Thursday, April 25, 2013
For you Joann and your fight !!
Wells Fargo Shareholder Meeting Disrupted
AP
Protestors barged into San Francisco-based bank Wells Fargo's shareholders' meeting on Tuesday -- and attempted to make a citizens' arrest on bank CEO John Stumpf -- as demonstrations outside the bank's Montgomery Street headquarters made their dissatisfaction with the bank known, according to reports.
About a dozen people angry with the bank's mortgage policies interrupted the Salt Lake City shareholders' meeting, the San Francisco Examiner reported, with another 30 people protesting in San Francisco outside the bank's Financial District headquarters.
Homeowners facing foreclosure and eviction blame the bank for "dual-tracking" mortgages -- meaning, simultaneously working to foreclose on a home while working with homeowners to find a payment plan -- and for being slow or unwilling to work with homeowners.
Private security guards escorted the man who attempted to make an arrest on Stumpf out of the meeting, while police said they had made no arrests on protesters in San Francisco or Salt Lake City.
A bank spokesperson noted that "Wells Fargo has adjusted mortgage loans in recent years for 167,000 borrowers for a total of $6.6 billion in forgiveness," according to the newspaper.
CAN YOU SAY BULLSHIT MS. SPOKESPERSON? BET YOU WERE PAID WELL FOR THOSE COMMENTS .
Friday, April 19, 2013
America Lost: Deutsche Bank at it again
America Lost: Deutsche Bank at it again: NEW FRAUD BEING PUT OUT BY THE KING OF FORECLOSURES. DON'T BUY INTO THIS FRAUD OR YOU WILL LOSE EVERYTHING THIS TIME AROUND. REMEMBER N...
Deutsche Bank at it again
NEW FRAUD BEING PUT OUT BY THE KING OF FORECLOSURES. DON'T BUY INTO THIS FRAUD OR YOU WILL LOSE EVERYTHING THIS TIME AROUND. REMEMBER NO MORE BAIL OUTS PEOPLE.
Deutsche Bank AG (DBK) is moving closer to turning U.S. rental home payments into bonds, which would be one of the first new types of securitization since the 2008 credit crisis, and pave the way for an infusion of capital.
A $100 million credit facility the bank arranged for investment firm Five Ten Capital LLC is backed by mortgages on rental houses, according to Chief Executive Officer Rob Bloemker. The structure includes separate loans on each property, helping address one concern raised by Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings, whose blessings could help sell the debt.
Enlarge image Deutsche Bank Loan Signals Rental Home Bond Dreams
Single-family rental properties have attracted more than $10 billion from investors including Blackstone Group LP, the world’s largest private-equity firm, which more than tripled its loan led by Deutsche Bank last month. Photographer: Andrew Harrer/Bloomberg
Sponsored Links
American Express – Savin...
FDIC Insured Savings Accounts with No Monthly Fees or...
AmericanExpress.com/Pe...
American Express—Savings
High Yield Savings Account With No Fees And Competiti...
AmericanExpress.com/Pe...
Office VoIP Phone Systems
Link multiple offices with one phone system and one b...
www.ringcentral.com/of...
Buy a link
“This has huge implications for the securitization of these assets,” said Steve Blevit, a Sidley Austin LLP attorney in Los Angeles, who worked on the credit line on behalf of Deutsche Bank. “This is the first deal that anyone’s done in this space that has mortgages on each of the properties.”
Single-family rental properties have attracted more than $10 billion from investors including Blackstone Group LP (BX), the world’s largest private-equity firm, which more than tripled its loan led by Deutsche Bank last month. The sale of asset-backed bonds to extract cash and boost returns with borrowed money may aid the transformation of a business once dominated by small investors into a new asset class that according to Goldman Sachs Group Inc. may total $2.8 trillion.
Additional Capital
Investors have rushed to acquire single-family properties to rent after home prices fell as much as 35 percent from the peak in 2006. Even with an expanding pool of buyers competing for properties, prices are still down 29 percent. Private equity firms and companies have sought to raise additional funds through borrowing from banks and initial public offerings.
Blackstone, which has invested more than $4 billion to buy 24,000 homes, expanded its Deutsche Bank-led loan in March to $2.1 billion from $600 million. Citigroup Inc. (C) extended a $245 million line of credit in October to Waypoint Homes, an Oakland, California-based firm that owns more than 3,000 rental homes and said this month it planned to sell shares to the public.
“As people see that the single-family for-rent business is a long-term operation you’ll see more financing come into the sector,” Jonathan Gray, global head of real estate for Blackstone, said during an interview in Los Angeles. “I don’t know how it’ll end up with us in terms of the best way to finance it, but I do think securitization will start to be a source of financing.”
Renee Calabro, a Deutsche Bank spokeswoman, declined to comment.
Key Enablers
Securitizations, which involve pooling debt ranging from subprime mortgages to car loans and student debt, were blamed for fueling the housing bubble and subsequent financial crisis by making credit too easily available.
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch were “key enablers of the financial meltdown,” the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, created by Congress with a 10-member bipartisan board, said in its January 2011 report. “This crisis could not have happened without the rating agencies.”
The commission’s report also blamed the crisis on lenders’ irresponsible and sometimes fraudulent practices; regulators’ inattention and overconfidence; and the recklessness of borrowers and investors.
Still, reviving the market was a key part of the Federal Reserve’s response to the crisis as it sought to restart lending and boost asset prices.
Rating Comments
Ratings companies began commenting last year on how they would approach an assessment of securities backed by rental homes as private-equity firms accelerated their purchases.
Moody’s said in a report in January that the bonds would be safest if backed by mortgages on each property, rather than secured by a trust that owns a pool of houses. The credit grader said it wouldn’t offer its highest ratings to deals backed by equity structures and that adding mortgages on individual homes carries costs to create and register the loans.
Structures without mortgages would also limit Kroll Bond Rating Agency’s grades, according to analyst Glenn Costello.
If securities were backed by a pool of properties, a bankruptcy could lead to new debt on the homes that would disadvantage bondholders, the ratings companies have said.
That’s not the only concern that Fitch would have about potential deals that could limit its ratings, Dan Chambers, an analyst, said in a telephone interview. There’s also too little history on the skills of operators and data on the performance of the asset, he said.
With institutional investors buying large numbers of homes to rent out in some markets, “if they all go on at the same time, what’s that going to do with occupancies and rents?” he said. “I don’t think we’re going to be at AA for a long time.”
Systematic Basis
Deutsche Bank’s loan to Piedmont, California-based Five Ten “shows mortgages can be documented for each property on a low- cost basis,” Blevit said. “We figured out how to do it on a systematic basis so that it’s not expensive to do.”
Five Ten, which owns about 1,000 homes in seven states, including Florida and Arizona, plans to use its additional funding to buy, renovate and rent more houses, CEO Bloemker said.
“We felt having mortgages on all the properties would give us more flexibility in long term financing going forward,” Bloemker said in a telephone interview from Texas, where the firm is expanding along with Missouri. “It will give us access to better terms and lower rates as this market matures.”
Available financing has “really gone up” with most of the largest banks already offering loans, according to Silver Bay Realty Trust Corp. (SBY) CEO David N. Miller, whose Minnetonka, Minnesota-based rental-home firm raised $245 million in an IPO in December. The shares have since risen 5.9 percent.
Near Future
Securitization is “certainly a possibility and a strong possibility over time, but I just don’t see it very much in the near future,” he said on a conference call last month.
Laurie S. Goodman, the Amherst Securities Group LP researcher who’s in the Fixed Income Analysts Society’s Hall of Fame, is also skeptical that the bond market will be a significant source of funding for firms renting out homes bought in foreclosures, known as real-estate owned, or REO.
“I don’t think securitization will be the best outlet for the REO-to-rental operators, at least in the near term,” she said in an e-mail. “The rating agencies will be very conservative, and don’t have a rental history they are comfortable with to forecast cash flows.”
