Monday, September 30, 2013

Securitization Audits Successfully Used as Evidence in Robo-Signing Violation Cases

Securitization Audits Successfully Used as Evidence in Robo-Signing Violation Cases | September 23, 2013
Cheyenne, WY -- (SBWIRE) -- 09/23/2013 -- As the foreclosure crisis rages on, robo-signing continues to play a key role in foreclosure fraud cases.

Robo-signing refers to a variety of practices, all of which violate the foreclosure process and will be exposed on a securitization audit. Robo-signing is the mass signing of documents by someone whose name does not appear on the mortgage document they are signing or by someone who is not authorized to sign mortgage documents. Robo-signers are generally employees of a mortgage servicing company that sign foreclosure documents without reviewing them. Rather than take the additional time to review the specific details of each individual case, robo-signers presume the paperwork to be correct and sign it automatically.

During the housing boom, banks employed robo-signers to process hundreds of thousands of securitized loans. Some robo-signers were qualified mortgage executives that signed mortgage affidavit documents without reviewing the information, while others were temporary workers with virtually no understanding of the work they were doing. Robo-signing can also entail forgery of an executive’s signature or failing to comply with standard notary procedures.

Robo-signing is a violation of the Securities Exchange Commission’s regulations and can be used as evidence to fight foreclosure. If there is proof that a robo-signer signed off on a loan without reviewing the details of the case, he is guilty of committing fraud by claiming knowledge of a financial matter of which he had no personal knowledge.

What Will It Cost JPMorgan to Make Nice With Regulators?

If U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder is a shark, then he’s circling JPMorgan (NYSE:JPM), and there’s blood in the water. Regulators have threatened to sue the bank, America’s largest by assets, claiming that it knowingly sold bad mortgage-backed securities to investors.
Regulators are seeking as much as $11 billion total from the bank for this and related alleged violations of securities laws such as a $6 billion penalty sought by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, according to the Financial Times.
Holder met with JPMorgan Chairman and CEO Jamie Dimon on Thursday to discuss the issue. According to a Financial Times report, people familiar with the situation said that the talks were constructive, but that no final deal emerged from the nearly two-hour meeting.
Dimon appears eager to make nice with regulators but also disagrees with regulators about how much responsibility his bank bears for the actions of Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual. The government encouraged JPMorgan to acquire both companies during the financial crisis, moves that ultimately helped minimize the damage that failing securities were doing to the markets at the time.
The government’s seemingly relentless onslaught of litigation against major financial institutions like JPMorgan is designed to try to teach the industry a lesson. At first blush, it appears to be working: Dimon has made it clear that rebuilding the bank’s reputation with regulators is one of his top priorities.
He was likely motivated to play nice in the wake of the London Whale fiasco, in which JPMorgan lost more than $6 billion. Dimon has described the ordeal as “the stupidest and most embarrassing situation I have ever been a part of.”
But JPMorgan isn’t the only bank the regulatory sharks are circling. Bank of America (NYSE:BAC) squared off against the government on Tuesday morning on the first day of a trial that is expected to last as long as four weeks. Prosecutors led by U.S. Attorney General for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara have accused the bank of “massive fraud” by selling bad mortgages to Freddie Mac and Freddie Mae during the build-up to the financial crisis.
It’s important to clarify that while prosecutors have their crosshairs trained on Bank of America, this particular case has more to do with Countrywide Financial, once the country’s largest mortgage lender. Countrywide was purchased by Bank of America in 2008 as the housing market was collapsing, and the lender along with it.
In a complaint initially filed in October 2012, the plaintiffs explained their case against Bank of America: “In 2007, as loan default rates rose across the country and the GSEs reevaluated their loan purchase requirements, Countrywide rolled out a new ‘streamlined’ loan origination model it called the ‘Hustle.’” The Hustle program — or High Speed Swim Lane — is at the heart of the case against the mortgage lender.

JPMorgan Audit Director Laban Jackson: 'We Actually Are Guilty'

Sorry just isn't enough.

jpmorgan guilty

CHICAGO (Reuters) - The head of JPMorgan Chase & Co's audit committee acknowledged on Thursday that the bank had made mistakes and said it has tried to learn from them.
"We've got these things that we actually are guilty of and we've got to fix them," said Laban Jackson, the head of the audit committee of JPMorgan's board of directors.
"It's embarrassing for the board," he added. Jackson spoke at a conference at a downtown Chicago hotel on Thursday.
The remarks could underscore the bank's eagerness to resolve the raft of regulatory investigations it now faces. Earlier on Thursday, JPMorgan Chief Executive Jamie Dimon met with U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder in Washington to discuss a settlement to end investigations into its sales of shoddy mortgage securities leading up to the financial crisis.
In Chicago, Jackson spoke publicly with Anne Sheehan, chair of the Council of Institutional Investors, which sponsored the event.
Jackson did not discuss in detail the bank's settlement talks with regulators.
But he did offer a picture of some board decision making and vowed that it would try to become more open with investors. When Sheehan, as moderator, suggested that many directors would not share the same goal, Jackson replied, "That's got to change, and you guys have to drive it."
Asked what he learned from JPMorgan's troubles, Jackson said that while few boards or managers could stop malfeasance, JPMorgan made sure its response to problems like the so-called "London whale" trading losses were correct, such as by bringing in law firms to investigate its actions.
Jackson quoted JPMorgan's top director, former Exxon Mobil CEO Lee Raymond, as saying: "our job is to get the respect back in the market."
Jackson received a polite reception from attendees at the conference, which included hundreds of officials from state pension funds, endowments and other institutions.
Several said, however, they wished the directors had taken a harder line. "I think he was very light on the board's self-evaluation," said Dieter Waizenegger, executive director of CtW Investment Group, an adviser to union pension funds. CtW previously had opposed Jackson's re-election to the board.
Jackson noted that after problems emerged, JPMorgan had clawed back millions of dollars from executives, demoted some and fired others to send a strong message the bank's rules and culture had to be respected.
"I don't know what else we could have done because we're not allowed to shoot people," Jackson said. "That's what happened. I'm sorry to all you shareholders."

Why Judges Are Scowling at Banks, unless you live in VT

Come to VT- Judges side with banks even though the banks are presenting fraud.. because in our great state .. what happen throughout this country does not happen here. Blinders are on.

Why Judges Are Scowling at Banks

LAST week, for the first time since the financial crisis, the government faced off in court against a major bank over lending practices during the mortgage mania. Lawyers for the Justice Department contend that Countrywide Financial, a unit of Bank of America, misrepresented the quality of mortgages it sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the taxpayer-owned mortgage finance giants, starting in 2007. Fannie and Freddie incurred gross losses of $850 million on the defective loans and net losses of $131 million, the government said.

