information about loans, and no lawyer at the periphery can possibly possess additional information beyond what is in that registry. It may be nice to conjure up the image of a kindly loan officer, familiar with the circumstances of every person behind every home mortgage, but that’s not how the system works in big banks.
The OCC released an interim report on the Independent Foreclosure Review program last June, detailing the agency’s ambitious plans for getting to the bottom of foreclosure fraud. It sent out letters to 4.4 million borrowers, ran ads in 1,400 publications including Parade, People magazine, and USA Weekend, as well as Hispanic and African-American publications, and racked up an estimated 341 million impressions. Nearly 200,000 people submitted their files for review and regulators selected another 142,817 files for “look-back” reviews.
About the same time, the GAO released a report critical of the foreclosure review program, which involved servicers handling two-thirds of U.S. mortgages, because it didn’t provide clear enough information for borrowers.
But by retreating to a class-action style payout system, where borrowers simply receive lump sums, the feds seem to be acknowledging that there wasn’t much outright fraud — as in banks stealing houses from innocent borrowers — to find.
Fraud is a flexible term, of course, and many lawyers think it includes lending money to people who have no hope of paying it back. This so-called “predatory lending” doesn’t make any economic sense, unless you’re willing to buy the theory that the fees flowing from an ultimately unprofitable loan were enough to induce bankers to destroy their own institutions in search of a year-end bonus. That’s possible, but it downplays the responsibility of the borrowers who signed detailed loan documents, filled with caveats and cooling-off periods mandated by federal regulators.
As for robosigning computers stealing homes, still not much evidence for that. If you know of a case, do let me know.