Perfect Environment
Part of the reason securitizations may be slow to develop is that the companies involved aren’t sure whether they would want long- or short-term financing, which would affect the nature of their deals, Fitch’s Chambers said. Chris Hentemann, chief investment officer at hedge fund 400 Capital Management LLC, which oversees about $700 million, said it would be a natural progression for the securitized markets to replace bank lending.
Right now would be “the perfect environment for securitizations like this to come to market,” said Hentemann, a former head of global structured products at Bank of America Corp.’s securities unit through 2007. “There’s a lot of capital out there chasing higher yields, so the pricing has become much more normalized and it’s much more efficient for people to bring securitizations to market at good economic levels.”
America Lost: Pay attention investors
America Lost: Pay attention investors: REMEMBER INVESTORS OF THESE NPL TRADES AND OTHER HOUSING TRADES, THESE ARE BAD INVESTMENTS - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Before the ...
Pay attention investors
REMEMBER INVESTORS OF THESE NPL TRADES AND OTHER HOUSING TRADES, THESE ARE BAD INVESTMENTS -
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No.
69412 / April 19, 2013
SEC SUSPENDS TRADING IN SECURITIES OF
EWAN 1, INC. n/k/a
ACCESSKEY
IP, INC.
The Securities and Exchange Commission
(“Commission”)
announced the temporary
suspension, pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Securi
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“Exchange Act”
), of trading in the securities of
Ewan 1, Inc. n/k/a AccessKey IP, Inc.
(“AccessKey”)
,
of
Santa Ana, CA
commencing
at 9
:30 a.m.
EST
o
n
April 19,
201
3
, and
terminating at 11:59 p.m.
ED
T
on
May 2
, 201
3
.
The Commission temporarily suspended trading in the securities of
AccessKey
because
of questions that have been raised about the
accuracy and
adequacy of publicly
available
information
about
Ac
c
essKey
because it has not filed a periodic report since
fil
ing
its
Exchange Act registration on August 21, 2002
.
The Commission cautions broker
s
,
dealers, shareholders, and prospective purchasers that
they should carefully consider
the foregoing information along with all other currently
available information and any information subsequently issued by the company.
Further, brokers and dealers should be alert to the fact that, pursuant to Rule 15c2
-
11
under the Exchange Act, at the
termination of the trading suspension, no quotation may
be entered unless and until they have strictly complied with all of the provisions of the
rule. If any broker or dealer has any questions as to whether or not he has complied with
the rule, he should
not enter any quotation but immediately contact the staff in the
Division of Trading and Markets, Office of Interpretation and Guidance, at (202) 551
-
5777.
If any broker or dealer is uncertain as to what is required by Rule 15c2
-
11, he
should refrain fro
m entering quotations relating to
A
c
cessKey
’s
securities until such time
as he has familiarized himself with the rule and is certain that all of its provisions have
been met. If any broker or dealer enters any quotation which is in violation of the rule,
the Commission will consider the need for prompt enforcement action.
Any broker, dealer or other person who has any information which may relate to this
mat
ter should conta
ct
Chedly C
.
Dumornay, A
ssistant Regional Director
,
Miami
Regional
Office of the Se
curities and Exchange Commission
at (305
-
982
-
6377)http://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2013/34-69412.pdf
Another warning from SEC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No.
69411 / April 19, 2013
SEC SUSPENDS TRADING IN SECURITIES OF UC HUB GROUP, INC.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”)
ann
ounced the temporary
suspension, pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Securi
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“Exchange Act”
), of trading in the securities of
UC Hub Group
, Inc. (“
UC Hub
”)
,
of
West Hollywood
, CA
commencing
at 9:30 a.m.
EST
o
n
April 19
, 201
3
, and
terminating
at 11:59 p.m.
ED
T
on
May 2
, 201
3
.
The Commission temporarily suspended trading in the securities of
UC Hub
because of
questions that have been raised about the
accuracy and
adequacy of publicly
available
information
about
UC Hub
because it ha
s not filed a
periodic report since filing its
Form
10
-
Q
for the period ending April 30, 2010, filed
on
June 14, 2010
.
The Commission cautions broker
s
,
dealers, shareholders, and prospective purchasers that
they should carefully consider the foregoing i
nformation along with all other currently
available information and any information subsequently issued by the company.
Further, brokers and dealers should be alert to the fact that, pursuant to Rule 15c2
-
11
under the Exchange Act, at the termination of
the trading suspension, no quotation may
be entered unless and until they have strictly complied with all of the provisions of the
rule. If any broker or dealer has any questions as to whether or not he has complied with
the rule, he should not enter any q
uotation but immediately contact the staff in the
Division of Trading and Markets, Office of Interpretation and Guidance, at (202) 551
-
5777.
If any broker or dealer is uncertain as to what is required by Rule 15c2
-
11, he
should refrain from entering quota
tions relating to
UC Hub
’s
securities until such time as
he has familiarized himself with the rule and is certain that all of its provisions have been
met. If any broker or dealer enters any quotation which is in violation of the rule, the
Commission will
consider the need for prompt enforcement action.
Any broker, dealer or other person who has any information which may relate to this
mat
ter should conta
ct
Chedly C
.
Dumornay, A
ssistant Regional Director
,
Miami
Regional
Office of the Securities and Exchan
ge Commission
at (305
-
982
-
6377).
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No.
69411 / April 19, 2013
SEC SUSPENDS TRADING IN SECURITIES OF UC HUB GROUP, INC.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”)
ann
ounced the temporary
suspension, pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Securi
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“Exchange Act”
), of trading in the securities of
UC Hub Group
, Inc. (“
UC Hub
”)
,
of
West Hollywood
, CA
commencing
at 9:30 a.m.
EST
o
n
April 19
, 201
3
, and
terminating
at 11:59 p.m.
ED
T
on
May 2
, 201
3
.
The Commission temporarily suspended trading in the securities of
UC Hub
because of
questions that have been raised about the
accuracy and
adequacy of publicly
available
information
about
UC Hub
because it ha
s not filed a
periodic report since filing its
Form
10
-
Q
for the period ending April 30, 2010, filed
on
June 14, 2010
.
The Commission cautions broker
s
,
dealers, shareholders, and prospective purchasers that
they should carefully consider the foregoing i
nformation along with all other currently
available information and any information subsequently issued by the company.
Further, brokers and dealers should be alert to the fact that, pursuant to Rule 15c2
-
11
under the Exchange Act, at the termination of
the trading suspension, no quotation may
be entered unless and until they have strictly complied with all of the provisions of the
rule. If any broker or dealer has any questions as to whether or not he has complied with
the rule, he should not enter any q
uotation but immediately contact the staff in the
Division of Trading and Markets, Office of Interpretation and Guidance, at (202) 551
-
5777.
If any broker or dealer is uncertain as to what is required by Rule 15c2
-
11, he
should refrain from entering quota
tions relating to
UC Hub
’s
securities until such time as
he has familiarized himself with the rule and is certain that all of its provisions have been
met. If any broker or dealer enters any quotation which is in violation of the rule, the
Commission will
consider the need for prompt enforcement action.
Any broker, dealer or other person who has any information which may relate to this
mat
ter should conta
ct
Chedly C
.
Dumornay, A
ssistant Regional Director
,
Miami
Regional
Office of the Securities and Exchan
ge Commission
at (305
-
982
-
6377).
America Lost: THIS JUST RELEASED BY SEC
America Lost: THIS JUST RELEASED BY SEC: So investors paying attention yet??? UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Before the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF ...
THIS JUST RELEASED BY SEC
So investors paying attention yet???