Bank of America disagrees. Its lawyers say that Countrywide did not defraud Fannie or Freddie.
This case is undoubtedly big, but it is only one of many mortgage-related matters inching through the judicial system. And what is notable about some of the lower-profile matters is the tone and tack that federal judges are taking in their rulings. District court judges are not generally known as flamethrowers, but some seem to be losing patience with the banks.
For decades leading up to the foreclosure debacle, plaintiffs’ lawyers say, judges generally took the side of lenders when borrowers came to court complaining of problematic lending or predatory loan servicing. Many judges still do. But some are getting tough, perhaps having seen too many examples of dubious bank behavior.
“Maybe the judges are tired of the diet of baloney sandwiches the banks have been feeding them,” said April Charney, a foreclosure defense lawyer who for years represented troubled borrowers at Jacksonville Area Legal Aid in Florida. She is now in private practice.
Two recent rulings — one in New York involving Bank of America and one in Massachusetts involving Wells Fargo — serve as examples. In the Wells Fargo case, a ruling on Sept. 17 by Judge William G. Young of Federal District Court was especially stinging. In it, he required Wells Fargo to provide him with a corporate resolution signed by its president and a majority of its board stating that they stand behind the conduct of the bank’s lawyers in the case.
The case involved a borrower named Joseph Henning who fell behind on his mortgage, which he received from Wachovia, an entity later absorbed by Wells Fargo. In a suit filed against Wells Fargo in May 2009, Mr. Henning contended that the loan was predatory.
Judge Young agreed with the bank’s argument that federal laws pre-empted the state-law remedies Mr. Henning was seeking. But he did so reluctantly, calling it a win based “on a technicality.”
Then he chastised the bank. “The disconnect between Wells Fargo’s publicly advertised face and its actual litigation conduct here could not be more extreme,” the judge wrote. “A quick visit to Wells Fargo’s Web site confirms that it vigorously promotes itself as consumer-friendly,” he continued, “a far cry from the hard-nosed win-at-any-cost stance it has adopted here.”
If Wells Fargo does not supply the corporate resolution within 30 days of the ruling, the case will go to a jury trial, the judge said.
Mary Eshet, a spokeswoman for Wells Fargo, called the judge’s remarks in the ruling “inflammatory and unsubstantiated,” and added: “We believe Judge Young should follow the law which he recognizes and finalize his own judgment in this case.” The bank is asking an appellate court to require the judge to enter his dismissal order without the corporate resolution.
Valeriano Diviacchi, the lawyer for the borrower, said he had never seen a ruling requiring a corporate resolution as Judge Young’s did. Mr. Diviacchi said that he didn’t know why the judge made the ruling but that the judge appeared to want the case to be heard by a jury of Mr. Henning’s peers, people who may have had their own experiences with questionable bank practices.
“Judge Young is one of the few judges who will refer matters to juries — even when a cause of action does not entitle a party to a jury right — because he believes in it as a foundation of the justice system and a democratic society,” Mr. Diviacchi said.
The second case arose after Edwin Ramos and Michelle Ava Stouber-Ramos filed for bankruptcy and had the first and second mortgage on their Tampa, Fla., condominium discharged by the court. That kind of discharge protects a borrower from any attempts to collect the debts as a personal liability.
Bank of America received notice of the discharge in September 2010. But in spring 2012, the bank began sending letters to the Ramoses, saying their $26,991 second mortgage was “seriously delinquent” and demanding that they pay the amount owed immediately. Otherwise, the bank said, it would proceed with “collection action.” 
  According to Michael H. Schwartz, a lawyer in White Plains who represented the borrowers, Mr. Ramos started getting three phone calls a day from the bank, demanding repayment. When Mr. Ramos advised the bank’s representatives that the debt had been expunged in a bankruptcy proceeding, he was told “too bad,” according to a court filing.

The phone calls and letters continued even after Mr. Schwartz went back to court to ask that Bank of America be sanctioned for illegal attempts to collect the debt. During this time, Bank of America sold the servicing rights on the first mortgage to another company, which soon began sending its own demand letters to the Ramoses.
This month, the matter came before Robert D. Drain, a federal bankruptcy judge in New York. Judge Drain found Bank of America in contempt of the debt discharge order protecting the Ramoses and required the bank to pay Mr. Schwartz’s legal bills in the case. The judge also ordered the bank to pay $10,000 a month in sanctions to the Ramoses until it stopped making the repayment demands.
Judge Drain acknowledged that it wasn’t a lot of money to Bank of America. But, he said, he hoped that its lawyers would get the message. “This is not just a stupid mistake” by the bank, the judge said. “This is a policy.”
A Bank of America spokeswoman said the bank was working to resolve the court’s issues and “researching and investigating what transpired.”
But Mr. Schwartz said the Ramos case was just one of several in which he represented homeowners who were pursued by Bank of America over discharged debts. In another of his cases, court filings show that a homeowner received 105 phone calls and four threatening letters from the bank. “I believe the bank has made a conscious decision that it is less expensive to pay sanctions than to change its internal processes,” he said. “This problem is nationwide.”
Judges who take a more aggressive stance against the banks in such cases are doing what they can to hold these institutions accountable. It may not seem like a lot, but it is progress.

Thursday, September 26, 2013

JPMorgan Chase Discussing $11 Billion Settlement To End Crisis-Era Mortgage Probes

Again, you need to dig  deeper, JP/Chase had a number of Washington Mutual loans given to them by the FDIC, and were charged off by JP/Chase. Than Chase made deals after claiming to own these loans with hedge funds selling them at pennies on the dollar and writing off second loans as paid and satisfied as part of the deal , so hedge funds could foreclose, and than JP/Chase turned around and later said to the homeowner, ( who they already told them they owned the loans) were sorry we made a mistake. NO !! Its time the banks and CEO start paying for this abuse, and its stop being the homeowner who is the one losing for a crime they didn't commit!!!!!!!! THIS IS NOT OVER till all the truth comes out.

JPMorgan Chase Discussing $11 Billion Settlement To End Crisis-Era Mortgage Probes