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Before the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 Release No. 69413 / April 19, 2013 SEC SUSPENDS TRADING IN SECURITIES OF THE ESTATE VAULT, INC. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) announced the temporary suspension, pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Securi ties Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act” ), of trading in the securities of The Estate Vault , Inc. ( “ Estate Vault ” ), of Las Vegas, NV commencing at 9:30 a.m. EST o n April 19 , 2 01 3 , and terminating at 11:59 p.m. ED T on May 2 , 201 3 . The Commission temporarily suspended trading in the securities of Estate Vault because of questions that have been raised about the accuracy and adequacy of publicly available information about Estat e Vault because it has not filed a periodic report since its Form 10 - Q for the period ending February 28, 2009, filed on Dec ember 2 4 , 20 09 . The Commission cautions broker s , dealers, shareholders, and prospective purchasers that they should carefully con sider the foregoing information along with all other currently available information and any information subsequently issued by the company. Further, brokers and dealers should be alert to the fact that, pursuant to Rule 15c2 - 11 under the Exchange Act, a t the termination of the trading suspension, no quotation may be entered unless and until they have strictly complied with all of the provisions of the rule. If any broker or dealer has any questions as to whether or not he has complied with the rule, he s hould not enter any quotation but immediately contact the staff in the Division of Trading and Markets, Office of Interpretation and Guidance, at (202) 551 - 5777. If any broker or dealer is uncertain as to what is required by Rule 15c2 - 11, he should refrai n from entering quotations relating to Estate Vault ’s securities until such time as he has familiarized himself with the rule and is certain that all of its provisions have been met. If any broker or dealer enters any quotation which is in violation of th e rule, the Commission will consider the need for prompt enforcement action. Any broker, dealer or other person who has any information which may relate to this mat ter should conta ct Chedly C . Dumornay, A ssistant Regional Director , Miami Regional Office o f the Securities and Exchange Commission at (305 - 982 - 6377).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Before the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 Release No. 69413 / April 19, 2013 SEC SUSPENDS TRADING IN SECURITIES OF THE ESTATE VAULT, INC. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) announced the temporary suspension, pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Securi ties Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act” ), of trading in the securities of The Estate Vault , Inc. ( “ Estate Vault ” ), of Las Vegas, NV commencing at 9:30 a.m. EST o n April 19 , 2 01 3 , and terminating at 11:59 p.m. ED T on May 2 , 201 3 . The Commission temporarily suspended trading in the securities of Estate Vault because of questions that have been raised about the accuracy and adequacy of publicly available information about Estat e Vault because it has not filed a periodic report since its Form 10 - Q for the period ending February 28, 2009, filed on Dec ember 2 4 , 20 09 . The Commission cautions broker s , dealers, shareholders, and prospective purchasers that they should carefully con sider the foregoing information along with all other currently available information and any information subsequently issued by the company. Further, brokers and dealers should be alert to the fact that, pursuant to Rule 15c2 - 11 under the Exchange Act, a t the termination of the trading suspension, no quotation may be entered unless and until they have strictly complied with all of the provisions of the rule. If any broker or dealer has any questions as to whether or not he has complied with the rule, he s hould not enter any quotation but immediately contact the staff in the Division of Trading and Markets, Office of Interpretation and Guidance, at (202) 551 - 5777. If any broker or dealer is uncertain as to what is required by Rule 15c2 - 11, he should refrai n from entering quotations relating to Estate Vault ’s securities until such time as he has familiarized himself with the rule and is certain that all of its provisions have been met. If any broker or dealer enters any quotation which is in violation of th e rule, the Commission will consider the need for prompt enforcement action. Any broker, dealer or other person who has any information which may relate to this mat ter should conta ct Chedly C . Dumornay, A ssistant Regional Director , Miami Regional Office o f the Securities and Exchange Commission at (305 - 982 - 6377).
America Lost: A true propaganda report
America Lost: A true propaganda report: Heres a true propaganda report to,entice investors to buy into this new fraud. Don't buy into it, this is so far from the truth. This i...
A true propaganda report
Heres a true propaganda report to,entice investors to buy into this new fraud. Don't buy into it, this is so far from the truth. This is because investors are bailing on these NPL's because they know this newest scam will completely wipe them out this time.Alot of these homes are still full of bank fraud ( fyi it doesn't go away ) These companies coming up with digital paperwork will eventually will be found out and the fraud will be massive.Not to mention the notes are full of liens, and the titles are junk. Smart investors like I said are bailing .
Demand for distressed properties from investors is contributing to the recovery, not creating an artificial one, according to Pro Teck Valuation Services’ Home Value Forecast (HVF) for April.
According to the report, one of the catalysts driving the housing market rebound has been large investment funds, which are buying distressed single-family homes to be used as rentals.
“These funds have also been renovating homes, which has helped to improve the overall conditions of the surrounding neighborhoods and provided a positive injection of capital,” said Tom O’Grady, CEO of Pro Teck.
Furthermore, the reduction in the supply of homes available for sale is also fueling positive home price reports. A year ago, Pro Teck boldly projected “the market was likely to turn much faster than anyone could imagine.”
“[N]ot only been realized, but also exceeded,” Pro Teck stated.
The real estate valuations company came to the conclusion after noting the number of new homes being built remained at historically low rates for more than five years, which would eventually lead to a shortage once demand returned. In addition, the declines in home values prevented many homeowners from selling, further reducing supply.
After observing a number of real estate cycles, Pro Teck also said that while each one may appear to be different, they all have one thing in common: a catalyst to propel movement.
According to the report, one of the catalysts driving the housing market rebound has been large investment funds, which are buying distressed single-family homes to be used as rentals.
“These funds have also been renovating homes, which has helped to improve the overall conditions of the surrounding neighborhoods and provided a positive injection of capital,” said Tom O’Grady, CEO of Pro Teck.
Furthermore, the reduction in the supply of homes available for sale is also fueling positive home price reports. A year ago, Pro Teck boldly projected “the market was likely to turn much faster than anyone could imagine.”
“[N]ot only been realized, but also exceeded,” Pro Teck stated.
The real estate valuations company came to the conclusion after noting the number of new homes being built remained at historically low rates for more than five years, which would eventually lead to a shortage once demand returned. In addition, the declines in home values prevented many homeowners from selling, further reducing supply.
After observing a number of real estate cycles, Pro Teck also said that while each one may appear to be different, they all have one thing in common: a catalyst to propel movement.
“Once the cycle starts, a virtuous process of higher sales leads to
higher prices which leads to more buyers coming into the market out of
fear that they will miss out. At the same time, higher sales typically
leads to a shortage of inventory available for sale except in those
markets where new homes can easily be built,” Pro Teck explained.
However, the current real estate market also has two unique traits—very low mortgage rates and historically high levels of home affordability, according to the report.
The forecast report included a listing of the 10 best and 10 worst performing metros out of the top 200.
The ranking considers factors such as sales/listing activity and prices, months of remaining inventory (MRI), days on market (DOM), sold-to-list price ratio and foreclosure and REO activity.
Michael Sklarz, principal of Collateral Analytics and contributor to the HVF, noted five of the top markets are in California, while two are in Texas.
Meanwhile, Sklarz said the bottom metros are an “interesting mix, with two continuing to be in the upstate New York area and three in the Southeast.”
“All have double-digit Months of Remaining Inventory, however, many of the indicators are showing positive trends even for the bottom metros area this month,” he added.
Top Metros
However, the current real estate market also has two unique traits—very low mortgage rates and historically high levels of home affordability, according to the report.
The forecast report included a listing of the 10 best and 10 worst performing metros out of the top 200.
The ranking considers factors such as sales/listing activity and prices, months of remaining inventory (MRI), days on market (DOM), sold-to-list price ratio and foreclosure and REO activity.
Michael Sklarz, principal of Collateral Analytics and contributor to the HVF, noted five of the top markets are in California, while two are in Texas.
Meanwhile, Sklarz said the bottom metros are an “interesting mix, with two continuing to be in the upstate New York area and three in the Southeast.”
“All have double-digit Months of Remaining Inventory, however, many of the indicators are showing positive trends even for the bottom metros area this month,” he added.