WASHINGTON -- Federal and state authorities are discussing an $11 billion settlement with JPMorgan Chase that would resolve numerous allegations of mortgage-related improprieties in the years before the financial crisis, according to people familiar with the ongoing negotiations.
The deal, if struck, would settle claims brought by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the New York attorney general and end at least three separate investigations by U.S. attorneys' offices in New York, California and Pennsylvania. The potential deal would involve a $7 billion cash payment and $4 billion in mortgage modifications for troubled borrowers.
The negotiations are “developing by the hour," one person familiar with the talks said. It’s possible no deal will be struck, or that it could be much more limited and resolve only one or a few of the various probes.
The bulk of the $7 billion cash payment being discussed would go to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-backed mortgage giants regulated by FHFA. The agency, led by Edward DeMarco, claims Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were duped into buying junk mortgage-backed securities issued by JPMorgan and the financial companies it purchased in 2008, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual.
FHFA filed its lawsuit against JPMorgan and separately sued more than a dozen other leading financial institutions in September 2011. The agency is trying to reclaim billions of dollars in losses sustained by the two mortgage giants, which were rescued by taxpayers at the height of the financial crisis in 2008.
The rest of the funds would be split between shoring up the Federal Housing Administration, which has claims against the bank for allegedly defrauding taxpayers on FHA loans; New York state; the U.S. government; and distressed homeowners, who could apply for mortgage assistance.
FHA, a government agency inside the Department of Housing and Urban Development that insures loans traditionally made to first-time home buyers and others unable to stump up big down payments, is likely to tap the U.S. Treasury for a bailout as a result of depleted reserves caused by soured loans.
JPMorgan has been resisting such a large payment, government officials said. But JPMorgan has an incentive to settle as many government probes as possible by Oct. 11, when the bank reports third-quarter earnings. Already, the bank has cautioned investors that it expects to incur a significant cost due to the various government-driven legal claims it faces.
Equity analysts who cover JPMorgan for investors have said the bank’s legal liability could depress its stock price and future earnings.
The various government entities also have an incentive to strike a mass settlement rather than file separate cases in court that could take years to resolve, particularly if the current settlement involves reduced payments or lowered loan balances for troubled borrowers.
Representatives for the Justice Department, FHFA, JPMorgan, and New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman declined to comment.
JPMorgan faces a litany of accusations of mortgage-related misdeeds, according to its securities filings.
U.S. attorneys offices in California and Pennsylvania are investigating the bank’s allegedly misleading sales of mortgage-backed securities, according to securities filings and people familiar with the probes. In one case, federal prosecutors told JPMorgan in May that they had “preliminarily concluded” that the bank violated civil securities laws related to mortgage securities it packaged and sold from 2005 to 2007. A federal criminal investigation related to mortgage securities is pending.
Schneiderman last year sued the bank, alleging it misled investors when they purchased securities issued by Bear Stearns. Preet Bharara, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, has been probing the bank for possibly defrauding taxpayers on FHA loans, securities filings show.
In recent years, federal prosecutors and HUD have struck deals with Bank of America, Citigroup and Deutsche Bank, the German lender, to resolve allegations they defrauded taxpayers on FHA loans.
The current round of talks centered on JPMorgan intensified in recent days after federal prosecutors notified the bank they planned to file a civil lawsuit. The talks are being led by the Obama administration’s Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Working Group, the formal name for the federal and state agencies with a stake in investigating mortgage securities-related wrongdoing.
The administration has faced criticism, particularly from federal lawmakers, over the apparent lack of cases it has brought against leading financial institutions for alleged wrongdoing committed in the years leading up to the financial crisis.
Defense lawyers that represent big banks have said in recent months that the Justice Department has ramped up its investigations into their clients.

FHA Expected to Tap Treasury for Bailout

Here we go again, and again taxpayers foot the bill. I say no. Make the banks that created this mess pay.

FHA Expected to Tap Treasury for Bailout

Battered by defaults on loans it insures, the Federal Housing Administration is expected to tap the Treasury Department for $1 billion to $1.5 billion to plug a budget shortfall, according to three people familiar with the agency's finances.
The FHA is expected to ask for the funds at the end of the month, the sources said. If it does, it would be the first time in its 79-year history that the agency needed a bailout from the Treasury.
The Obama administration estimated in April that the FHA would need nearly $1 billion to close its funding gap this year.
That gap is due almost entirely to losses in the FHA's reverse mortgage program. Many seniors who received the loans in a lump sum were later unable to pay taxes and insurance, resulting in a wave of defaults. The reverse mortgage program was projected to have a $5.2 billion deficit this year. By comparison, the FHA's mortgage program was projected to have a surplus of $4.3 billion.
The agency, which insured 27% of all mortgages last year, has been in the hot seat since November when an independent actuarial report found that projected losses over the next 30 years could put the agency $16 billion in the red, far out of reach of a required 2% capital buffer.
The FHA is required to maintain a 2% capital reserve but has fallen below that congressionally mandated level for the past four years. The changing nature of the housing market and the FHA's fluctuating finances made it unclear for most of this year whether the agency would need to invoke its "permanent and indefinite" budget authority, allowing it to receive funds from Treasury.
The FHA's finances have improved recently, with its overall serious delinquency rate falling for four consecutive quarters to 8.47% at June 30.
The FHA also has benefited from foreclosure delays and a slow process for reimbursing lenders on defaulted loans. Even though the FHA paid out $21.4 billion in claims in the past four quarters, it had $36.1 billion in cash reserves at the end of its fiscal second quarter, up from $32.3 billion a year earlier.

Wednesday, September 25, 2013

Lets play a game



 American Home Mortgage Company
Arch Bay Holdings, LLC - Series 2008A
Arch Bay Holdings, LLC - Series 2008B
Arch Bay Holdings, LLC - Series 2009A
Arch Bay Holdings, LLC - Series 2009C
Arch Bay Holdings, LLC - Series 2009D
Arch Bay Holdings, LLC - Series 2010A
Arch Bay Holdings, LLC - Series 2010B ********** 1
Arch Bay Holdings, LLC - Series 2010C
Arch Bay Holdings, LLC-Series 2009B

Bank of America, National Association as Trustee

 Countrywide Bank, FSB

 DB Structured Products, Inc.

 Deutsche Bank

 FDIC as Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank ( Its actually on MERS!)

 Green Tree Servicing LLC

JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. fka WAMU

Litton Loan Servicing LP

 Quantum Group Mortgage & Real Estate

 Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC

 Select Portfolio Servicing Inc

Washington Financial Group, Inc.
Washington Mutual Bank (Interim Funder)
Washington Mutual Bank (vendor)
Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.
Washington Mutual Mortgage Securites Corp.

 Washington Mutual Bank (Interim Funder)
Washington Mutual Bank (vendor)
Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.

In 2005, Select Portfolio Servicing was purchased by Credit Suisse, a financial services company, headquartered in Z├╝rich, Switzerland. According to a Securities and Exchange Commission report (CFN: 1-6862) filed August 12, 2005, Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc. now known as Credit Suisse, purchased Select Portfolio Servicing and its parent holding company for $144.4 million. Credit Suisse's Investment Banking Strategy[2] included "the acquisition of Select Portfolio Servicing, a mortgage servicing company."

Credit Suisse Financial Corporation
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Capital, LLC
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC

 York Financial Inc. Owns Archbay Capital who was the one who in DEC 29, 2012 sold the holdings of Archbay to Roosevelt Mortgage Archbay Holdings LLC 2010B. Not Archbay.

US Bank as Custodian/Trustee
US Bank National Association (Warehouse)

But hey, lets not forget, according to my Judge, my house was not a part of this fraud happening around the  country. OK..

Monday, September 23, 2013

Basic Pleading Defects Reveal Fatal Flaws in Foreclosures

by Neil Garfield
I have frequently made the point that if you want to protect your case on appeal, you must have a coherent and accurate record established in the court file or you will be shunted away on a technicality of some sort. The strategy I endorse, and the only one I use is aggressive litigation from the start. This alone will help remove your case from the pile of deadbeat borrowers who are just trying to string out the inevitable. In order to do that, you must reject the paradigm that the debt, loan, note, mortgage, default and notice of default are valid and that the sale was valid. In order to do that you need to do your research. It is my opinion that there is going to be a wave of malpractice suits against lawyers who told their clients "there is nothing you can do."
In most cases, this is not true. There are plenty of defenses, chief among them PAYMENT and denial that the contract was ever formed --- because neither the forecloser nor any of its predecessors loaned any money to the homeowner.
The flip side of the coin is also true. If the other side pleads improperly and fails to prove their case, they have a poor record for appeal and usually won't. Applying basic rules of law and pleading, it is apparent that most foreclosures are based on pleadings that don't have two essential ingredients. They don't allege that the borrower received money from the forecloser or its predecessor and they don't allege financial injury. The first defect leads to the conclusion that there can be no injury if the loan was not made by the forecloser or its predecessors. The second defect fails to invoke the court's jurisdiction.
It is well-settled in the law that in order to invoke the court's jurisdiction the Pleader must allege an injury that is recognizable by law. This allegation is required in every type of lawsuit. It is equally well-settled that the Pleader must allege a short plain statement of ultimate facts upon which relief could be granted. Further, it is well settled that the facts alleged cannot be formulaic conclusions. ---- a point that is always hammered by the Banks when confronted with a claim or counterclaim from homeowners. They are right. But what is good for the goose is good for the gander.
In the days before the dust cloud of sham securitizations a Bank had to allege it made a loan to the homeowner or that it had purchased a loan, or acquired it through merger from an entity that made the loan. Why then are Banks skipping this essential allegation? And why are the Banks avoiding any allegation that they suffered financial injury?
In the old days if a lawyer went to court on an uncontested Motion for Summary Judgment, if his pleading and affidavit did not allege and prove the existence of the loan he was sent packing until he could come back with his papers in order. In other words, in uncontested hearings where the homeowner did not even show up, the Judge denied or continued the Motion for Summary Judgment where the Bank failed to allege the loan and failed to allege financial injury.
Fast forward to 2013. Foreclosers routinely omit any allegation that the borrower received a loan from the entity foreclosing on the house. They routinely omit any allegation of financial injury. Instead, they merely assert they are the holder of the note and mortgage. This is important because allowing the Banks to avoid alleging the existence of the loan shifts the burden of pleading and proof onto the Homeowner, thus leaving the hapless homeowner with the burden of chasing a ghost instead of simply defending their property.
If the Banks were required to plead that a loan was given to the borrower and the lender in that transaction was the Foreclosers or that it had purchased the loan, the Bank has the burden of proving the existence of the loan. So why did Banks stop pleading the loan? And why did they stop pleading financial injury?
The answer is simple. They didn't make the loan and they don't own the loan. Wall Street Banks created a cloud in which they controlled all the appearances and illusions starting with conflicting paperwork given to the lenders (investors) and borrowers (homeowners). If lawyers fail to deny or at least state they are without knowledge as to the essential allegations of the complaint they are making a mistake --- one that will move the case inexorably toward foreclosure. If lawyers fail to seek dismissal of the case or vacation of the notice of sale (non-judicial states) on the basis that that the forecloser does not claim to be the lender or even represent the lender and that the lender does not allege financial injury they are making a mistake that will cost them in the trial court and on appeal.
Most lawyers are timid about taking this position despite the glaring absence of the allegations from the banks. They feel they will make fools of themselves by denying the existence of the debt, note, mortgage, and default when they know their client received a loan. Money was on the table. How can you deny that?
The answer is that if the money didn't come from the payee on the note, the mortgagee on the mortgage, the beneficiary under the deed of trust, then they cannot have any injury. And if they are not the actual owner of an unpaid account receivable, then they cannot submit a credit bid at eh auction. The banks know this. That is why they do a substitution of trustee in 100% of the cases brought to foreclosure in non-judicial states. Because if the original trustee was left there, the trustee might actually do his job --- and inquire where this new beneficiary came from and how they stand to lose any money through non payment by the homeowner.
And there is another reason why the banks avoid such issues like the plague. If they open up the issue of payments and money, then the inquiry in discovery will be about money, where it came from, where it went, who was paid, and when they were paid. If that cloud created by the illusion of securitization contains evidence of a principal agent relationship between the lenders (investors in mortgage bonds) and the third party intermediaries (investment banks and affiliates) then the money received for insurance, CDS, guarantees, and proceeds of sale to the Federal Reserve will reduce the accounts receivable and require a reduction in the accounts payable from the homeowners. And if that happens, the insurers and everyone else are going to be making claims based upon multiple payments on the same claim for a loss that the bank never incurred because it was always playing with investor money.

Are Defendants in Foreclosure Cases Entitled to A Fair And Impartial Courtroom?

Are Defendants in Foreclosure Cases Entitled to A Fair And Impartial Courtroom? Are Foreclosure Courtrooms a “Temple of Justice”?

Complete Plagarization to follow, these words are not my own….they describe the treatment that rapists and child molesters and murders are supposed to receive:
This Court is committed to the doctrine that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. It is the duty of Courts to scrupulously guard this right and to refrain from attempting to exercise jurisdiction in any matter where his qualification to do so is seriously brought in question. The exercise of any other policy tends to discredit the judiciary and shadow the administration of justice. “It is not enough for a judge to assert that he is free from prejudice. His mien and the reflex from his court room speak louder than he can declaim on this point.
If he fails through these avenues to reflect justice and square dealing, his usefulness is destroyed. The attitude of the judge and the atmosphere of the court room should indeed be such that no matter what charge is lodged against a litigant or what cause he is called on to litigate, he can approach the bar with every assurance that he is in a forum where the judicial ermine is everything that it typifies, purity and justice. The guaranty of a fair and impartial trial can mean nothing less than this.
We canonize the courthouse as the temple of justice. There is no more appropriate justification for this than the fact that it is the only place we know where the rich and poor, the good and the vicious, the rake and the rascal—in fact every category of social rectitude and social delinquent—may enter its portal with the assurance that they may controvert their differences in calm and dispassionate environment before an impartial judge and have their rights adjudicated in a fair and just manner. Such a pattern for administering justice inspires confidence. The legend on the seal of this court—’sat cito si recte’ (soon enough if right or just)—embossed on the floor in the rotunda of this building, encourages devotion to such a pattern. Litigation guided by it makes the courthouse the temple of justice. When judges permit their emotions or the misapplication of legal principles to shunt them away from it, they must be reversed. The judge must above all be neutral and his neutrality should be of the tough variety that will not bend or break under stress. He may ask questions to clarify the issues but he should not lean to the prosecution or defense lest it appear that his neutrality is departing from center. The judge’s neutrality should be such that even the defendant will feel that his trial was fair.

The consequence of this departure from the role of apparent neutrality is that defendant must be afforded a new hearing on the alleged violations of probation before a different judge.

The requirement of judicial impartiality is at the core of our system of criminal justice. As our supreme court said in a much quoted and memorable passage:
"This Court is committed to the doctrine that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. It is the duty of Courts to scrupulously guard this right and to refrain from attempting to exercise jurisdiction in any matter where his qualification to do so is seriously brought in question. The exercise of any other policy tends to discredit the judiciary and shadow the administration of justice. "It is not enough for a judge to assert that he is free from prejudice. His mien and the reflex from his court room speak louder than he can declaim on this point. If he fails through these avenues to reflect justice and square dealing, his usefulness is destroyed. The attitude of the judge and the atmosphere of the court room should indeed be such that no matter what charge is lodged against a litigant or what cause he is called on to litigate, he can approach the bar with every assurance that he is in a forum where the judicial ermine is everything that it typifies, purity and justice. The guaranty of a fair and impartial trial can mean nothing less than this."
Unfortunately, I feel I was in this category. 