Top Metros
- Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, California
- Indianapolis-Carmel, Indiana
- Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, California
- Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Rossville, California
- Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, California
- Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield Beach, Florida
- Stockton, California
- Warren-Troy-Farmington Hill, Michigan
- Dallas-Plano-Irving, Texas
- Austin-Red Rock-San Marcos, Texas
- Cape Coral-Fort Myers, Florida
- Rochester, New York
- Baton Rouge, Louisiana
- Albany-Schnectady-Troy, New York
- Greenville-Maudlin-Easley, South Carolina
- Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, Florida
- Mobile, Alabama
- Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, Arkansas
- Shreveport-Bossier City, Louisiana
- Spokane, Washington
Thursday, April 18, 2013
America Lost: Sad but true
America Lost: Sad but true: Thanks to Joann for this story Lose your house, collect $300 by Ted Rall Apr...
Sad but true
Thanks to Joann for this story
Like the blissed-out soma-sucking drones of Huxley’s “Brave New World,” we must be too drugged to feel, much less express, rage. How else to explain that furious mobs haven’t burned the banks to the ground?
Earlier this month, as the media ginned up empty speculation about Hillary Clinton’s presidential prospects, and wallowed in nuclear cognitive dissonance — Iran, which doesn’t have nukes and says it doesn’t want them, is repeatedly called a grave threat worth going to war over, while North Korea, which does have them and won’t stop threatening to turn the U.S. West Coast into a “sea of fire,” is dismissed as empty bluster, nothing to worry about — the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve released the details of the settlement between the Obama administration and the big banks over the illegal foreclosure scandal.
Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo and other major home mortgage lenders foreclosed upon and evicted millions of homeowners between the start of the housing collapse in 2007 and 2011. Millions of families became homeless, including 2.3 million children. The vast majority of these Americans are still struggling; many fell into poverty from which they will never escape.
Disgusting, amazing, yet true: The banks had no legal right to evict these people. In many cases, the banks didn’t have basic paperwork, like the original deed to the house. They resorted to “robo-signing” boiler room operations to churn out falsified and forged eviction papers.
In others cases, people could have kept their homes if they’d been allowed to refinance — their right under federal law — but the banks illegally refused, giving them the runaround, repeatedly asking for the same paperwork they’d already sent in. Soldiers fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, protected from foreclosure under U.S. law, came home to find their homes resold at auction. In other cases, banks even repossessed homes where the homeowner had never missed a mortgage payment.
The foreclosure scandal helped spark the Occupy Wall Street movement.
Promising justice and compensation for the victims, President Barack Obama’s Justice Department joined lawsuits filed by the attorneys general of several states.
Last year, Obama announced that the government had concluded a “landmark settlement” with the banks that would “deliver some measure of justice for those families that have been victims of their abusive practices.” The Politico newspaper called the $26 billion deal “a big win for the White House.” $26 billion. Sounds impressive, right?
So … the envelope, please.
How much will the banks have to pay? What will people whose homes were stolen — there is no other word — receive? Now we know the details.
Remember what we’re talking about. Your house is your biggest asset. You own tens of thousands, in some cases hundreds of thousands of dollars in equity. One morning the sheriff comes. He throws you and your family out on the street. Your possessions are dumped on the lawn. You have nowhere to go. Your kids are crying. If you were struggling before, now you’re completely screwed. And the bank that did it had no legal basis whatsoever to do what they did.
They took your house, sold it, and pocketed the profits.
What would happen to you if you walked into Tiffany’s and stole a $200,000 necklace?
The details:
Even though they qualified for federal loan modifications, the banks seized 1.1 million homes, making 1.1 million families homeless after they were approved for refinancing. Since the average foreclosed home was worth $191,000, the banks stole $210 billion in homes. Under the “landmark settlement,” these wrongfully evicted Americans will receive $300 or $500 each, the value of a modest night out at a nice restaurant in Manhattan (two tenths of one percent of their loss).
• 900,000 borrowers who were entitled under Obama’s Make Home Affordable program to refinancing were denied help and lost their homes. They get $300 or $600.
• 420,000 homeowners who lost their homes while the banks intentionally dithered and “lost” their paperwork get $400 or $800.
• 28,000 families who were entitled to protection against foreclosure under federal bankruptcy law, but got thrown out of their homes anyway, get $3,750 to $62,500.
• 1,100 soldiers entitled to protection against foreclosure because of their military status get $125,000.
• 53 families who weren’t late on their mortgages, never missed a payment, but got thrown out anyway, get $125,000.
So we’ve got more than 2.4 million families — that’s 5 million people — whose homes got taken away by scumbag banksters. They’re getting a thousand bucks each on average. A thousand bucks for a two hundred thousand dollar theft! Not to mention the heartbreak and stress they suffered.
Why aren’t those five million people stringing up bank execs from telephone poles? It’s gotta be the Paxil.
But what really gets me is the 53 families who are getting $125,000 payouts for losing homes they were 100 percent up to date on.
Even if you’re a heartless right-winger, you’ve got to have a problem with a bank taking your house when you never missed a payment. Sorry, but these are multinational, multibillion dollar banks. They should pay these families tens of millions of dollars each. Those 53 families should own Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America and Wells Fargo.
Some perspective:
Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit received $260 million in pay between 2007 and 2012, the height of the foreclosure scandal.
In 2011 alone, JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon was given $23 million. In 2012, the company’s board of directors “punished” him for a $6 billion loss in derivatives trading by paying him “merely” $18.7 million.
In 2012 alone, Bank of America paid CEO Brian Moyhnihan $12 million; Wells Fargo paid $23 million to CEO John Stumpf.
Not bad for some of the worst criminals in history.
That’s how things work in the United States: The criminals get the big payouts. The people whose lives they destroy get $300.
Lose your house, collect $300
by Ted Rall
NEW YORK – One in 10 Americans take such antidepressants as Prozac and Paxil. Among those in their 40s and 50s, it’s 23 percent. Maybe that’s why we’re so passive.Like the blissed-out soma-sucking drones of Huxley’s “Brave New World,” we must be too drugged to feel, much less express, rage. How else to explain that furious mobs haven’t burned the banks to the ground?
Earlier this month, as the media ginned up empty speculation about Hillary Clinton’s presidential prospects, and wallowed in nuclear cognitive dissonance — Iran, which doesn’t have nukes and says it doesn’t want them, is repeatedly called a grave threat worth going to war over, while North Korea, which does have them and won’t stop threatening to turn the U.S. West Coast into a “sea of fire,” is dismissed as empty bluster, nothing to worry about — the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve released the details of the settlement between the Obama administration and the big banks over the illegal foreclosure scandal.
Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo and other major home mortgage lenders foreclosed upon and evicted millions of homeowners between the start of the housing collapse in 2007 and 2011. Millions of families became homeless, including 2.3 million children. The vast majority of these Americans are still struggling; many fell into poverty from which they will never escape.
Disgusting, amazing, yet true: The banks had no legal right to evict these people. In many cases, the banks didn’t have basic paperwork, like the original deed to the house. They resorted to “robo-signing” boiler room operations to churn out falsified and forged eviction papers.
In others cases, people could have kept their homes if they’d been allowed to refinance — their right under federal law — but the banks illegally refused, giving them the runaround, repeatedly asking for the same paperwork they’d already sent in. Soldiers fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, protected from foreclosure under U.S. law, came home to find their homes resold at auction. In other cases, banks even repossessed homes where the homeowner had never missed a mortgage payment.
The foreclosure scandal helped spark the Occupy Wall Street movement.
Promising justice and compensation for the victims, President Barack Obama’s Justice Department joined lawsuits filed by the attorneys general of several states.
Last year, Obama announced that the government had concluded a “landmark settlement” with the banks that would “deliver some measure of justice for those families that have been victims of their abusive practices.” The Politico newspaper called the $26 billion deal “a big win for the White House.” $26 billion. Sounds impressive, right?
So … the envelope, please.
How much will the banks have to pay? What will people whose homes were stolen — there is no other word — receive? Now we know the details.
Remember what we’re talking about. Your house is your biggest asset. You own tens of thousands, in some cases hundreds of thousands of dollars in equity. One morning the sheriff comes. He throws you and your family out on the street. Your possessions are dumped on the lawn. You have nowhere to go. Your kids are crying. If you were struggling before, now you’re completely screwed. And the bank that did it had no legal basis whatsoever to do what they did.
They took your house, sold it, and pocketed the profits.
What would happen to you if you walked into Tiffany’s and stole a $200,000 necklace?
The details:
Even though they qualified for federal loan modifications, the banks seized 1.1 million homes, making 1.1 million families homeless after they were approved for refinancing. Since the average foreclosed home was worth $191,000, the banks stole $210 billion in homes. Under the “landmark settlement,” these wrongfully evicted Americans will receive $300 or $500 each, the value of a modest night out at a nice restaurant in Manhattan (two tenths of one percent of their loss).
• 900,000 borrowers who were entitled under Obama’s Make Home Affordable program to refinancing were denied help and lost their homes. They get $300 or $600.
• 420,000 homeowners who lost their homes while the banks intentionally dithered and “lost” their paperwork get $400 or $800.
• 28,000 families who were entitled to protection against foreclosure under federal bankruptcy law, but got thrown out of their homes anyway, get $3,750 to $62,500.
• 1,100 soldiers entitled to protection against foreclosure because of their military status get $125,000.
• 53 families who weren’t late on their mortgages, never missed a payment, but got thrown out anyway, get $125,000.
So we’ve got more than 2.4 million families — that’s 5 million people — whose homes got taken away by scumbag banksters. They’re getting a thousand bucks each on average. A thousand bucks for a two hundred thousand dollar theft! Not to mention the heartbreak and stress they suffered.
Why aren’t those five million people stringing up bank execs from telephone poles? It’s gotta be the Paxil.
But what really gets me is the 53 families who are getting $125,000 payouts for losing homes they were 100 percent up to date on.
Even if you’re a heartless right-winger, you’ve got to have a problem with a bank taking your house when you never missed a payment. Sorry, but these are multinational, multibillion dollar banks. They should pay these families tens of millions of dollars each. Those 53 families should own Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America and Wells Fargo.
Some perspective:
Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit received $260 million in pay between 2007 and 2012, the height of the foreclosure scandal.
In 2011 alone, JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon was given $23 million. In 2012, the company’s board of directors “punished” him for a $6 billion loss in derivatives trading by paying him “merely” $18.7 million.
In 2012 alone, Bank of America paid CEO Brian Moyhnihan $12 million; Wells Fargo paid $23 million to CEO John Stumpf.
Not bad for some of the worst criminals in history.
That’s how things work in the United States: The criminals get the big payouts. The people whose lives they destroy get $300.
Wednesday, April 17, 2013
America Lost: The real story of Wamu
America Lost: The real story of Wamu: The downfall of Washington Mutual The real story of Wamu http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/2009/09/28/story1.html
The real story of Wamu
The downfall of Washington Mutual
The real story of Wamu
http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/2009/09/28/story1.html
America Lost: Fraud By The Big Banks
America Lost: Fraud By The Big Banks: “The FBI Estimates That 80 Percent Of All Mortgage Fraud Involves Collaboration Or Collusion By Industry Insiders” Posted on Decem...
Fraud By The Big Banks
“The FBI Estimates That 80 Percent Of All Mortgage Fraud Involves Collaboration Or Collusion By Industry Insiders”
Fraud By The Big Banks – More Than Anything Done By The Little Guy – Caused The Financial Crisis
The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Thrift Supervision noted last year (page 7):The FBI estimates that 80 percent of all mortgage fraud involves collaborationThis confirms what one of the country’s top fraud experts has said for years: that it was fraud by the big banks – more than anything done by the little guy – which caused the financial crisis:
or collusion by industry insiders.
William K. Black – professor of economics and law, and the senior regulator during the S & L crisis – explained last month before to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission why banks gave home loans to people who they knew couldn’t repay. The whole piece is a must-read, but here are excerpts from the introduction:But instead of prosecuting fraud, the government just continues to cover it up.
The data demonstrate conclusively that most liar’s loans were fraudulent, which means that there were millions of fraudulent mortgage loans because liar’s loans became common (Credit Suisse estimates that they represented 49% of new originations by 2006). The data also demonstrate that even minimal underwriting of the loan files was sufficient to detect the overwhelming majority of such fraudulent liar’s loans. No honest, rational lender would make large numbers of liar’s loans. The epidemic of mortgage fraud was so large that it hyper-inflated the housing bubble, which allowed refinancing to further extend the life of the bubble (and the depth of the ultimate Great Recession.In other words, banks made loans to borrowers who they knew couldn’t really repay because the heads of the banks could make huge bonuses based on high volumes and fraudulent appraisals, and they didn’t care if their own companies later failed.
***
In the cases where there have been even minimal investigations (New Century, Aurora/Lehman, Citi, WaMu, Countrywide, and IndyMac) senior lender officials were aware that liar’s loans were typically fraudulent. The lenders could not make an honest business out of selling overwhelmingly fraudulent mortgages.
Liar’s loans were done for the usual reason – they optimized (fictional) short-term accounting income by creating a “sure thing” (Akerlof & Romer 1993). A fraudulent lender optimizes short-term fictional accounting income and longer term (real) losses by following a four-part recipe:
A. Extreme Growth
B. Making bad loans at a premium yield
C. Extreme leverage
D. Grossly inadequate loss reserves
Note that this same recipe maximizes fictional profits and real losses. This destroys the lender, but it makes senior officers that control the lender wealthy. This explains Akerlof & Romer’s title – Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit. The failure of the firm is not a failure of the fraud scheme. (Modern bailouts may even recapitalize the looted bank and leave the looters in charge of it.)
The first two “ingredients” are related. Home lending is a mature, reasonably competitive industry. A lender cannot grow extremely rapidly by making good loans. If he tried, he’d have to cut his yield and his competitors would respond. His income would decline. But he can guarantee the ability to grow extremely rapidly by being indifferent to loan quality and charging weaker credit risks, or more naïve borrowers, a premium yield.
In order to become indifferent to loan quality the officers controlling the lender must eviscerate its underwriting.
***
There is no honest reason for a secured lender to seek or permit inflated appraisal values. This is a sure marker of accounting control fraud – a marker that juries easily understand.
In short, they looted their companies and the economy as a whole.
Professor Black brings us current to where we are today:
History demonstrates that if the control frauds get away with their frauds they will strike again.
By allowing the banks to use their political power to gimmick the accounting rules to permit them to hide their massive losses on liar’s loans we have made it far harder to take effective administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions against the elite frauds that caused the Great Recession. Hiding the losses also adopts the dishonest Japanese approach that cripples economic recovery and public integrity.
Prosecuting the elites control frauds can be done successfully. Create a new “Top 100” priority list and appoint regulators that will make supporting the Justice Department a top agency priority. That’s how we obtained over 1000 priority felony convictions of elite S&L criminals. No controlling officer of a large, non-prime specialty lender has been convicted of running a control fraud. Only one has even been indicted.
The FBI has written that any discussion of the crisis that ignores the role of mortgage fraud is “irresponsible.”
Monday, April 15, 2013
America Lost: Another Government slap across the face
America Lost: Another Government slap across the face: Look at the bottom. Notice Government ! Here is where you can lie and cheat and steal from the country and its people and its OK! This is t...
Another Government slap across the face
Look at the bottom. Notice Government ! Here is where you can lie and cheat and steal from the country and its people and its OK! This is total bullshit!
What is an iRegistration?
An iRegistration enables companies to take advantage of the fraud and loan tracking benefits of a MERS® System registration at a discounted price by registering the loan, but without the requirement of recording MERS as the original mortgagee in the county land records. Benefits of iRegistered-loans include:- Mitigates fraud by verifying a borrower’s declaration of property
- Enables lenders to complete property preservation information (as required by certain jurisdictions)
- Provides transparency throughout the life of the loan
- How convenient- fraud within fraud.