Don't you love how the GOP works?

Friday, September 20, 2013

Sham Transactions

The more you look at the false claims of securitization the more it stinks. We are dealing with a system that is based on really big lies. I'm sure our leaders of government have a very appealing rationalization why we must pretend the mortgage bonds are real, why we must pretend the mortgages are real, why we must pretend the notes are real, and why we must pretend the debts and defaults are real. But those are lies based on sham transactions. And those lies are based in public policy. And public policy is contrary to law.
My focus is on cases pending in the judicial branch of government. Our system of government was designed to insert the judicial branch into disputes so that fractures in public policy do not cheat citizens out of their basic rights. In this case, the failure of the other two branches of government to include the rights of homeowners is damaging both to the society generally and producing millions of cases of unjust enrichment and displacement of millions of people from their homes in cases, where if all facts were known two facts would be inescapably accepted: (1) mortgages filed as encumbrances against real property were fatally defective and unenforceable and (2) the balance owed on the debt is either impossible to ascertain or zero, with a liability owed to homeowners on the overpayments received in the midst of that opaque cloud we are calling "securitization."
The trigger for the writing of this article is once again coming from BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON as the "Trustee" of vast numbers of REMIC Trusts. Bill Paatalo, a private investigator, uncovered an officer of BONY who is very frustrated with BOA and others who are telling borrowers that BONY is the owner of their loan. Indeed, suits have been brought in the name of BONY without any reference to the trust; and of course suits have been brought in the name of BONY as Trustee of a REMIC Trust, which represents but does not own the loans (the ownership interest being "conveyed" with the issuance of the mortgage bond to investors who were duped into thinking they were buying high grade investments. BONY and DEUTSCH both say such suits are brought without their authorization and have instructed servicer's to cease and desist using the name of Deutsch of BONY MELLON in foreclosure suits.
The problem revealed is contained in an email Paatalo posted from an officer of BONY MELLON, who wants BOA to stop telling people that BONY is the owner of their loans. He says BONY doesn't own the loans and has no right, power or obligation to modify or mitigate damages caused by the borrower failing or stopping payments on the loan they unquestionably received. He says BONY is the Trustee for the loan and denies ownership and further denies the ability or right to modify.
What he doesn't say is what he means by "Trustee for the loan" and why the "trust" should be considered real as a legal person when there is no financial account or assets held in the name of the Trust. Like Reynaldo Reyes at Deutsch Bank, he is basically saying there are no trust assets, there never was any funding of the trust, and there never was an assignment or purchase of the loan by the trust --- for the simple reason that the Trust never had a bank account much less the money to buy loans or anything else.
So Reyes and this newly revealed actor from BONY are saying the same thing. They are Trustees in name only without any duties because no money or assets are in the trust. Which brings us back to the beginning. If the loan was securitized, the Trust would have had a bank account to receive money advanced by investors who were purchasing alleged mortgage bonds that promised that the investor also was an owner of the loans --- an undecided percentage interest in the loans.
That money in the Trust account would have been used to fund or purchase the loan to the borrower. And the Trust would have been the mortgagee or beneficiary on the mortgage or deed of trust. There would have been no need for MERS, or originators or any of the countless sham corporations that are now out of business and who supposedly loaned money to borrowers. If it was real, the records would show the Trust paid for the loan and the recorded documents from the loan closing would clearly show the Trust as the lender.
It is really a very simple deal, if it is real. But complexity was introduced by Wall Street, the effect of which was that the lenders didn't get the loans they were expecting, didn't get the collateral they thought they were getting and didn't even get named as lenders despite the fact that it was investor money that was used to make and acquire the loans. Like the borrowers, investors were stepping into a cloud that intentionally obscured the ownership of the loan.
On the one hand, the Banks covered ownership by the issuance and execution of an Assignment and Assumption Agreement, but that was before any loan applications existed, just like the prospectus and sale of the bonds --- a process known as selling forward on Wall Street. On the other hand, the bonds were issued in the name of the investment banks, a process called Street Name on Wall Street. On the third hand, the loan documents showed neither the investment banks nor the investors or even the REMIC Trusts. instead they showed some other entity as the lender even though the "lender" had advanced mooney whatsoever --- a process later dubbed as "pretender lenders" by me in in my writing and seminars.
By pushing title through pretender lenders and private exchanges that registered title that was never published (like the county recorders' offices publish recorded deeds, mortgages and liens), the Banks created a Cloud which by definition created clouded title to the property, the loan and created a mortgage document that was recorded despite naming the wrong terms and the wrong payee.
Pushing title away from the investors who advanced the money and toward themselves, the Banks were able to play with the money as if it were their own, and even purchase insurance and credit default swaps payable to the banks, who were clearly the intermediary agents of the investors. And the Banks even got the government to guarantee half the loans even though the underwriting standards were ignored --- since the banks had no risk of loss on the loans (they were using investor money and they were getting the right to receive third party payments from the government and private parties). Eventually after the meltdown, the Banks became part of a program where tens of billions of dollars worth of the bogus mortgage bonds owned by the investors were sold to the Federal government (some $50 Billion per month).
Through their creation of the Cloud, the banks were able to take the money of the investors and receive it as their own, concealing the initial theft (skimming) off the top by creating sham proprietary trades. Now they are receiving judgments and deeds from foreclosure auctions based upon their submission of a credit bid that clearly violates the very specific provisions of state statutes that identify who can submit a credit bid rather than cash at the auction. Only the actual owner of the unpaid account receivable has the right to submit a credit bid.
And by the creation of the Cloud judges and lawyers missed the point completely. The result is stripping the investors of value, ownership and right to collect on the loans they advanced. At no time has any Servicer filed a foreclosure in the name of the investors whose money was used to fund the deal. In no case is there any underlying real transaction in which real money was paid and something was received in exchange. The Courts are now the vehicle of public policy and manifest injustice by enforcement of unenforceable mortgages for fabricated notes referring to non existent debts.
The net result is that public policy and government action is contrary to the rule of law.

So Countrywide lives again in PennyMac

Well for those of you who are unaware of who Penny Mac is , these are the good old boys of Countrywide, you know the fraudsters who were up to their necks in the mortgage nightmare.
As an investor I would run not walk to the nearest exit.

 PennyMac CEO Stanford Kurland, who spent most of career at Countrywide, is recreating his old firm.

How nice, bankrupting the country the first time around wasn't enough.  So it's perhaps no surprise that one of the first firms to rush into this profit-filled fun house is headed by the former executives of the most notorious subprime lender of the era that led to the financial crisis. PennyMac (PMT), a finance company run almost entirely by alumni of Countrywide Financial.
 To head the office, PennyMac has tapped Stephen Brandt, who, according to a Congressional report released in July, ran Countrywide's "Friends of Angelo" program. The report found that Brandt's former unit handed out hundreds of sweetheart loans to members of Congress, their staffs and other government employees. One of the main thrusts of the division, according to the report, which was nicknamed after Countrywide's former CEO, Angelo Mozilo, was to soften anti-predatory lending laws.( How nice )
 "There's free money on the table and you don't have to work that hard to get it, especially if you are the former executives of Countrywide," In the past year, though, PennyMac has morphed into something that more resembles Countrywide. PennyMac's stated business plan was to buy up delinquent mortgage loans on the cheap, offer modifications and make some money in the process.( In other words NON PERFORMING LOANS- FORECLOSURES, that these monsters originally created! )

Look up PennyMac created by employees of country wide, you will be shocked.

PennyMac Readies Its First Jumbo Securitization

PennyMac is putting its first jumbo mortgage-backed securities deal in the pipeline, a deal roughly $550 million in size, according to a Kroll presale report.
The $550,462,191 deal is backed by loans with a weighted average first-lien loan-to-value ratio of 69.7% and a combined first- and junior-lien loan-to-value ratio of 70.6%. Merrill Lynch is named as the lead manager for the deal.
“These low ratios exhibit a substantial margin of safety against potential home price declines,” Kroll said in its report. “However, it should be noted that these are the higher WA LTV and WA CLTV ratios seen in a pool rated by KBRA.”
Top originators contributing to the deal are AmeriSave (13.1%), Guaranteed Rate (9.6%), JMAC (8.2%), PRMG (6.3%), RPM (6.2%), Cobalt (6%) and George Mason (5.4%). Geographically, the higher state concentration is found in California (56.5%), the largest loan in the pool is $1.96 million.
Kroll assigned an expected AAA(sf) rating to six classes of exchangeable certificates in the transaction, two of which have 7.75% credit enhancement. It also assigned investment grade expected ratings of AA(sf), A(sf) and BBB(sf) to three tranches, which, respectively, have 5.2%, 3.45% and 2.45% CE.
One class with 1.4% CE received a speculative grade BB(sf) rating and two classes did not receive ratings from Kroll.
The transaction, which will be services by PennyMac, lacks a master servicer.
“In most RMBS transactions, upon a servicer default a master servicer generally steps in to facilitate the continuity of critical servicing functions such as loss mitigation and advancing of principal and interest,” Kroll noted in the presale report. “To mitigate concerns regarding the lack of a master servicer, Citibank NA, as fiscal agent, will be required to make any P&I advance due if the servicer fails to fund such advance.”

Thursday, September 19, 2013

Tell the SEC NO, not this time.. I did

Contact the SEC now and tell them no more slaps on the hands. 

SEC Addresses: Headquarters and Regional Offices

The Securities and Exchange Commission has twelve offices across the country:

SEC Headquarters
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549
(202) 942-8088
contact form:
see also: Electronic Mailboxes at the Commission
Directions for Hand Deliveries & Pick-ups
Atlanta Regional Office
Rhea Kemble Dignam, Regional Director
950 East Paces Ferry, N.E.
Ste 900
Atlanta, GA 30326-1382
(404) 842-7600
State jurisdiction: Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama
Boston Regional Office
John Dugan, Acting Regional Director
33 Arch Street, 23rd Floor
Boston, MA 02110-1424
(617) 573-8900
State jurisdiction: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island
Chicago Regional Office
Tim Warren, Acting Regional Director
175 W. Jackson Boulevard
Suite 900
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 353-7390
State jurisdiction: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin
Denver Regional Office
Julie Lutz and Kevin Goodman, Acting Co-Regional Directors
1801 California Street, Suite 1500
Denver, CO 80202-2656
(303) 844-1000
State jurisdiction: Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming
Fort Worth Regional Office
David Woodcock, Regional Director
Burnett Plaza, Suite 1900
801 Cherry Street, Unit 18
Fort Worth, TX 76102
(817) 978-3821
State jurisdiction: Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kansas (except for the exam program which is administered by the Denver Regional Office)
Los Angeles Regional Office
Michele Wein Layne, Regional Director
5670 Wilshire Boulevard, 11th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90036-3648
(323) 965-3998
State jurisdiction: Arizona, Hawaii, Guam, Nevada, Southern California (zip codes 93599 and below, except for 93200-93299)
Miami Regional Office
Eric I. Bustillo, Regional Director
801 Brickell Ave., Suite 1800
Miami, FL 33131
(305) 982-6300
State jurisdiction: Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico
New York Regional Office
Andrew Calamari, Regional Director
Brookfield Place
200 Vesey Street, Suite 400
New York, NY 10281-1022
State jurisdiction: New York, New Jersey
Philadelphia Regional Office
Daniel M. Hawke, Regional Director
The Mellon Independence Center
701 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1532
(215) 597-3100
State jurisdiction: Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, District of Columbia
Salt Lake Regional Office
Kenneth D. Israel, Jr., Regional Director
15 W. South Temple Street
Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 524-5796
State jurisdiction: Utah
San Francisco Regional Office
Michael S. Dicke, Co-Acting Regional Director
Kristin A. Snyder, Co-Acting Regional Director
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 2800
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 705-2500
State jurisdiction: Washington, Oregon, Alaska, Montana, Idaho, Northern California (zip codes 93600 and up plus 93200-93299)
NO! This is letting them get away with it again. Its like them telling me they were the owner of my Long Beach Washington Mutual mortgage and a year later saying they made a mistake and  didn't own it and using the same damn excuses. NO, this needs to stop. I lost my home because of this abuse.. and I canbet  thousands more.
Let it stop now and this time  charges filed, for once work for the people and the investors, and not just let them off the hook.

You are subscribed to Press Releases from the Securities Exchange Commission. A new press release is now available.
09/19/2013 07:00 AM EDT