MERS’ Role in Rhode Island Affirmed by State Supreme Court
12 April 2013
Justices: MERS has both Contractual and Statutory Authority to Support its Role as Mortgagee
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Jason Lobo
Phone: 703.652.1660
Email: jasonl@mersinc.org
Reston, Virginia, April 12, 2013— MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. today announced that a five-justice panel of the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), being named as the mortgagee as the agent of the promissory note-owner of the mortgage, is consistent with Rhode Island law.
In Bucci v. Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB et al., Justice Francis X. Flaherty, writing for the Court, agreed with the trial justice’s reasoning surrounding MERS role as the mortgagee, which held that “the fact that MERS acts in a nominee capacity for the lender and the lender’s successors and assigns does not diminish MERS’s role as the mortgagee nor is there created a new legal term ‘nominee-mortgagee.’”
In reviewing the language contained in the mortgage, the Court found the language to be “clear and unequivocal” when defining MERS as the mortgagee and agreed with the trial justice’s reasoning by finding that “the plaintiffs explicitly granted the statutory power of sale and the right to foreclose to MERS,” and therefore that MERS had the “contractual authority to exercise that right.” Supreme Court Justices Maureen McKenna Goldberg, Gilbert V. Indeglia, William P. Robinson III and Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell joined in this unanimous opinion.
The justices ruled that none of the plaintiff’s myriad arguments held any merit. “[I]t is our opinion that none of the statutes that plaintiffs rely upon prohibit MERS from foreclosing on the Bucci mortgage…” they held. The justices recognized that in the “modern world of lending” it is no longer the case that the mortgagee and the note-holder are always the same entity. Further, the Court found nothing in the statutes, “despite the feudal roots of these enactments” to “preclude an entity like MERS from acting as the nominee on behalf of the note-owner.”
The court concluded that “… we see no reason why MERS, as an agent of the owner of the note, cannot foreclose on behalf of that entity.” MERS stopped foreclosing in its name in July 2011. Mortgages are now assigned to a member lender prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings.
“We are pleased that the Rhode Island Supreme Court Justices expended such thoughtful and precise analysis when affirming MERS role and authority,” MERSCORP’s Director for Corporate Communications Jason Lobo said. “This decision caps months of strong rulings in MERS’ favor in Rhode Island.”
For descriptions of cases and other materials pertaining to MERS’ business model and role in U.S. housing, please visit www.mersinc.org.
###
MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. is a privately
held corporation that owns and manages the MERS® System and all other
MERS® products. It is a member-based organization made up of thousands
of lenders, servicers, sub-servicers, investors and government
institutions. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS)
serves as the mortgagee in the land records for loans registered on the
MERS® System, and is a nominee (or agent) for the owner of the
promissory note. The MERS® System is a national electronic database that
tracks changes in mortgage servicing and beneficial ownership interests
in residential mortgage loans on behalf of its members.
Sunday, April 14, 2013
Washington Mutual /JP Morgan Chase/ Deutsche Bank
Here is some information for Washington Mutual Mortgage , Now held by JP Morgan Chase
JPM Subsidiary (Subsidiaries of the Registrant) Of Wamu
http://www.secinfo.com/dsvr4.rFKy.7.htm#1stPage
Ahmanson Land Company
Ahmanson Marketing, Inc.
CRP Properties, Inc.
ECP Properties, Inc.
HMP Properties, Inc.
FA California Aircraft Holding Corp.
Pacific Centre Associates LLC
WMRP Delaware Holdings LLC
WMICC Delaware Holdings LLC
Irvine Corporate Center, Inc.
North Properties, Inc. New Jersey
Rivergrade Investment Corp.
Savings of America, Inc.
WaMu Insurance Services, Inc.
Washington Mutual Community Development, Inc.
Pike Street Holdings
Providian Bancorp Services
Second and Union, LLC
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp.
WaMu Capital Corp.
Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.
WM Asset Holdings Corp.
WM Marion Holdings, LLC
JPMC Mortgage Funding LLC
WaMu 2007 MF-1 Trust
Washington Mutual Preferred Funding LLC
Wamu 2006-OA1
Wamu 2007-Flex 1
WaMu 2008 SFR- 2
Washington Mutual Home Equity Trust
Unfortunately they did not want Long Beach loans.
http://www.secinfo.com/dsvr4.rFKy.16.htm#1stPage
In connection with the Washington Mutual transaction, JPMorgan Chase acquired certain loans that it deemed to be credit-impaired. Wholesale loans with a carrying amount of $135 million at December 31, 2009, down from $224 million at December 31, 2008, were determined to be credit-impaired at the date of acquisition. These wholesale loans are being accounted for individually (not on a pooled basis) and are reported as nonperforming loans since cash flows for each individual loan are not reasonably estimable. Such loans are excluded from the remainder of the following discussion, which relates solely to purchased credit-impaired consumer loans.
If you had or have problems with Deutsche Bank Go here
https://tss.sfs.db.com/investpublic/
look them up ( ones you can) Seems DB has alot of privacy ones attached as well .
Find the
JPM Subsidiary (Subsidiaries of the Registrant) Of Wamu
http://www.secinfo.com/dsvr4.rFKy.7.htm#1stPage
Ahmanson Land Company
Ahmanson Marketing, Inc.
CRP Properties, Inc.
ECP Properties, Inc.
HMP Properties, Inc.
FA California Aircraft Holding Corp.
Pacific Centre Associates LLC
WMRP Delaware Holdings LLC
WMICC Delaware Holdings LLC
Irvine Corporate Center, Inc.
North Properties, Inc. New Jersey
Rivergrade Investment Corp.
Savings of America, Inc.
WaMu Insurance Services, Inc.
Washington Mutual Community Development, Inc.
Pike Street Holdings
Providian Bancorp Services
Second and Union, LLC
WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp.
WaMu Capital Corp.
Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp.
WM Asset Holdings Corp.
WM Marion Holdings, LLC
JPMC Mortgage Funding LLC
WaMu 2007 MF-1 Trust
Washington Mutual Preferred Funding LLC
Wamu 2006-OA1
Wamu 2007-Flex 1
WaMu 2008 SFR- 2
Washington Mutual Home Equity Trust
Unfortunately they did not want Long Beach loans.
http://www.secinfo.com/dsvr4.rFKy.16.htm#1stPage
In connection with the Washington Mutual transaction, JPMorgan Chase acquired certain loans that it deemed to be credit-impaired. Wholesale loans with a carrying amount of $135 million at December 31, 2009, down from $224 million at December 31, 2008, were determined to be credit-impaired at the date of acquisition. These wholesale loans are being accounted for individually (not on a pooled basis) and are reported as nonperforming loans since cash flows for each individual loan are not reasonably estimable. Such loans are excluded from the remainder of the following discussion, which relates solely to purchased credit-impaired consumer loans.
If you had or have problems with Deutsche Bank Go here
https://tss.sfs.db.com/investpublic/
look them up ( ones you can) Seems DB has alot of privacy ones attached as well .
Find the
Saturday, April 13, 2013
America Lost: Banks Want Foreclosure Not Reinstatement of Loan
America Lost: Banks Want Foreclosure Not Reinstatement of Loan: April 5, 2013 There has been a spike of questions about modifications, short sales and settlements with the banks. My unvarnished opini...
Banks Want Foreclosure Not Reinstatement of Loan
April 5, 2013 There has been a spike of questions about modifications, short sales and settlements with the banks. My unvarnished opinion is that all this activity is Public Relations and a substantive policy intended to increase rather than avert foreclosures. Quite the contrary, offers of modifications are excuses to drag more money out of borrowers, give them a “trial run” and then deny the modification. I will admit that there have been more modifications of late but they are few in comparison to the number of loans that should be modified, naming the creditor, the balance due, the terms of repayment and perfecting what is now an empty unperfected lien.
In the law we look to the intent to determine the intent. If a reasonable person would understand the consequences of their actions, it is deemed intentional despite all protestations to the contrary.
The result we see from bank policies and conduct is that people go into a declared “default” on a false loan because the bank representative who has no money in the game told them that the only way they can apply for relief is by being behind in their payments at least 90 days. Translation: We are advising you to breach your loan documents and go into debt on past due payments such that you won’t be able to reinstate.
People go into trial modifications on a false loan with a bank or entity with no authority to offer it during which they deplete their savings and retirement, go totally broke from paying the “offer of trial modification” thinking they are saving their home. Then they are told that the permanent modification was denied because of some obscure reason and they have a few days to reinstate the loan with money they don’t have and with a credit score that took a major hit because of the reporting by the same non-creditor who threatened them with foreclosure.
The objective is to wear people down financially, emotionally and physically. Turmoil in the household caused by the stress of impending foreclosure causes divorce, physical ailments and even suicides. The result is that the house goes into foreclosure despite the fact that the borrower made a perfectly valid offer of modification whose proceeds far exceed the proceeds from foreclosure.
The banks are like any other business searching for profit. So at first blush one might assume that anything they can do to mitigate their loss they would jump at, which is the way it always was until the whole “securitization” thing came along. What changed was that instead of having a risk of loss if the loan failed, the banks made tons of money betting on the failure. So as soon as mortgages were declared in default, they collected 100 cents on the dollar, insurance and the proceeds of hedges like credit default swaps. The irony here is that the banks collected the mitigation payments from insurance and credit default swaps while it was investors who were actually losing the money.
The payment from insurance and credit default swaps was triggered by a declaration from the Master Servicer that the value of the portfolio had decreased. This was not subject to challenge by the insurance company or the counterparty of the credit default swap contract. So in effect the loans were being sold multiple times. In the case of Bear Stearns, they were leveraged as much as 42 times. That means they were in a double bind position of taking fees for insuring portfolios that were sure to fail or at least sure to be declared as having failed, and they were getting money on their own insurance and credit default swap protections.
Translation: a loan that comes out of delinquency or declared default represents a huge liability for a bank that has already collected millions of dollars on a $200,000 loan. If everyone paid off their loan, the banks would owe back the money they received from insurance and credit default swaps. It isn’t the difference between the foreclosure proceeds and the offer of modification that motivates them, it is the difference between the millions they already received from insurers and counterparties and the nominal principal of the loan. And the only way they can be sure that they never have that liability to pay back millions of dollars on a loan they declared in default is by forcing it into foreclosure.
But the government and public are expecting the banks to act reasonably in the context of the old mortgages where the lenders had a risk of loss if the borrower didn’t pay. Now they have a risk of loss of the borrower does pay. Confusion over this had led the government, courts and borrowers to expect that the modification process would bring a stop to the tsunami of foreclosures, but as we have seen in recent weeks, the wave of foreclosures is coming again and millions of people are going to lose their homes to non-creditors who have already been paid multiple times for the “value” of the loan.
The only way out of this which has received some traction in the courts is to allege that contrary to the requirements of HAMP and HARP and other programs, the servicer and creditor did NOT “Consider” the modification proposal, which of course is an accurate portrayal of the the real world of loans that are subject to claims of securitization — even though those claims are probably false.
People who have made this challenge and who do so with professional help point out the obvious: that the proceeds from the modification are far better than the proceeds of a foreclosure. But the question is better for whom? If we take the real creditors, the investor lenders, the analysis is simple. They want the most money they can get. Since they were not included in the payment of insurance and credit de fault swaps, their only hope to mitigate their real loss is by real money from the homeowner which the homeowner is offering, based upon real documentation which is enforceable unlike the current fabricated, forged documents done without authority, right justification or excuse.
So the banks have an interest that is entirely adverse to that of the investors who were their clients. The banks want foreclosure so they can keep the insurance money and the investors want the loans reinstated so they can get their money back. This conflict of interest is so severe that the country is barely grinding through a recession that is entirely caused by the behavior of these banks who sucked the money out of the economy and are now holding it all over the world in tens of thousands of shell companies around the world.
The moral of the story is that if you are serious about modification or short-sale be prepared for a long journey where in the end your petition is denied and you must still litigate. For those who get the modification they want arising from the cover-up PR campaign of the banks, congratulations you are one in thousands who should have received the same benefit.
Friday, April 12, 2013
America Lost: Don't believe what your seeing or hearing
America Lost: Don't believe what your seeing or hearing: Editor's Analysis: The Banks have been paying a lot of money to plant articles around the country and in media generally to give us ...
Don't believe what your seeing or hearing
Editor's Analysis: The Banks have been paying a lot of money to plant articles around the country and in media generally to give us the impression that the recession is over, they did their job in preventing it, and the housing crisis has turned the corner with prices rising. Housing prices are rising in some places because of a glut of cheap money (see mortgage meltdown 1996-2008); other than that the whole thing is an outright lie. Even their own analysts don't agree with the articles and statements made on behalf of the megabanks.You can't take half the blood out of a person and expect them not to be anemic, weak and dizzy. The megabanks took more than that out of our economic system and parked it around the world out of reach of all but the select few who are members of the club. For the rest of us, earning a living is becoming increasingly difficult, getting approval for a reasonably priced mortgage is difficult unless you go for one of the new deals that are out there at 2.5%, 15 years fixed rate, supposedly. Besides the fact that they are going to steer you into an entirely different loan product in the classic bait and switch, they are restarting the "securitization" scheme that wrecked us in the first place.Who is making money at 2.5%? How can you even have a budget for advertising much less appear dozens of times per day on TV, radio, magazines and newspapers? The answer to these and other similar questions lies in the fact that on average, the mortgages are going to be at much higher rates than those advertised, the incidence of force-placed insurance on fully insured homes will be increased to become a regular major contributor to income to the megabanks in the form of kickbacks or commissions and simply price gouging, and no doubt someone has come up with a really creative way to make certain the loans, on the whole, go into default decreasing the value of a "portfolio" or "pool" of loans to less than half of the nominal value placed on the note --- but increasing the profits from betting against the same mortgages they represented as being underwritten according to industry standards.The fact is that the Federal Reserve cannot keep rates down indefinitely, and the rush to gold and other currencies shows that the big players who know more than you do are getting ready for a major devaluation of currency in the U.S. The "inflation" that accompanies a devaluation might work to the benefit of the homeowners who owe the old dollars but can pay with the new dollars (if they have any). But increased rates mean higher payments, and higher payments combined with no credit and low wages and low median income spells disaster for the demand side of housing. Simply put: housing prices are going down again and they are already starting to slip.The only reason inventories of homes for sale are "low" is because of the shadow inventory of homes set for foreclosure sales, the zombie houses that have been stripped and are worthless and the homeowners who are so far underwater that they can't make it to the closing table. It is a very unpersuasive recovery. Zillow outlines it chapter and verse.Working backwards, the reason for all this is simple theft using exotic sounding names of financial instruments that were never funded or used. In the end, the loan was from the investors and the debt was and is between the investors and the homeowners. Everyone else is an intermediary. Those conduits for the loan have no stake in it. They have their agreements for fees but that is about it.There are only two ways of going on this: (1) do the same thing all over again and kick the can down the road to the next blowout recession or (2) stop kidding ourselves that housing prices are going anywhere but down unless we expose the truth of what happened in these so-called mortgage loans funded with money stolen from investors under the premise that the money would fund a REMIC trust which would then acquire loans and be secured, on record, for their interest. Anyone out there see the trust on any document in any loan closing that didn't end up in litigation? No?That's because the intermediaries were and are asserting ownership stakes in loans that never came out of their pocket, loans for which they have no risk of loss and loans that were acquired on paper by other intermediaries when the debt was at all times material hereto owned by the investor lender. AND THAT is why you must LEAD with the deficiencies in the money trail and NOT with the DOCUMENT trail, which will merely have you running down a rabbit hole dug special for you.
America Lost: Information you need to know.
America Lost: Information you need to know.: There are two issues when the other side presents original documents. First is that they say these are originals and they do not accompany i...
Information you need to know.