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged JPMorgan Chase & Co. with misstating financial results and lacking effective internal controls to detect and prevent its traders from fraudulently overvaluing investments to conceal hundreds of millions of dollars in trading losses.
The SEC previously charged two former JPMorgan traders with committing fraud to hide the massive losses in one of the trading portfolios in the firm’s chief investment office (CIO).  The SEC’s subsequent action against JPMorgan faults its internal controls for failing to ensure that the traders were properly valuing the portfolio, and its senior management for failing to inform the firm’s audit committee about the severe breakdowns in CIO’s internal controls.
JPMorgan has agreed to settle the SEC’s charges by paying a $200 million penalty, admitting the facts underlying the SEC’s charges, and publicly acknowledging that it violated the federal securities laws.
“JPMorgan failed to keep watch over its traders as they overvalued a very complex portfolio to hide massive losses,” said George S. Canellos, Co-Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.  “While grappling with how to fix its internal control breakdowns, JPMorgan’s senior management broke a cardinal rule of corporate governance and deprived its board of critical information it needed to fully assess the company’s problems and determine whether accurate and reliable information was being disclosed to investors and regulators.”
As part of a coordinated global settlement, three other agencies also announced settlements with JPMorgan today: the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.  JPMorgan will pay a total of approximately $920 million in penalties in these actions by the SEC and the other agencies.
According to the SEC’s order instituting a settled administrative proceeding against JPMorgan, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 established important requirements for public companies and their management regarding corporate governance and disclosure.  Public companies such as JPMorgan are required to create and maintain internal controls that provide investors with reasonable assurances that their financial statements are reliable, and ensure that senior management shares important information with key internal decision makers such as the board of directors.  JPMorgan failed to adhere to these requirements, and consequently misstated its financial results in public filings for the first quarter of 2012.
According to the SEC’s order, in late April 2012 after the portfolio began to significantly decline in value, JPMorgan commissioned several internal reviews to assess, among other matters, the effectiveness of the CIO’s internal controls.  From these reviews, senior management learned that the valuation control group within the CIO – whose function was to detect and prevent trader mismarking – was woefully ineffective and insufficiently independent from the traders it was supposed to police.  As JPMorgan senior management learned additional troubling facts about the state of affairs in the CIO, they failed to timely escalate and share that information with the firm’s audit committee.
Among the facts that JPMorgan has admitted in settling the SEC’s enforcement action:
  • The trading losses occurred against a backdrop of woefully deficient accounting controls in the CIO, including spreadsheet miscalculations that caused large valuation errors and the use of subjective valuation techniques that made it easier for the traders to mismark the CIO portfolio.
  • JPMorgan senior management personally rewrote the CIO’s valuation control policies before the firm filed with the SEC its first quarter report for 2012 in order to address the many deficiencies in existing policies.
  • By late April 2012, JPMorgan senior management knew that the firm’s Investment Banking unit used far more conservative prices when valuing the same kind of derivatives held in the CIO portfolio, and that applying the Investment Bank valuations would have led to approximately $750 million in additional losses for the CIO in the first quarter of 2012. 
  • External counterparties who traded with CIO had valued certain positions in the CIO book at $500 million less than the CIO traders did, precipitating large collateral calls against JPMorgan.
  • As a result of the findings of certain internal reviews of the CIO, some executives expressed reservations about signing sub-certifications supporting the CEO and CFO certifications required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
  • Senior management failed to adequately update the audit committee on these and other important facts concerning the CIO before the firm filed its first quarter report for 2012.
  • Deprived of access to these facts, the audit committee was hindered in its ability to discharge its obligations to oversee management on behalf of shareholders and to ensure the accuracy of the firm’s financial statements.
The SEC’s order requires JPMorgan to cease and desist from causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 13a-11, 13a-13, and 13a-15.  The order also requires JPMorgan to pay a $200 million penalty that may be distributed to harmed investors in a Fair Fund distribution.
The SEC’s investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted by Michael Osnato, Steven Rawlings, Peter Altenbach, Joshua Brodsky, Joseph Boryshansky, Daniel Michael, Kapil Agrawal, Eli Bass, Sharon Bryant, Daniel Nigro, and Christopher Mele.  The SEC appreciates the coordination of the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, Federal Reserve, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as well as the assistance of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.

Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist JPMorgan Chase

Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-And-Desist Order

Its also time they do an internal audit of all of Washington Mutual and Long Beach Loans that Chase has. Also the Washington Mutual (WAMU) SEC Filings, as well as Long Beach Mortgages
This is long overdue. 

Wednesday, September 18, 2013

SEC Waking Up: Madoff Conspirators Face Charges — Now About Those Mortgage Bonds

After a long slumber of non-regulation and failure to bring charges for securities fraud the SEC is finally getting into the "game" --- the culture of fraud on Wall Street. When the Madoff story broke it was inconceivably large. $60 Billion generated through a PONZI scheme --- selling securities or taking money under a prospectus that promised that the flow of money would be invested for the benefit of the investors. The hallmark of such schemes is that they eventually fail when people stop buying the securities or depositing money. At that point the money deposited with the fraudster eventually fails to provide the funds necessary to keep paying investors the return they were promised and fails to cash out investors who want their money back. It fails because the scheme was either not to invest the money at all or to seek cover under investments that clearly were never going to be in compliance with the prospectus or any other standard of investment.

So now we ask again, what about the MBS players? Mortgage-backed securities dwarfed the Madoff scheme. $13 trillion-$20 trillion or more was taken from investors under a prospectus that promised funding of mortgages of the highest quality. Like Madoff, the investment bankers took what they wanted before they used the money to pay back investors or fund mortgages. And when they did fund mortgages they intentionally inserted false entities as lenders --- entities with no relationship to the investors. The effect was a conversion of the intended investment into an unsecured loan to either the investment bank or the borrower and no claim to bring against the borrower,directly or indirectly. The secured interest was destroyed and then claimed by the Banks. The claim for repayment was also converted to the benefit of the Banks, who then "traded" in their proprietary account in which the gains were kept by the Bank and the losses were tossed over the fence to the investors under a pooling and servicing agreement that was ignored except for laying off the losses on the investors.

When investors stopped buying MBS the scheme promptly collapsed. Investment banks still continued to advance money to investors directly or indirectly through the subservicers. They did this for the same reason any PONZI operator pays his "investors" (victims) --- to keep them buying into the investment pool and to create the illusion that nothing is wrong. At the same time the Banks were advancing money on alleged mortgage loans, they were declaring loans in default, foreclosing and claiming losses in their "ownership" of the mortgage bonds they had sold to pension funds. Eventually even the taxpayer became an unwitting and unwilling investor to save the world from the brink of economic collapse. It was believed the Banks were in trouble because they had recklessly lost money in risky trades. This was never true.

And now the massive deluge of Foreclosures continues the fraud. Just as the investors were not represented at the closing of alleged mortgage loans, they are not represented in Foreclosures. The banks are foreclosing in their own names --- cutting off the investors completely when the bank takes title to the property at the foreclosure sale --- and cutting off insurers, CDS counter parties, guarantors, and other co-venturers and co-obligors from seeking refunds or forcing the repurchase of the loans that were never subject to any form of underwriting standards of the industry.

The money they took off the top, the money they received from third parties who waived rights to collect from the borrower, was converted from a trade on behalf of their principals --- the investors (victims) who thought that their money was being deposited with the investment bank to fund a REMIC trust. The investor money became the bank's money. The investors' ownership of loans, notes, mortgages, and bonds became the property ofthe banks and so it stays today, except for the settlements with investors who are suing and except for the long list of fines and penalties leveled on the banks for pennies on the dollar. The pending BOA Article 77 hearing in which the insurers are pointing to the incestuous relationship between the "trustees" of the REMIC trusts and the investment banks is starting to come back and haunt both the trustee, who knew there was no funded trust, and the bank that was merely Madoff by another name.

So the payments due to investors stopped or were cut back without credit for the money received by the investment banks as agents of the investors. Thus the account receivable of the investor is kept away from the courts because it would show vastly different balances than the balance claimed by the servicer's and banks. The balance is much lower than what is represented in court. And it probably has been eliminated entirely when the net is cast over principals and agents' receipt of funds. The Foreclosures are wrong. They simply continue the fraud and ratify by judges' orders the theft of money, loans and what should have been notes payable to the investors or the REMIC trust that was never funded -- and therefore could never have purchased the loans.
If the money was applied properly most of the investors would be covered by the money that still remains in the banks that they are claiming as their own capital. Applied properly in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, this would reduce the account receivable from the loans. It would also by definition reduce the corresponding account payable from the borrowers, making modification and settlement easy ---but for the interference of the servicers and investment banks who are trying desperately to hold onto their ill-gotten gains.