There are two issues when the other side presents original documents. First is that they say these are originals and they do not accompany it with an affidavit from someone with actual personal knowledge of the transactions or the high bar for business records exceptions to hearsay. My experience is that 50-50, the documents are original or fabricated by use of Photoshop and a laser printer or dot matrix printer. So what you need to do is to go down to the clerk’s office and see what they filed. It would not be unusual for them to file a copy saying it was the original. Second, on that same point, the original can be examined. When the signatures are heavy there should be indentations on the back. Also a notary stamp tends to bleed through the paper to the back.
The second major point is the issue of holder v owner. The owner of the debt is entitled to the ultimate relief, not the note-holder unless the other side fails to object. So along with the proffering of the “originals” they must tell the story, using competent foundation testimony, how they came into possession of the note. In discovery this is done by asking to see proof of payment and proof of loss. Which is to say that you want to see the canceled check or wire transfer receipt that paid for the “transaction” in which the possessor of the note became a holder under UCC and is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that they are the owner. If there is no transaction for value, then the note was not negotiated under the terms of the UCC.
Since they possess the note there is a hairline allowance that they may sue for the collection on a note in which they have no financial sake but there is no ability to win if the borrower denies they received the money or that the possessor of the note obtained the note for purposes of litigation and is not the creditor — i.e., the party who could properly submit a credit bid at auction by a creditor as defined by law, nor are they able to execute a satisfaction of mortgage because even upon the receipt of the money they have no loss, and under the terms of the note itself the overpayment is due back to the borrower.
And just as importantly, they cannot modify the mortgage so any submission to them for modification is futile without them showing proof of payment, proof of loss and/or authority to speak for and represent the interests of an identified creditor.
An identified creditor is not merely a name but is a report of the name of the owner of the debt, the contact person and their contact information. Then you can contact the owner and ask for the balance and how it was computed. So the failure to identify the actual owner is interference with the borrower’s right to seek HAMP or HARP modifications — potentially a cause of action for intentional interference in the contractual relations of another (asserting that the note and mortgage incorporated existing law) or violation of statutory duties since the Dodd-Frank act includes all participants in the securitization scheme as servicers.
The key is the money trail because that is the actual transaction where money exchanged hands and it must be shown that the money trail leads from A to B to C etc. The documents would then be examined to see if they are in fact relating to the transaction or a particular leg of the chain.
If the documents don’t conform to the actual monetary transaction, then the documents are refuted as evidence of the debt or any right to enforce the debt. What we know is that in nearly all cases the documents at origination do NOT reflect the actual monetary transaction which means they (a) do not show the actual owner of the debt but rather a straw-man nominee for an undisclosed lender contrary to several provisions of the Truth in Lending Act. The same holds true for the false securitization” chain in which documents are fabricated to refer to transactions that never occurred — where there was a transfer of the debt on paper that was worthless because no transaction took place.
One last thing on this is the issue of blank endorsements. There is widespread confusion between the requirements of the UCC and the requirements of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. It is absolutely true that a blank endorsement on a negotiable instrument is valid and that the holder possesses all rights of a holder including the presumption (rebuttable) of ownership.
But hundreds of Judges have erred in stopping their inquiry there. Because the UCC says that the agreement of the parties is paramount to any provision of the act. So if the PSA says the endorsement and assignment must be in a particular form (recordable) made out to the trust and that no blank endorsements will be accepted, then the indorsement is an offer which cannot be accepted by the asset pool or the trustee for the asset pool because it would violate an express prohibition in the PSA.
And that leads to the last point which is that a document calling itself an assignment is not irrefutable evidence of an actual transfer of the loan. If the assignee does not agree to take it, then the transaction is void. None of the assignments I have seen have any joinder and acceptance by the trustee or anyone on behalf of the pool because nobody on the trustee level is willing to risk jail, even though Eric Holder now says he won’t prosecute those crimes. If you take the deposition of the trustee and ask for information concerning the trust account, they will get all squirrelly because there is no trust account on which the trustee is a signatory.
If you ask them whether they accepted the assignment of a defaulted loan and if so, what was the basis for them doing so they will get even more nervous. And if you ask them specifically if they accepted the assignment which you attach to the interrogatory or which you show them at deposition, they will have to say that they did not execute any document accepting that assignment, and then they will be required to agree, when you point out the PSA provisions that no such assignment or endorsement would be valid.
#banks #mortgage #fraud #assignment #UCC #note
The second major point is the issue of holder v owner. The owner of the debt is entitled to the ultimate relief, not the note-holder unless the other side fails to object. So along with the proffering of the “originals” they must tell the story, using competent foundation testimony, how they came into possession of the note. In discovery this is done by asking to see proof of payment and proof of loss. Which is to say that you want to see the canceled check or wire transfer receipt that paid for the “transaction” in which the possessor of the note became a holder under UCC and is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that they are the owner. If there is no transaction for value, then the note was not negotiated under the terms of the UCC.
Since they possess the note there is a hairline allowance that they may sue for the collection on a note in which they have no financial sake but there is no ability to win if the borrower denies they received the money or that the possessor of the note obtained the note for purposes of litigation and is not the creditor — i.e., the party who could properly submit a credit bid at auction by a creditor as defined by law, nor are they able to execute a satisfaction of mortgage because even upon the receipt of the money they have no loss, and under the terms of the note itself the overpayment is due back to the borrower.
And just as importantly, they cannot modify the mortgage so any submission to them for modification is futile without them showing proof of payment, proof of loss and/or authority to speak for and represent the interests of an identified creditor.
An identified creditor is not merely a name but is a report of the name of the owner of the debt, the contact person and their contact information. Then you can contact the owner and ask for the balance and how it was computed. So the failure to identify the actual owner is interference with the borrower’s right to seek HAMP or HARP modifications — potentially a cause of action for intentional interference in the contractual relations of another (asserting that the note and mortgage incorporated existing law) or violation of statutory duties since the Dodd-Frank act includes all participants in the securitization scheme as servicers.
The key is the money trail because that is the actual transaction where money exchanged hands and it must be shown that the money trail leads from A to B to C etc. The documents would then be examined to see if they are in fact relating to the transaction or a particular leg of the chain.
If the documents don’t conform to the actual monetary transaction, then the documents are refuted as evidence of the debt or any right to enforce the debt. What we know is that in nearly all cases the documents at origination do NOT reflect the actual monetary transaction which means they (a) do not show the actual owner of the debt but rather a straw-man nominee for an undisclosed lender contrary to several provisions of the Truth in Lending Act. The same holds true for the false securitization” chain in which documents are fabricated to refer to transactions that never occurred — where there was a transfer of the debt on paper that was worthless because no transaction took place.
One last thing on this is the issue of blank endorsements. There is widespread confusion between the requirements of the UCC and the requirements of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. It is absolutely true that a blank endorsement on a negotiable instrument is valid and that the holder possesses all rights of a holder including the presumption (rebuttable) of ownership.
But hundreds of Judges have erred in stopping their inquiry there. Because the UCC says that the agreement of the parties is paramount to any provision of the act. So if the PSA says the endorsement and assignment must be in a particular form (recordable) made out to the trust and that no blank endorsements will be accepted, then the indorsement is an offer which cannot be accepted by the asset pool or the trustee for the asset pool because it would violate an express prohibition in the PSA.
And that leads to the last point which is that a document calling itself an assignment is not irrefutable evidence of an actual transfer of the loan. If the assignee does not agree to take it, then the transaction is void. None of the assignments I have seen have any joinder and acceptance by the trustee or anyone on behalf of the pool because nobody on the trustee level is willing to risk jail, even though Eric Holder now says he won’t prosecute those crimes. If you take the deposition of the trustee and ask for information concerning the trust account, they will get all squirrelly because there is no trust account on which the trustee is a signatory.
If you ask them whether they accepted the assignment of a defaulted loan and if so, what was the basis for them doing so they will get even more nervous. And if you ask them specifically if they accepted the assignment which you attach to the interrogatory or which you show them at deposition, they will have to say that they did not execute any document accepting that assignment, and then they will be required to agree, when you point out the PSA provisions that no such assignment or endorsement would be valid.
#banks #mortgage #fraud #assignment #UCC #note
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)