We have a victory!!

Judge Rules in Favor of Eminent Domain Over Wells Fargo

"Isn't this, as we say in the trade, a no-brainer?" said U.S. District Court Senior Judge Charles Breyer in court. In an effort to seize underwater mortgages through the use of eminent domain, the city of Richmond, Calif. has scored an early victory over Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo, who has staunchly opposed the use of eminent domain for economic recovery, saw their suit thrown out by a Federal judge because the case wasn’t far enough along. The city of Richmond has yet to determine how it will go about acting on the potential eminent domain seizure.
"Ripeness of these claims does not rest on contingent future events certain to occur but rather on future events that may never occur," said Breyer. "Plaintiffs are not, for example, challenging a proposal of the City Council that may or may not raise constitutional concerns depending on the contours of the final version—put simply, there may never be a 'final version.'"
The lawsuit filed by Wells Fargo on behalf of their investors against the city of Richmond, as well as Mortgage Resolution Partners, the group aiding the city with enacting change and stamping out the Bay Area housing crisis. Perhaps fearing a “domino effect” of sorts, Wells Fargo had been hoping to nip the eminent domain seizure in the bud, however; there are rumblings of the city of San Francisco looking to the Richmond eminent domain method in order to cure some of its own housing woes.
“Our strategies have been, let's be honest, ‘Let’s see what the federal government or the banking industry will do to help these folks,’” said San Francisco District Supervisor David Campos on the steps of City Hall in San Francisco last week. “We’ve waited long enough.”
Last week, the eminent domain plan began going into effect, with Richmond councilmembers voting in favor 4-3 of the motion. “Our residents have been badly harmed by this housing crisis,” Mayor Gayle McLaughlin reportedly said at the time. “The banks have been unwilling or unable to fix this situation, so the city is stepping in to provide a fix.”
The “fix” in question would essentially bring the principal amount closer to the current property’s value, allowing homeowners to more easily make payments on their mortgages. Mortgage Resolution Partners receives around $4,500 per loan as an “advisory fee.” The banks are angry because the city is essentially seizing their assets at a lower price than what they believe is fair, regardless of the perceived market value.

Looking for answers

Hi everyone,
This is a long shot , but hoping someone will know . I am looking for employees of Dana Capital , mostly a man named Joe. He would of worked for them in 2004. I want to know if he knows if my note was securitized . I am sure he will.

Dana Capital Group
Category: Mortgage Brokers 
8001 Irvine Center Drive
Irvine, CA 92618

I am also looking for investors for this security

Roosevelt Mortgage ( bought the loans from Archbay Mortgage LLC 2010B) This would be in Jan- Feb of this year. The actual sale was Dec.29. 2012.
Rushmore - Servicer
US Bank Corp - Trustee 

Inside this security is a loan , stating its worth 180,000.00 , this is NOT true, the house is worth 116,000.00. Their are 3 liens on this house, one is a US FEDERAL Lien for 201,000.00, Plus 32,000.00 Tax lien ( not for the house) and a 19,000.00 lien for Beneficial. 

Their is also , questions concerning the actual ownership of this loan. It was originally with Long Beach Mortgage in 2004- 2010. According to land records. However DB Structured Products claimed to of bought it in Sept 2006, but their is no assignment, no land records , nothing they proved to of bought it. In 2010 Deutsche Bank sold it to Archbay holdings LLC 2010B, with a robo signed document, yet, never showed how they were able to sell it, when no land records showed they owned it . ( title now no good) Than in 2011 Chase  claims to own it, ( received by Washington Mutual) Archbay and Deutsche Bank lawyers also have a robo signed assignment signed 6 years after the fact , stating it came from Chase, which Chase has also denied in doing, and was to be sent back to a M.E. Wilderman at Orion Financial group. ( 2nd title defect) Archbay never showed how they were able to buy it, also , why would they request an emerg assignment from Chase , if they in fact had all the required paperwork to buy it? Why robo signed? Why an incomplete assignment? Why if Chase did this , they state they didn't?  Now it was sold to Roosevelt mortgage Dec 29, 2012. 

I want to buy the house and pay in cash . Or I go to federal court and everyone loses. This house has been in foreclosure since May 2006, my only fault was taking on this loan when I didn't have to , and all I wanted was to know who owned it to pay for it. I never asked for a free ride , every work out was walked away from , not by me.

Please contact me , if you can help in this matter.

So what has changed?

Two years ago today, demonstrators descended on Zuccotti Park in New York City's financial district. Their focus, economic injustice, was clear in the name the movement would take: Occupy Wall Street.
Since then, nearly 8,000 Occupy protesters have been arrested fighting to fix a series of problems they feel are plaguing the nation. Have their efforts been for naught?
1. The gap between the rich and poor is still growing.
occupy los angeles
The U.S. continues to be plagued by the worst income inequality in the developed world. In fact, according to one measure, income inequality grew faster under President Obama than under President George W. Bush.
2. The Robin Hood Tax has yet to be implemented.
occupy protest
The Occupy Movement called for a tax on all Wall Street transactions. While the European Commission has proposed a similar tax on its financial institutions, it has yet to be pushed forward in the U.S. Supporters plan to continue rallying for it Tuesday during demonstrations in New York.
3. The student loan debt problem is only getting worse.
occupy protest
Obama recently signed a measure to lower interest rates for student loans. Still, total outstanding student loan debt has surpassed $1 trillion while the average borrower is more than $26,000 in debt. Over the course of a lifetime, average student loan debt could cost a household $208,000.
4. The Volcker Rule has still not passed.
occupy protest
The rule, named after former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, was written as part of the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill to protect customers from risky bank behavior. Despite support from Obama and Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew, the rule remains unfinished.
5. The housing market has begun posting signs of recovery.
occupy protest
The number of homes entering foreclosure is down sharply, and prices are on the rise. This has led to a fear (unimaginable until recently) that prices are going up too fast.
6. Politicians continue to prioritize the wealthy.
occupy new york
Occupiers decried the influence of the 1 percent on politics. Unfortunately, not much has changed. The issues politicians care about are more likely to match up with the issues their wealthy constituents are concerned about as well. One prominent example: Rich Americans are much more likely to be concerned about the budget deficit than their average counterparts, a March study found. Another unfortunate result of the wealthy's outsized influence on politics is that democracy has done little to counterbalance income inequality, a study published in the most recent issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives found.
7. Corporations are still allowed to spend an unlimited amount on political campaigns.
occupy new york
Despite protests from Occupiers and even some state governments, the Supreme Court's Citizens United decision, which allowed for unlimited political spending by corporations, unions and other entities, has yet to be overturned. A full 62 percent of Americans oppose this unlimited flow of corporate money into politics.